VST at a glance
The past year
Chart−28.9% $124.09, close Nov 19
- From the highest close
- −31.1%
- Vs the 200-day average
- −18.0%
Short interest
History10.3M shares
- Of shares outstanding
- 3.05%
- Since the last report
- +4.0%
- Days to cover
- 1.9 days
- Settled
- Oct 30, 2026
Insider buying, 7 days
FilingsNone filed this week
- Form 4s filed
- Nov 14 – Nov 20
Top investors
Funds4 of 37 funds hold it
- David Tepper
- 3.9%
- Ray Dalio
- 0.1%
- Maverick Capital
- 0.0%
- Latest 13F filings
- 1 added · 3 cut
Understand the Business
- Customers buy retail electricity and gas, while wholesale buyers pay for energy, capacity and grid services; Vistra captures value when its owned generation serves those needs efficiently.↗
- Large technology customers now contract directly for nuclear clean power, shifting part of Vistra’s value from volatile spot markets toward long-duration power purchase agreements.↗↗
Why this business is different
- Energy Harbor made Vistra a scaled competitive nuclear owner with a large retail base, a combination that few merchant power companies can replicate quickly.↗↗
- The disadvantage is exposure: Vistra lacks regulated guaranteed returns, so commodity prices, hedging, retail switching and plant availability still drive cash flow.↗↗
What could matter next
- Meta and the Comanche Peak customer contracts must begin and ramp as planned; that would turn nuclear scarcity into contracted earnings instead of merely a power-market theme.↗↗
- Helix could create a new route to serve AI infrastructure demand, but Vistra still needs actual projects and returns that justify its capital commitment.↗
Why the Stock Moved
- September 2025 · Customer contracts nuclear: The customer deal moved Comanche Peak toward long-duration contracted clean-power economics. The 20-year Comanche Peak agreement targets 1,200 MW, beginning in Q4 2027 and reaching full supply by 2032. Contracting could reduce future merchant exposure.↗
- August 2024 · Earnings opportunity rises: The company reframed 2025 earnings as higher and more visible. August 2024 raised the 2025 adjusted EBITDA midpoint opportunity by $200 million to $5.2–5.7 billion. Higher forward earnings expectations supported greater cash-return and growth-investment capacity.↗
- March 2024 · Nuclear scale closes: The close made Vistra a larger integrated nuclear-and-retail platform. Vistra completed Energy Harbor, adding zero-carbon generation and retail customers. More nuclear output increased the earnings base and optionality for long-term clean-power agreements.↗
VST price history
Loading recent earnings…
Investment thesis
What must happen next
The stock depends on tight power markets translating into future contracted prices, not only today’s protected hedge book.HoldingMateriality: High
By August 3, Vistra had hedged 100% of expected 2026 generation and 94% of 2027. Higher spot prices therefore do not immediately become company cash flow. Vistra earns more when scarce, reliable generation and capacity are valuable; hedges reduce volatility but do not eliminate exposure to future market resets.
Watch: Power-market conditions must keep forward energy and capacity values high enough to renew hedges at attractive levels.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Merchant generation earns no guaranteed regulated return and remains exposed to future wholesale-price resets.
Open source ↗Most near-term generation was hedged, limiting immediate participation in higher spot prices.
Open source ↗The thesis needs data-center power contracts to become durable cash flows rather than announcements with delayed delivery.StrengtheningMateriality: High
Comanche Peak deliveries are expected from Q4 2027, reaching full volume by 2032. Meta purchases begin late 2026, while its 433 MW uprates extend the ramp through 2034. Large technology customers can convert nuclear output from merchant commodity exposure into longer-duration contracted revenue and help justify nuclear life-extension investments.
Watch: The investment-grade customer and Meta agreements must begin on time, expand as planned, and support required nuclear uprates and license work.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
The customer is unnamed; the twenty-year agreement includes extension options and a multi-year delivery ramp.
Open source ↗Meta contracted existing generation and future uprates; the full 2,609 MW is not all new capacity.
