TMS at a glance
The past year
Chart−100.0% $3.94, close Nov 20
- From the highest close
- −100.0%
- Vs the 200-day average
- −100.0%
Short interest
History665,461 shares
- Of shares outstanding
- 0.92%
- Since the last report
- +47.7%
- Days to cover
- 8.6 days
- Settled
- Oct 30, 2026
Insider buying, 7 days
Filings$109,530 bought on the open market
- Purchases
- 1
- Form 4s filed
- Nov 16 – Nov 22
Understand the Business
Why the Stock Moved
Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.
TMS price history
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Investment thesis
What must happen next
Value creation depends on integration-driven margin improvement: operating margins must reverse the FY2025 operating loss as cost synergies and same-store improvements scale.HoldingMateriality: High
operating_income = -9113588 (annual, period_end 2025) — shows current operating loss to be reversed. If operating_income improves to break‑even and then positive, the business can fund growth and reduce leverage; if not, persistent operating losses will force refinancing or dilution and destroy equity value.
Watch: Failure to achieve realized cost synergies or same-store sales gains (e.g., competition from national e-commerce or large rollups undercutting pricing).
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
operating_income = -9113588 (annual, period_end 2025) — shows current operating loss to be reversed.
Open source ↗The company’s large post‑combination liabilities relative to equity constrain strategic optionality and mean debt servicing is a gating factor for value creation.StrengtheningMateriality: High
liabilities = 462,109,000 (instant, period_end 2025). High liabilities increase the importance of operating cash flow and refinancing; if debt cannot be serviced or refinanced on reasonable terms, equity holders face dilution or restructuring.
Watch: Inability to refinance or execute covenant cures leading to acceleration or a creditor‑led restructuring.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
liabilities = 462,109,000 (instant, period_end 2025).
Open source ↗The company must convert to positive operating cash flow to be self‑funding; otherwise it will rely on external equity or asset sales that dilute or limit upside.HoldingMateriality: Medium
operating_cash_flow = -1275338 (annual, period_end 2025) — current cash burn from operations. Positive operating_cash_flow enables debt reduction and internal investment; persistent negative operating cash flow increases default or dilution risk.
Watch: Need for additional capital via PIPE or equity raises on unfavorable terms if operations do not turn cash‑positive.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
operating_cash_flow = -1275338 (annual, period_end 2025) — current cash burn from operations.
Open source ↗Equity upside requires a clear, demonstrated path from FY2025 net losses to sustainable profitability; absent visible progress in net_income trends, the equity is a levered bet on turnaround execution.WeakeningMateriality: Medium
net_income = -16495381 (annual, period_end 2025) — material net loss in the first full year post‑combination. A sustained return to positive net_income would validate that margins and scale economics work; continued net losses imply value is primarily in restructuring or refinancing, not operational improvement.
Watch: If non‑operational charges mask underlying operational improvement (or conversely, one‑time gains make a turnaround look better than it is), trend in net_income can be misleading.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
net_income = -16495381 (annual, period_end 2025) — material net loss in the first full year post‑combination.
Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence
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Original research
Value creation depends on integration-driven margin improvement: operating margins must reverse the FY2025 operating loss as cost synergies and same-store improvements scale. If operating_income improves to break‑even and then positive, the business can fund growth and reduce leverage; if not, persistent operating losses will force refinancing or dilution and destroy equity value.
The company’s large post‑combination liabilities relative to equity constrain strategic optionality and mean debt servicing is a gating factor for value creation. High liabilities increase the importance of operating cash flow and refinancing; if debt cannot be serviced or refinanced on reasonable terms, equity holders face dilution or restructuring.
The company must convert to positive operating cash flow to be self‑funding; otherwise it will rely on external equity or asset sales that dilute or limit upside. Positive operating_cash_flow enables debt reduction and internal investment; persistent negative operating cash flow increases default or dilution risk.
Equity upside requires a clear, demonstrated path from FY2025 net losses to sustainable profitability; absent visible progress in net_income trends, the equity is a levered bet on turnaround execution. A sustained return to positive net_income would validate that margins and scale economics work; continued net losses imply value is primarily in restructuring or refinancing, not operational improvement.
All standing thesis claims
Original report summary
Teamshares is a post‑SPAC owner-operator of a retail business whose value will be created (or destroyed) by integration-driven margin expansion and the ability to convert cash from operations to service substantial post‑combination liabilities without.
Bull case and bear case
Bull case and bear case for Teamshares
Where the evidence on Teamshares disagrees: Mixed on the latest evidence (Nov 22, 2026). Of its 4 thesis points, 1 strengthening, 2 holding and 1 weakening.
Bull case: what the evidence supports
Value creation depends on integration-driven margin improvement: operating margins must reverse the FY2025 operating loss as cost synergies and same-store improvements scale.
The company’s large post‑combination liabilities relative to equity constrain strategic optionality and mean debt servicing is a gating factor for value creation.
The company must convert to positive operating cash flow to be self‑funding; otherwise it will rely on external equity or asset sales that dilute or limit upside.
Bear case: what the evidence questions
Equity upside requires a clear, demonstrated path from FY2025 net losses to sustainable profitability; absent visible progress in net_income trends, the equity is a levered bet on turnaround execution.
Thesis-Break Engine
What has broken in Teamshares’s thesis
Each break OptimistFi flagged on Teamshares, dated — with what has historically followed the same kind of break across the market, not a forecast for Teamshares.
- CEO / officer changecondition set before this filing
Across all companies, this kind of break has happened 16,849 times before. Those stocks trailed comparable companies by a median of 2% over the next six months, and 38% of them trailed it by 10 points or more.
MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT
The numbers behind the thesis
What Changed
- MixedReported results of operations (earnings release).
Teamshares filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-11-16: Reported results of operations (earnings release). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedEntered a material definitive agreement.
Teamshares filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-10-19: Entered a material definitive agreement. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedEntered a material definitive agreement.
Teamshares filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-09-23: Entered a material definitive agreement. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
Risks / falsifiers
What could break the thesis
- Failure to achieve realized cost synergies or same-store sales gains (e.g., competition from national e-commerce or large rollups undercutting pricing).
- Inability to refinance or execute covenant cures leading to acceleration or a creditor‑led restructuring.
- Need for additional capital via PIPE or equity raises on unfavorable terms if operations do not turn cash‑positive.
- If non‑operational charges mask underlying operational improvement (or conversely, one‑time gains make a turnaround look better than it is), trend in net_income can be misleading.
TMS news
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Financial statements
TMS income statement
Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.
TMS: quick answers
- What is TMS's short interest?
- As of October 30, 2026, 665,461 TMS shares were sold short, 0.92% of its shares outstanding, up 47.7% from the count before. At the stock's average daily volume that is 8.6 days to cover. FINRA publishes the count twice a month. TMS short interest history

