TE at a glance
The past year
Chart−57.8% $1.29, close Nov 19
- From the highest close
- −89.3%
- Vs the 200-day average
- −77.1%
Short interest
History79.1M shares
- Of shares outstanding
- 26.3%
- Since the last report
- +7.6%
- Days to cover
- 4.5 days
- Settled
- Oct 30, 2026
Insider buying, 7 days
FilingsNone filed this week
- Form 4s filed
- Nov 14 – Nov 20
Top investors
Funds1 of 37 funds hold it
- George Soros
- 0.0%
- Latest 13F filings
- 1 added · 0 cut
Understand the Business
Why the Stock Moved
Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.
TE price history
Loading recent earnings…
Investment thesis
What must happen next
Customer qualification of T1’s post-FREYR energy-device manufacturing capacity becomes repeat purchasing rather than one-time ramp demand.HoldingMateriality: High
GAAP annual revenue increased from $2.942 million in FY2024 to $755.295 million in FY2025. If repeat demand is real, T1 has a path to scale; if customers do not re-order, the revenue base is not investable.
Watch: Large customers qualify First Solar, Qcells, Canadian Solar, or lower-cost Asian-linked suppliers instead of renewing with T1.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual revenue increased from $2.942 million in FY2024 to $755.295 million in FY2025.
Open source ↗Manufacturing learning, utilization, and procurement discipline improve unit economics as volume scales; otherwise T1 remains a low-margin assembler.HoldingMateriality: High
GAAP annual gross profit rose from $1.228 million in FY2024 to $55.581 million in FY2025. Revenue only creates owner value if each incremental shipment carries enough gross profit to absorb fixed costs.
Watch: Commodity-like module or energy-device pricing pressure from First Solar, Qcells, Canadian Solar, Trina, Jinko, or JA Solar prevents T1 from pricing above cost.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual gross profit rose from $1.228 million in FY2024 to $55.581 million in FY2025.
Open source ↗The operating-cost base becomes scalable fixed infrastructure, not permanent overhead, as T1 ramps shipments.WeakeningMateriality: Medium
The company reached $755.295 million of GAAP annual revenue in FY2025, giving it a larger base over which to spread overhead. If fixed costs are absorbed, earnings power can emerge; if not, the business can grow while destroying capital.
Watch: Manufacturing ramp delays require duplicate engineering, rework, or underutilized labor instead of fixed-cost leverage.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
The company reached $755.295 million of GAAP annual revenue in FY2025, giving it a larger base over which to spread.
Open source ↗Customer terms and working-capital management help fund the ramp instead of forcing T1 into continual external financing.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium
GAAP annual operating cash flow improved from negative $102.817 million in FY2024 to positive $95.463 million in FY2025. Positive operating cash flow would let owners keep more of the upside; cash burn would shift bargaining power to lenders or new equity buyers.
Watch: Customers stop providing favorable payment terms or deposits, causing working capital to reverse.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual operating cash flow improved from negative $102.817 million in FY2024 to positive $95.463 million in FY2025.
Open source ↗Execution must outrun balance-sheet pressure so creditors or dilutive capital do not capture the value of the manufacturing ramp.WeakeningMateriality: Medium
Liabilities declined from $1.099 billion at FY2024 year-end to $1.050 billion at FY2025 year-end. Even if the plant-level opportunity is real, common shareholders can lose if funding needs dominate the economics.
Watch: Debt maturities, covenants, or project-finance requirements force refinancing on unfavorable terms.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Liabilities declined from $1.099 billion at FY2024 year-end to $1.050 billion at FY2025 year-end.
Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence
Loading the original research archive…
Original research
Customer qualification of T1’s post-FREYR energy-device manufacturing capacity becomes repeat purchasing rather than one-time ramp demand. If repeat demand is real, T1 has a path to scale; if customers do not re-order, the revenue base is not investable.
