Case todayBrokenAnalyst downgrade · Sep 29, 2026The case · holding · Oct 13, 2026Own FICO if its score franchise keeps enough pricing power despite regulatory and alternative-score pressure.5 conditions4 strengthening · 1 holdingNext resultsJan 27, 2027Projected from its filing dates

FICO at a glance

The past year

Chart

−59.5% $720.17, close Nov 13

From the highest close
−61.0%
Vs the 200-day average
−33.4%
Nov 12, 2025Daily close, Fair IsaacNov 13, 2026

Short interest

History

2.5M shares

Of shares outstanding
11.8%
Since the last report
+4.3%
Days to cover
3.1 days
Settled
Oct 30, 2026

Congress and officials

Trades

2 trades, 90 days

Buys / sells
0 / 2
Filers
1

Insider buying, 7 days

Filings

None filed this week

Form 4s filed
Nov 8 – Nov 14

Top investors

Funds

2 of 37 funds hold it

Chuck Akre
5.0%
Terry Smith
0.2%
Latest 13F filings
2 added · 0 cut

Understand the Business

Why the Stock Moved

Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.

FICO price history

Latest price$720.19Today+$2.81 (+0.39%)
FICO +1.54%S&P 500 -2.05%Since first plotted close
4 hours

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Investment thesis

What must happen next

5 MATERIAL PROPOSITIONS
  • FICO’s score franchise remains embedded enough in lender and mortgage-market workflows that price and usage gains continue to convert into revenue rather than triggering broad substitution.StrengtheningMateriality: High

    GAAP annual revenue increased to $1.991 billion in FY2025 from $1.718 billion in FY2024 and $1.378 billion in FY2022. If the score standard holds, FICO can keep compounding with limited capital; if substitution becomes credible, the highest-quality part of the franchise is impaired.

    Watch: FHFA, Fannie Mae, or Freddie Mac implementation choices make VantageScore 4.0 or other models practical substitutes for FICO in mortgage origination.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    GAAP annual revenue increased to $1.991 billion in FY2025 from $1.718 billion in FY2024 and $1.378 billion in FY2022.

    Open source ↗
  • FICO’s analytics IP and software delivery model keep incremental revenue highly profitable because customers are paying for standardized risk intelligence rather than labor-intensive customization.StrengtheningMateriality: High

    GAAP annual operating income was $924.9 million in FY2025, up from $733.6 million in FY2024 and $542.4 million in FY2022. This is what turns franchise strength into owner earnings; if delivery becomes services-heavy or price competition rises, growth would be much less valuable.

    Watch: Large lenders require bespoke implementations, indemnities, or service commitments that make deployments more labor-intensive.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    GAAP annual operating income was $924.9 million in FY2025, up from $733.6 million in FY2024 and $542.4 million in FY2022.

    Open source ↗
  • FICO’s broader decisioning and analytics software remains important enough to diversify the business beyond a single mortgage-score pricing lever.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium

    GAAP annual gross profit was $1.637 billion in FY2025, up from $1.369 billion in FY2024 and $1.075 billion in FY2022. A broader analytics platform would make the franchise more durable; if customers view FICO mainly as an expensive score vendor, regulatory and substitution risk matters more.

    Watch: Banks standardize fraud, decisioning, and customer-management systems on Experian, TransUnion, Equifax, SAS, NICE Actimize, or internal machine-learning platforms.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    GAAP annual gross profit was $1.637 billion in FY2025, up from $1.369 billion in FY2024 and $1.075 billion in FY2022.

    Open source ↗
  • FICO’s asset-light economics generate enough operating cash flow to fund shareholder returns and per-share compounding without needing heavy reinvestment.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium

    GAAP annual operating cash flow was $778.8 million in FY2025 versus GAAP net income of $651.9 million. The investment case depends on cash conversion, not accounting growth alone; if cash flow weakens, buybacks and debt tolerance become much less attractive.

    Watch: Customers push for slower payment terms, usage-based concessions, or contract structures that reduce cash conversion.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    GAAP annual operating cash flow was $778.8 million in FY2025 versus GAAP net income of $651.9 million.

    Open source ↗
  • The same capital allocation that boosts per-share value also raises fragility because FICO carries substantial liabilities and negative book equity, leaving less room if the franchise stumbles.HoldingMateriality: Medium

    GAAP liabilities were $3.614 billion at FY2025 year-end, up from $2.681 billion at FY2024 year-end. Leverage can amplify equity returns while the moat holds, but it can also force a change in buybacks or investment if cash flows are pressured.

    Watch: A credit-score pricing shock reduces cash flow while debt and interest obligations remain fixed.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    GAAP liabilities were $3.614 billion at FY2025 year-end, up from $2.681 billion at FY2024 year-end.

    Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence

Loading the original research archive…

Original research

FICO’s score franchise remains embedded enough in lender and mortgage-market workflows that price and usage gains continue to convert into revenue rather than triggering broad substitution. If the score standard holds, FICO can keep compounding with limited capital; if substitution becomes credible, the highest-quality part of the franchise is impaired.

FICO’s analytics IP and software delivery model keep incremental revenue highly profitable because customers are paying for standardized risk intelligence rather than labor-intensive customization. This is what turns franchise strength into owner earnings; if delivery becomes services-heavy or price competition rises, growth would be much less valuable.

FICO’s broader decisioning and analytics software remains important enough to diversify the business beyond a single mortgage-score pricing lever. A broader analytics platform would make the franchise more durable; if customers view FICO mainly as an expensive score vendor, regulatory and substitution risk matters more.