Open source ↗Vistra must keep assets available when power prices and capacity obligations make each megawatt most valuable.HoldingMateriality: High
Vistra reported at least 97% fleet commercial availability during recent Texas and PJM extreme-heat periods, not an annual capacity factor or guarantee of future performance. Vistra’s earnings machine relies on physical generation availability during high-value hours; outages can erase scarcity upside and create replacement-power costs.
Watch: The fleet must avoid extended nuclear, gas, coal, solar or battery outages during peak demand and capacity-performance periods.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Management reported strong availability during recent heat; maintenance and outage risk remain.
Open source ↗The model needs retail demand to remain a stabilizing outlet for generation, not a margin drag in volatile markets.UnclearMateriality: High
Retail adjusted EBITDA rose to $773 million from $756 million in Q2, but first-half retail earnings fell to $841 million from $940 million. Retail load gives Vistra customer demand to serve and a channel for integrated supply, but customer switching and bad load forecasting can hurt margins.
Watch: Retail customer counts and supply-cost matching must remain stable in competitive markets, especially during weather and price spikes.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Retail load and generation are partly offsetting businesses, but switching and supply-cost mismatches can hurt earnings.
Open source ↗Q2 retail improvement did not reverse its first-half year-over-year decline.
Open source ↗Capital allocation must avoid turning the AI-power opportunity into speculative spending without contracted returns.UnclearMateriality: High
Helix includes an initial Vistra commitment of up to $1 billion. The August update still described Cogentrix as pending, so regulatory approval was not a completed acquisition. Per-share value depends on growth investments earning enough contracted cash flow to justify their capital cost and execution risk.
Watch: Helix and other growth investments must produce contracted power economics that exceed their capital cost and execution risk.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Vistra is Helix’s preferred power provider and potential capital contributor, not the recipient of $1 billion in power revenue.
Open source ↗Reported operating cash must cover plant investment and shareholder returns without depending on adjusted earnings alone.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium
H1 operating cash rose to $2.222 billion from $1.171 billion; capital expenditure including nuclear fuel and service prepayments was $1.572 billion. Free cash flow before growth excludes working-capital and margin-deposit movements and is not unadjusted cash left after all investment.
Watch: Watch operating cash, nuclear-fuel and growth spending, margin collateral, and debt-funded capital returns.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
The six-month cash statement supports cash recovery, while adjusted free cash flow before growth removes selected cash uses.
Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence
Loading the original research archive…
Original research
The stock depends on tight power markets translating into future contracted prices, not only today’s protected hedge book. Vistra earns more when scarce, reliable generation and capacity are valuable; hedges reduce volatility but do not eliminate exposure to future market resets.
The thesis needs data-center power contracts to become durable cash flows rather than announcements with delayed delivery. Large technology customers can convert nuclear output from merchant commodity exposure into longer-duration contracted revenue and help justify nuclear life-extension investments.
Vistra must keep assets available when power prices and capacity obligations make each megawatt most valuable. Vistra’s earnings machine relies on physical generation availability during high-value hours; outages can erase scarcity upside and create replacement-power costs.
The model needs retail demand to remain a stabilizing outlet for generation, not a margin drag in volatile markets. Retail load gives Vistra customer demand to serve and a channel for integrated supply, but customer switching and bad load forecasting can hurt margins.
Capital allocation must avoid turning the AI-power opportunity into speculative spending without contracted returns. Per-share value depends on growth investments earning enough contracted cash flow to justify their capital cost and execution risk.
Reported operating cash must cover plant investment and shareholder returns without depending on adjusted earnings alone. Free cash flow before growth excludes working-capital and margin-deposit movements and is not unadjusted cash left after all investment.
All standing thesis claims
Original report summary
competitive power demand stays tight, its nuclear and gas fleet keeps running reliably, and long-term clean-power contracts convert into durable cash generation.
Since this case
What has happened since Sep 29, 2026
The case above was written from evidence through Sep 29, 2026 and stays as written. This part is read from SEC filings and closing prices each time the page is built, so it moves as new reports are filed.
- Results
- The financial statements could not be read just now.
- Share price
- The price since this case could not be read just now.
- Filings
- The filings since this case could not be read just now.
- Insiders
- Insider filings since this case could not be read just now.
