STNG at a glance
Understand the Business
- Scorpio owns product tankers that carry refined petroleum products; shippers pay for vessel capacity, so earnings depend on daily tanker revenue exceeding voyage, operating and financing costs.↗↗
- It keeps many ships in spot-oriented pools to catch freight spikes, while fixed time charters shift voyage costs to customers and make some revenue more predictable.↗↗
Why this business is different
- Management says Scorpio Pools improve scheduling, backhaul opportunities and customer service. Those potential benefits must be weighed against related-party management fees and actual returns.↗
- The structural drawback is commodity-like cyclicality: expensive owned ships can earn sharply different daily rates when product-tanker markets change.↗↗
What could matter next
- September 29 added four newbuilding purchases for $415.6 million, including crude carriers. Their later earnings must justify spending beyond proceeds from the three planned product-tanker sales.↗
- The new three-year charters reduce some downside, but upside still depends on keeping enough vessels exposed to spot-oriented pools when rates are strong.↗↗
Why the Stock Moved
- February 2024 · Deleveraging reset: Debt risk looked lower while dividends rose. On Feb. 14, 2024, Scorpio reported $497.1 million of Q4 2023 unscheduled debt and lease repayments. Lower fixed claims made spot-rate cash flows more valuable to equity.↗
- October 2024 · Rates softened: Early-quarter tanker earnings indications weakened. On Oct. 29, 2024, Q4-to-date rates were $31,600 for long-range 2 and $20,800 for medium-range vessels. Lower provisional TCE rates threatened earnings, though coverage was only about one-third of the quarter.↗↗
STNG price history
Loading recent earnings…
Investment thesis
What must happen next
Product-tanker TCE rates must stay high enough to cover vessel operating and financing costs and earn an adequate return on the fleet.StrengtheningMateriality: High
September 3 Q3-to-date pool/spot TCE was $64,900 for LR2, $30,000 for MR and $25,500 for Handymax, with 85%, 79% and 70% coverage. These were provisional, partly booked rates, not final quarterly averages. TCE already subtracts voyage expenses. The remaining daily revenue must cover operating costs, depreciation and financing across the spot-oriented fleet.
Watch: Watch company TCE updates by vessel class and coverage; a broad fall toward late-2024 levels would weaken this condition.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
The October 2024 snapshot covered roughly 35% of LR2/MR days, not a finalized quarterly average.
Open source ↗September’s provisional rates had 85% LR2, 79% MR and 70% Handymax coverage; TCE is net of voyage expenses.
Open source ↗Capital allocation must keep fixed claims low and avoid committing too much cyclical cash to fleet expansion near strong asset markets.HoldingMateriality: High
July 28 cash was about $1.96 billion versus $655 million of gross debt, including $605 million of convertible notes. September 29 added four newbuilding agreements totaling $415.6 million, before other existing commitments. Lower debt increases equity participation in volatile tanker cash flows, but heavy newbuilding commitments could absorb the same cash.
Watch: Watch secured-debt balances, dividend and repurchase actions, and firm newbuilding commitments relative to cash generated in strong rate periods.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
July liquidity included net cash, but $605 million of convertible debt introduced potential share dilution.
Open source ↗Four new ships cost a combined $415.6 million, with delivery expected in 2028-2029.
Open source ↗Fleet renewal must preserve per-share earning power, not simply shrink Scorpio’s rate exposure during a favorable product-tanker market.UnclearMateriality: Medium
September 29 listed 74 owned product tankers and agreements to sell three more for $180.5 million. Four newbuildings were contracted for delivery in 2028-2029, so sales precede replacement earnings. Selling ships can crystallize asset value and lower operating risk, but too much fleet shrinkage caps earnings in strong markets.
Watch: Watch owned-vessel count, delivery timing and whether newbuildings replace earnings capacity before the cycle fades.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
The issuer listed 74 owned tankers and three agreed sales; the four newly ordered ships were not yet operating.
Open source ↗The charter mix must add downside protection while leaving enough ships exposed to spot-oriented pools when tanker rates are unusually strong.HoldingMateriality: Medium
In September 2026, Scorpio agreed to time charter out two long-range 2 product tankers and one medium-range product tanker for three-year terms. Fixed time charters can stabilize revenue, but locking too many ships below spot rates would cap upside in a strong market.
Watch: Watch the share of days fixed on time charters versus pool and spot employment, and the rates attached to new fixtures.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Three-year fixtures covered two LR2 s and one MR; commencement was expected in September or the fourth quarter.
Open source ↗Scorpio Pools must keep improving ship utilization and customer service enough to justify the pool structure and related management costs.HoldingMateriality: Medium
The filing attributes scheduling and backhaul benefits to the pools. Their managers are related parties; those claimed benefits do not independently prove superior owner returns. Pools can improve scheduling and utilization, but related management structures and allocation rules can affect owners’ economics.
Watch: Watch pool utilization, related-party fee disclosures and any evidence that pool economics lag direct spot employment.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
The issuer describes pool scheduling benefits and related-party management arrangements; superior returns are not independently established.
Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence
Loading the original research archive…
Original research
Product-tanker TCE rates must stay high enough to cover vessel operating and financing costs and earn an adequate return on the fleet. TCE already subtracts voyage expenses. The remaining daily revenue must cover operating costs, depreciation and financing across the spot-oriented fleet.
Capital allocation must keep fixed claims low and avoid committing too much cyclical cash to fleet expansion near strong asset markets. Lower debt increases equity participation in volatile tanker cash flows, but heavy newbuilding commitments could absorb the same cash.
Fleet renewal must preserve per-share earning power, not simply shrink Scorpio’s rate exposure during a favorable product-tanker market. Selling ships can crystallize asset value and lower operating risk, but too much fleet shrinkage caps earnings in strong markets.
The charter mix must add downside protection while leaving enough ships exposed to spot-oriented pools when tanker rates are unusually strong. Fixed time charters can stabilize revenue, but locking too many ships below spot rates would cap upside in a strong market.
Scorpio Pools must keep improving ship utilization and customer service enough to justify the pool structure and related management costs. Pools can improve scheduling and utilization, but related management structures and allocation rules can affect owners’ economics.
All standing thesis claims
Original report summary
product-tanker spot rates and selective time charters keep converting a smaller, lower-leverage fleet into cash while newbuild spending stays disciplined.
Since this case
What has happened since Sep 29, 2026
The case above was written from evidence through Sep 29, 2026 and stays as written. This part is read from SEC filings and closing prices each time the page is built, so it moves as new reports are filed.
- Results
- The financial statements could not be read just now.
- Share price
- The price since this case could not be read just now.
- Filings
- The filings since this case could not be read just now.
- Insiders
- Insider filings since this case could not be read just now.
- Conditions
- The engine’s condition checks could not be read just now.
Bull case and bear case
Bull case and bear case for Scorpio Tankers Inc.
Where the evidence on Scorpio Tankers disagrees: Mixed on the latest evidence (Sep 29, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 1 strengthening, 3 holding and 1 unclear.
Bull case: what the evidence supports
Product-tanker TCE rates must stay high enough to cover vessel operating and financing costs and earn an adequate return on the fleet.
Capital allocation must keep fixed claims low and avoid committing too much cyclical cash to fleet expansion near strong asset markets.
The charter mix must add downside protection while leaving enough ships exposed to spot-oriented pools when tanker rates are unusually strong.
Scorpio Pools must keep improving ship utilization and customer service enough to justify the pool structure and related management costs.
Bear case: what the evidence questions
Fleet renewal must preserve per-share earning power, not simply shrink Scorpio’s rate exposure during a favorable product-tanker market.
Thesis-Break Engine
Thesis-break watch · Scorpio Tankers
Loading the break-condition record for Scorpio Tankers.
MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT
The numbers behind the thesis
What Changed
- MixedFleet renewal adds a larger capital commitment
Scorpio agreed to sell three product tankers for $180.5 million and order two LR2 s plus two crude carriers for $415.6 million. Sales were expected by year-end; new ships arrive in 2028-2029, leaving a timing and market-exposure gap.
- MixedQ3-to-date rates remained high and time charters added visibility
The September update reported third-quarter-to-date pool and spot rates of $64,900 for long-range 2 tankers, $30,000 for medium-range tankers and $25,500 for Handymax vessels, plus three new three-year time charters. The update adds visibility but remains in-quarter data.
- SupportiveQ2 results converted stronger tanker rates into earnings
Q2 IFRS net income was $387.5 million, including $154.1 million of vessel-sale gains. Adjusted net income was $243.7 million versus $67.8 million a year earlier; the difference also reflects financing and fair-value items.
Risks / falsifiers
What could break the thesis
- Watch company TCE updates by vessel class and coverage; a broad fall toward late-2024 levels would weaken this condition.
- Watch secured-debt balances, dividend and repurchase actions, and firm newbuilding commitments relative to cash generated in strong rate periods.
- Watch owned-vessel count, delivery timing and whether newbuildings replace earnings capacity before the cycle fades.
- Watch the share of days fixed on time charters versus pool and spot employment, and the rates attached to new fixtures.
- Watch pool utilization, related-party fee disclosures and any evidence that pool economics lag direct spot employment.
STNG news
Loading headlines…
Financial statements
STNG income statement
Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.
STNG: quick answers
- Which well-known investors own STNG?
- 1 of the 37 well-known funds tracked here reported STNG shares in their latest 13F filing. By share of the fund's portfolio: Bridgewater Associates (Ray Dalio), 0.1%. Fund portfolios
STNG in well-known investors’ portfolios
1 of 37 funds reported STNG shares in their latest 13F filing. A 13F shows quarter-end positions and arrives up to 45 days later.
| Fund | Of its portfolio | Value | Change | Quarter |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ray DalioBridgewater Associates | 0.05% | $11.4M | +87.8% | Q2 2026 |

