PRAA at a glance
The past year
Chart−30.0% $11.43, close Nov 16
- From the highest close
- −48.6%
- Vs the 200-day average
- −34.9%
Short interest
History788,984 shares
- Of shares outstanding
- 2.09%
- Since the last report
- −12.4%
- Days to cover
- 1.9 days
- Settled
- Oct 30, 2026
Congress and officials
Trades1 trade, 90 days
- Buys / sells
- 0 / 1
- Filers
- 1
Insider buying, 7 days
FilingsNone filed this week
- Form 4s filed
- Nov 10 – Nov 16
Understand the Business
Why the Stock Moved
Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.
PRAA price history
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Investment thesis
What must happen next
Banks and other lenders keep selling enough charged-off consumer receivables to third-party specialists, and PRAA remains a credible buyer, so portfolio supply continues converting into recoveries and revenue without requiring uneconomic bids.StrengtheningMateriality: High
Annual GAAP revenue increased from $802.6 million in FY2023 to $1.1145 billion in FY2024. If this holds, PRAA has a recurring reinvestment runway; if it breaks, growth either stalls or is bought at poor returns.
Watch: Large bank sellers retain more charged-off paper in-house or sell forward flows to competitors, reducing PRAA’s access to attractive portfolios.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Annual GAAP revenue increased from $802.6 million in FY2023 to $1.1145 billion in FY2024.
Open source ↗PRAA’s servicing, analytics, and legal-collection infrastructure must turn purchased receivable balances into profitable collections rather than merely higher recognized revenue.WeakeningMateriality: High
Annual GAAP operating_income was positive at $285.8 million in FY2022 and $339.7 million in FY2024, showing the model can produce substantial operating profit. This is the difference between a scalable specialty finance model and a value trap that grows assets while destroying earnings.
Watch: Recent portfolio vintages were purchased with overly optimistic recovery assumptions, causing collection shortfalls before revenue rolls over.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Annual GAAP operating_income was positive at $285.8 million in FY2022 and $339.7 million in FY2024, showing the model can produce.
Open source ↗The business remains investable only if lenders and securitization markets keep financing receivable purchases on terms that leave a spread for equity after interest and credit losses.HoldingMateriality: Medium
Total GAAP liabilities rose from $2.8889 billion at FY2022 year-end to $4.0634 billion at FY2025 year-end, indicating continued access to financing. PRAA’s leverage can magnify returns in good vintages but can also transfer the economics to creditors when funding costs rise.
Watch: Bank lenders tighten advance rates or covenants after weak collections, forcing lower purchasing or asset sales.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Total GAAP liabilities rose from $2.8889 billion at FY2022 year-end to $4.0634 billion at FY2025 year-end, indicating continued access to.
Open source ↗PRAA must realize cash collections fast enough to fund operations and reinvestment, because accounting revenue alone does not protect equity holders in a portfolio-purchase model.WeakeningMateriality: Medium
Annual GAAP operating_cash_flow improved from negative $97.5 million in FY2023 to negative $94.6 million in FY2024 and negative $85.5 million in FY2025. If cash conversion does not improve, the company may need more debt, slower purchasing, or equity dilution even if reported revenue grows.
Watch: Collections are increasingly back-ended into later years, lengthening payback periods and raising reinvestment funding needs.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Annual GAAP operating_cash_flow improved from negative $97.5 million in FY2023 to negative $94.6 million in FY2024 and negative $85.5 million.
Open source ↗The underwriting and funding model must stop eroding book equity; otherwise common shareholders bear the downside of a leveraged receivables portfolio without earning through-cycle returns.WeakeningMateriality: Medium
GAAP stockholders’ equity remained positive at $979.9 million at FY2025 year-end. A shrinking equity base reduces financial flexibility and makes the stock more dependent on a sharp earnings recovery.
Watch: Further negative collection revisions or impairment charges reduce receivable carrying values.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP stockholders’ equity remained positive at $979.9 million at FY2025 year-end.
Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence
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Original research
Banks and other lenders keep selling enough charged-off consumer receivables to third-party specialists, and PRAA remains a credible buyer, so portfolio supply continues converting into recoveries and revenue without requiring uneconomic bids. If this holds, PRAA has a recurring reinvestment runway; if it breaks, growth either stalls or is bought at poor returns.