- Conditions
- None of the conditions the Thesis-Break Engine checks has crossed on Vistra since Sep 29, 2026.
Bull case and bear case
Bull case and bear case for Vistra Corp.
Where the evidence on Vistra disagrees: Strengthening on the latest evidence (Sep 29, 2026). Of its 6 thesis points, 2 strengthening, 2 holding and 2 unclear.
Bull case: what the evidence supports
The stock depends on tight power markets translating into future contracted prices, not only today’s protected hedge book.
The thesis needs data-center power contracts to become durable cash flows rather than announcements with delayed delivery.
Vistra must keep assets available when power prices and capacity obligations make each megawatt most valuable.
Reported operating cash must cover plant investment and shareholder returns without depending on adjusted earnings alone.
Bear case: what the evidence questions
The model needs retail demand to remain a stabilizing outlet for generation, not a margin drag in volatile markets.
Capital allocation must avoid turning the AI-power opportunity into speculative spending without contracted returns.
Thesis-Break Engine
Thesis-break watch · Vistra
No break has crossed Vistra’s thesis. Its break conditions are checked against every new filing as it lands.
MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT
The numbers behind the thesis
What Changed
- MixedQ2 earnings improve, with acquired contribution
Q2 ongoing adjusted EBITDA rose 31% to $1.767 billion, helped by acquired Lotus plants and higher realized prices. GAAP net income fell to $305 million from $327 million. Guidance was reaffirmed and excludes pending Cogentrix and Meta PPAs.
- MixedAI-infrastructure channel opens, economics still unproven
Vistra announced Helix with KKR, Kuwait Investment Authority and NVIDIA, including an initial commitment of up to $1 billion. Preferred power-provider status offers a route to customers, but does not establish realized sales or investment returns.
- SupportiveMeta adds long-duration nuclear demand
Meta signed 20-year nuclear power purchase agreements covering existing output and future uprates. The agreements strengthen the nuclear growth story, although full capacity is scheduled to come online over years rather than immediately.
Risks / falsifiers
What could break the thesis
- Power-market conditions must keep forward energy and capacity values high enough to renew hedges at attractive levels.
- The investment-grade customer and Meta agreements must begin on time, expand as planned, and support required nuclear uprates and license work.
- The fleet must avoid extended nuclear, gas, coal, solar or battery outages during peak demand and capacity-performance periods.
- Retail customer counts and supply-cost matching must remain stable in competitive markets, especially during weather and price spikes.
- Helix and other growth investments must produce contracted power economics that exceed their capital cost and execution risk.
- Watch operating cash, nuclear-fuel and growth spending, margin collateral, and debt-funded capital returns.
VST news
Loading headlines…
Financial statements
VST income statement
Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.
VST: quick answers
- When does Vistra (VST) report earnings next?
- Vistra's next results are projected for February 25, 2027, from the dates of its own results filings with the SEC. The company has not confirmed the date. It last reported on November 6, 2026. Earnings calendar
- What is VST's short interest?
- As of October 30, 2026, 10.3M VST shares were sold short, 3.05% of its shares outstanding, up 4.0% from the count before. At the stock's average daily volume that is 1.9 days to cover. FINRA publishes the count twice a month. VST short interest history
- Which well-known investors own VST?
- 4 of the 37 well-known funds tracked here reported VST shares in their latest 13F filings. By share of the fund's portfolio: Appaloosa (David Tepper), 3.9%; Bridgewater Associates (Ray Dalio), 0.1%; Maverick Capital, 0.0%. Fund portfolios
VST in well-known investors’ portfolios
4 of 37 funds reported VST shares in their latest 13F filing. A 13F shows quarter-end positions and arrives up to 45 days later.
| Fund | Of its portfolio | Value | Change | Quarter |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| David TepperAppaloosa | 3.9% | $293M | −4.5% | Q3 2026 |
| Ray DalioBridgewater Associates | 0.10% | $23.1M | −77.8% | Q3 2026 |
| Maverick Capital | 0.01% | $1.4M | New | Q3 2026 |
| George SorosSoros Fund Management | 0.00% | $201K | −65.6% | Q3 2026 |