FICO’s asset-light economics generate enough operating cash flow to fund shareholder returns and per-share compounding without needing heavy reinvestment. The investment case depends on cash conversion, not accounting growth alone; if cash flow weakens, buybacks and debt tolerance become much less attractive.

The same capital allocation that boosts per-share value also raises fragility because FICO carries substantial liabilities and negative book equity, leaving less room if the franchise stumbles. Leverage can amplify equity returns while the moat holds, but it can also force a change in buybacks or investment if cash flows are pressured.

All standing thesis claims
Original report summary

its score franchise keeps enough pricing power despite regulatory and alternative-score pressure.

Evidence assessed Oct 13, 2026. Expand each conclusion for its evidence and what would change it. Thesis evidence—not a buy or sell recommendation.

Bull case and bear case

Bull case and bear case for Fair Isaac

Where the evidence on Fair Isaac stands: Holding on the latest evidence (Oct 13, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 4 strengthening and 1 holding.

Bull case: what the evidence supports

  • FICO’s score franchise remains embedded enough in lender and mortgage-market workflows that price and usage gains continue to convert into revenue rather than triggering broad substitution.

    sec.gov ↗

  • FICO’s analytics IP and software delivery model keep incremental revenue highly profitable because customers are paying for standardized risk intelligence rather than labor-intensive customization.

    sec.gov ↗

  • FICO’s broader decisioning and analytics software remains important enough to diversify the business beyond a single mortgage-score pricing lever.

    sec.gov ↗

  • FICO’s asset-light economics generate enough operating cash flow to fund shareholder returns and per-share compounding without needing heavy reinvestment.

    sec.gov ↗

  • The same capital allocation that boosts per-share value also raises fragility because FICO carries substantial liabilities and negative book equity, leaving less room if the franchise stumbles.

    sec.gov ↗

Bear case: what would count against it

  • FHFA, Fannie Mae, or Freddie Mac implementation choices make VantageScore 4.0 or other models practical substitutes for FICO in mortgage origination.

    sec.gov ↗

  • Large lenders require bespoke implementations, indemnities, or service commitments that make deployments more labor-intensive.

    sec.gov ↗

  • Banks standardize fraud, decisioning, and customer-management systems on Experian, TransUnion, Equifax, SAS, NICE Actimize, or internal machine-learning platforms.

    sec.gov ↗

Company research

Research on Fair Isaac

Thesis-Break Engine

What has broken in Fair Isaac’s thesis

Each break OptimistFi flagged on Fair Isaac, dated — with what has historically followed the same kind of break across the market, not a forecast for Fair Isaac.

peers+14%-15%-1%12 mo agonow+6 mo
Daily price, then where similar breaks led across the market: the typical -1% path vs comparable companies over six months, inside the middle-half range (+14% to -15%). A base rate, not a forecast.
  • Analyst downgradecondition set before this filing

    Across all companies, this kind of break has happened 12,641 times before. Those stocks trailed comparable companies by a median of 1% over the next six months, and 33% of them trailed it by 10 points or more.

How the Thesis-Break Engine works →Historical outcomes are measured against comparable companies after past breaks of the same kind, across all companies. Not a prediction.

MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT

The numbers behind the thesis

Sourced from filings and market data

What Changed

  1. Mixed
    Costs associated with exit or disposal activities.

    Fair Isaac filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-10-06: Costs associated with exit or disposal activities. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.

  2. Mixed
    Reported results of operations (earnings release).

    Fair Isaac filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-07-29: Reported results of operations (earnings release). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.

  3. Mixed
    Entered a material definitive agreement.

    Fair Isaac filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-06-08: Entered a material definitive agreement. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.

Risks / falsifiers

What could break the thesis

  • FHFA, Fannie Mae, or Freddie Mac implementation choices make VantageScore 4.0 or other models practical substitutes for FICO in mortgage origination.
  • Large lenders require bespoke implementations, indemnities, or service commitments that make deployments more labor-intensive.
  • Banks standardize fraud, decisioning, and customer-management systems on Experian, TransUnion, Equifax, SAS, NICE Actimize, or internal machine-learning platforms.
  • Customers push for slower payment terms, usage-based concessions, or contract structures that reduce cash conversion.
  • A credit-score pricing shock reduces cash flow while debt and interest obligations remain fixed.

FICO news

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Financial statements

FICO income statement

Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.

FICO: quick answers

When does Fair Isaac (FICO) report earnings next?
Fair Isaac's next results are projected for January 27, 2027, from the dates of its own results filings with the SEC. The company has not confirmed the date. It last reported on November 4, 2026. Earnings calendar
What is FICO's short interest?
As of October 30, 2026, 2.5M FICO shares were sold short, 11.8% of its shares outstanding, up 4.3% from the count before. At the stock's average daily volume that is 3.1 days to cover. FINRA publishes the count twice a month. FICO short interest history
Have members of Congress traded FICO?
Reports made public in the last 90 days disclose 2 trades in FICO by 1 filer: 0 purchases and 2 sales. They are filed under the STOCK Act by members of Congress, the President and senior officials. Every disclosed FICO trade
Which well-known investors own FICO?
2 of the 37 well-known funds tracked here reported FICO shares in their latest 13F filings. By share of the fund's portfolio: Akre Capital Management (Chuck Akre), 5.0%; Fundsmith (Terry Smith), 0.2%. Fund portfolios

FICO in well-known investors’ portfolios

2 of 37 funds reported FICO shares in their latest 13F filing. A 13F shows quarter-end positions and arrives up to 45 days later.

FundOf its portfolioValueChangeQuarter
Chuck AkreAkre Capital Management5.0%$223M+3.9%Q3 2026
Terry SmithFundsmith0.16%$21.4MNewQ2 2026

Every fund’s portfolio

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