Manufacturing learning, utilization, and procurement discipline improve unit economics as volume scales; otherwise T1 remains a low-margin assembler. Revenue only creates owner value if each incremental shipment carries enough gross profit to absorb fixed costs.
The operating-cost base becomes scalable fixed infrastructure, not permanent overhead, as T1 ramps shipments. If fixed costs are absorbed, earnings power can emerge; if not, the business can grow while destroying capital.
Customer terms and working-capital management help fund the ramp instead of forcing T1 into continual external financing. Positive operating cash flow would let owners keep more of the upside; cash burn would shift bargaining power to lenders or new equity buyers.
Execution must outrun balance-sheet pressure so creditors or dilutive capital do not capture the value of the manufacturing ramp. Even if the plant-level opportunity is real, common shareholders can lose if funding needs dominate the economics.
All standing thesis claims
Original report summary
its post-FREYR manufacturing pivot proves to be repeatable, profitable energy-hardware capacity rather than one year of low-margin ramp revenue.
Bull case and bear case
Bull case and bear case for T1 Energy
Where the evidence on T1 Energy disagrees: Mixed on the latest evidence (Nov 13, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 1 strengthening, 2 holding and 2 weakening.
Bull case: what the evidence supports
Customer qualification of T1’s post-FREYR energy-device manufacturing capacity becomes repeat purchasing rather than one-time ramp demand.
Manufacturing learning, utilization, and procurement discipline improve unit economics as volume scales; otherwise T1 remains a low-margin assembler.
Customer terms and working-capital management help fund the ramp instead of forcing T1 into continual external financing.
Thesis-Break Engine
What has broken in T1 Energy’s thesis
Each break OptimistFi flagged on T1 Energy, dated — with what has historically followed the same kind of break across the market, not a forecast for T1 Energy.
- CEO / officer changecondition set before this filing
Across all companies, this kind of break has happened 16,849 times before. Those stocks trailed comparable companies by a median of 2% over the next six months, and 38% of them trailed it by 10 points or more.
MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT
The numbers behind the thesis
What Changed
No assessed change was returned in this research window. That can reflect a quiet period or a coverage limit.
Risks / falsifiers
What could break the thesis
- Large customers qualify First Solar, Qcells, Canadian Solar, or lower-cost Asian-linked suppliers instead of renewing with T1.
- Commodity-like module or energy-device pricing pressure from First Solar, Qcells, Canadian Solar, Trina, Jinko, or JA Solar prevents T1 from pricing above cost.
- Manufacturing ramp delays require duplicate engineering, rework, or underutilized labor instead of fixed-cost leverage.
- Customers stop providing favorable payment terms or deposits, causing working capital to reverse.
- Debt maturities, covenants, or project-finance requirements force refinancing on unfavorable terms.
TE news
Loading headlines…
Financial statements
TE income statement
Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.
TE: quick answers
- When does T1 Energy (TE) report earnings next?
- T1 Energy's next results are projected for February 11, 2027, from the dates of its own results filings with the SEC. The company has not confirmed the date. It last reported on November 12, 2026. Earnings calendar
- What is TE's short interest?
- As of October 30, 2026, 79.1M TE shares were sold short, 26.3% of its shares outstanding, up 7.6% from the count before. At the stock's average daily volume that is 4.5 days to cover. FINRA publishes the count twice a month. TE short interest history
- Which well-known investors own TE?
- 1 of the 37 well-known funds tracked here reported TE shares in their latest 13F filing. By share of the fund's portfolio: Soros Fund Management (George Soros), 0.0%. Fund portfolios
TE in well-known investors’ portfolios
1 of 37 funds reported TE shares in their latest 13F filing. A 13F shows quarter-end positions and arrives up to 45 days later.
| Fund | Of its portfolio | Value | Change | Quarter |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| George SorosSoros Fund Management | 0.01% | $1.0M | +472.6% | Q3 2026 |