PRAA’s servicing, analytics, and legal-collection infrastructure must turn purchased receivable balances into profitable collections rather than merely higher recognized revenue. This is the difference between a scalable specialty finance model and a value trap that grows assets while destroying earnings.
The business remains investable only if lenders and securitization markets keep financing receivable purchases on terms that leave a spread for equity after interest and credit losses. PRAA’s leverage can magnify returns in good vintages but can also transfer the economics to creditors when funding costs rise.
PRAA must realize cash collections fast enough to fund operations and reinvestment, because accounting revenue alone does not protect equity holders in a portfolio-purchase model. If cash conversion does not improve, the company may need more debt, slower purchasing, or equity dilution even if reported revenue grows.
The underwriting and funding model must stop eroding book equity; otherwise common shareholders bear the downside of a leveraged receivables portfolio without earning through-cycle returns. A shrinking equity base reduces financial flexibility and makes the stock more dependent on a sharp earnings recovery.
All standing thesis claims
Original report summary
its scale and underwriting let it buy charged-off consumer receivables cheaply enough, collect them compliantly, and fund the book without leverage overwhelming recoveries.
Bull case and bear case
Bull case and bear case for Pra Group
Where the evidence on Pra Group disagrees: Mixed on the latest evidence (Oct 18, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 1 strengthening, 1 holding and 3 weakening.
Bull case: what the evidence supports
Banks and other lenders keep selling enough charged-off consumer receivables to third-party specialists, and PRAA remains a credible buyer, so portfolio supply continues converting into recoveries and revenue without requiring uneconomic bids.
The business remains investable only if lenders and securitization markets keep financing receivable purchases on terms that leave a spread for equity after interest and credit losses.
Bear case: what the evidence questions
PRAA’s servicing, analytics, and legal-collection infrastructure must turn purchased receivable balances into profitable collections rather than merely higher recognized revenue.
PRAA must realize cash collections fast enough to fund operations and reinvestment, because accounting revenue alone does not protect equity holders in a portfolio-purchase model.
The underwriting and funding model must stop eroding book equity; otherwise common shareholders bear the downside of a leveraged receivables portfolio without earning through-cycle returns.
Thesis-Break Engine
What has broken in Pra Group’s thesis
Each break OptimistFi flagged on Pra Group, dated — with what has historically followed the same kind of break across the market, not a forecast for Pra Group.
- CEO / officer changecondition set before this filing
Across all companies, this kind of break has happened 16,849 times before. Those stocks trailed comparable companies by a median of 2% over the next six months, and 38% of them trailed it by 10 points or more.
MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT
The numbers behind the thesis
What Changed
- MixedEntered a material definitive agreement.
Pra Group filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-10-08: Entered a material definitive agreement. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedOther material event.
Pra Group filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-09-29: Other material event. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedDirector or principal officer change.
Pra Group filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-09-23: Director or principal officer change. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
Risks / falsifiers
What could break the thesis
- Large bank sellers retain more charged-off paper in-house or sell forward flows to competitors, reducing PRAA’s access to attractive portfolios.
- Recent portfolio vintages were purchased with overly optimistic recovery assumptions, causing collection shortfalls before revenue rolls over.
- Bank lenders tighten advance rates or covenants after weak collections, forcing lower purchasing or asset sales.
- Collections are increasingly back-ended into later years, lengthening payback periods and raising reinvestment funding needs.
- Further negative collection revisions or impairment charges reduce receivable carrying values.
PRAA news
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Financial statements
PRAA income statement
Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.
PRAA: quick answers
- When does Pra Group (PRAA) report earnings next?
- Pra Group's next results are projected for February 25, 2027, from the dates of its own results filings with the SEC. The company has not confirmed the date. It last reported on November 5, 2026. Earnings calendar
- What is PRAA's short interest?
- As of October 30, 2026, 788,984 PRAA shares were sold short, 2.09% of its shares outstanding, down 12.4% from the count before. At the stock's average daily volume that is 1.9 days to cover. FINRA publishes the count twice a month. PRAA short interest history
- Have members of Congress traded PRAA?
- Reports made public in the last 90 days disclose 1 trade in PRAA by 1 filer: 0 purchases and 1 sale. They are filed under the STOCK Act by members of Congress, the President and senior officials. Every disclosed PRAA trade

