HPAIW at a glance
The past year
Chart−90.2% $0.25, close Nov 16
- From the highest close
- −94.2%
- Vs the 200-day average
- −77.3%
Short interest
History38,001 shares
- Since the last report
- +52.3%
- Days to cover
- 1.0 day
- Settled
- Oct 30, 2026
Insider buying, 7 days
FilingsNone filed this week
- Form 4s filed
- Nov 10 – Nov 16
Understand the Business
Why the Stock Moved
Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.
HPAIW price history
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Investment thesis
What must happen next
Enterprise demand for AI-enabled customer-service automation continues to convert into paid Helport deployments because the product solves support-labor productivity problems that customers are still prioritizing.HoldingMateriality: High
GAAP annual revenue increased from $12.7 million in FY2023 to $29.6 million in FY2024 and $34.9 million in FY2025. If this holds, Helport has a growing revenue pool to monetize; if it breaks, the business loses the volume engine needed to absorb AI and public-company costs.
Watch: Large contact-center platforms such as NICE, Genesys, Five9, and Talkdesk bundle AI agent-assist and automation features that reduce the need for a specialist vendor.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual revenue increased from $12.7 million in FY2023 to $29.6 million in FY2024 and $34.9 million in FY2025.
Open source ↗Helport’s offering remains sufficiently productized that growth does not require a materially heavier mix of low-margin customization, implementation, or managed-service labor.HoldingMateriality: High
GAAP annual gross profit increased to $19.1 million in FY2025 from $18.6 million in FY2024. This determines whether incremental revenue can compound into attractive economics or merely buys scale at deteriorating unit margins.
Watch: The business shifts toward bespoke enterprise integrations or managed operations that require more delivery headcount per dollar of revenue.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual gross profit increased to $19.1 million in FY2025 from $18.6 million in FY2024.
Open source ↗Management can scale sales, R&D, and public-company costs without permanently sacrificing operating leverage.WeakeningMateriality: Medium
GAAP annual operating income remained positive at $2.7 million in FY2025. The owner needs proof that Helport can turn AI demand into per-share value, not just higher revenue with lower earnings power.
Watch: Competing with better-funded AI and contact-center vendors requires a step-change in R&D and sales spending.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual operating income remained positive at $2.7 million in FY2025.
Open source ↗Customer contracts and working-capital discipline keep the business self-funding despite its small scale.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium
GAAP annual operating cash flow improved from negative $0.5 million in FY2023 to positive $5.0 million in FY2024 and positive $9.1 million in FY2025. Strong cash conversion would let Helport invest through competition without dilution; weak collections would make growth more fragile.
Watch: Enterprise customers demand longer payment terms or milestone-based billing as deals become larger.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual operating cash flow improved from negative $0.5 million in FY2023 to positive $5.0 million in FY2024 and positive.
Open source ↗Because the cash buffer is thin, Helport must keep converting operations into cash or obtain non-punitive financing to avoid constraining product investment.WeakeningMateriality: Medium
Cash and cash equivalents were only $0.2 million at June 30, 2025, down from $2.6 million at June 30, 2024. A liquidity squeeze could force dilution, underinvestment, or weaker competitive positioning even if customer demand remains real.
Watch: A capital raise is completed on dilutive terms because cash on hand is insufficient for AI product investment or working capital.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Cash and cash equivalents were only $0.2 million at June 30, 2025, down from $2.6 million at June 30, 2024.
Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence
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Original research
Enterprise demand for AI-enabled customer-service automation continues to convert into paid Helport deployments because the product solves support-labor productivity problems that customers are still prioritizing. If this holds, Helport has a growing revenue pool to monetize; if it breaks, the business loses the volume engine needed to absorb AI and public-company costs.
Helport’s offering remains sufficiently productized that growth does not require a materially heavier mix of low-margin customization, implementation, or managed-service labor. This determines whether incremental revenue can compound into attractive economics or merely buys scale at deteriorating unit margins.
Management can scale sales, R&D, and public-company costs without permanently sacrificing operating leverage. The owner needs proof that Helport can turn AI demand into per-share value, not just higher revenue with lower earnings power.
Customer contracts and working-capital discipline keep the business self-funding despite its small scale. Strong cash conversion would let Helport invest through competition without dilution; weak collections would make growth more fragile.
Because the cash buffer is thin, Helport must keep converting operations into cash or obtain non-punitive financing to avoid constraining product investment. A liquidity squeeze could force dilution, underinvestment, or weaker competitive positioning even if customer demand remains real.
All standing thesis claims
Original report summary
its AI customer-service software proves to be a durable, productized platform rather than a small, customized software/services business whose early growth is competed away by larger contact-center and CRM vendors.
Bull case and bear case
Bull case and bear case for Helport AI
Where the evidence on Helport AI disagrees: Mixed on the latest evidence (Nov 17, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 1 strengthening, 2 holding and 2 weakening.
Bull case: what the evidence supports
Enterprise demand for AI-enabled customer-service automation continues to convert into paid Helport deployments because the product solves support-labor productivity problems that customers are still prioritizing.
Helport’s offering remains sufficiently productized that growth does not require a materially heavier mix of low-margin customization, implementation, or managed-service labor.
Customer contracts and working-capital discipline keep the business self-funding despite its small scale.
Bear case: what the evidence questions
Thesis-Break Engine
What has broken in Helport AI’s thesis
Each break OptimistFi flagged on Helport AI, dated — with what has historically followed the same kind of break across the market, not a forecast for Helport AI.
- Late SEC filingcondition set before this filing
Across all companies, this kind of break has happened 4,811 times before. Those stocks trailed comparable companies by a median of 12% over the next six months, and 52% of them trailed it by 10 points or more.
MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT
The numbers behind the thesis
What Changed
- MixedREPORT OF FOREIGN PRIVATE ISSUER.
Helport AI filed an SEC report on 2026-11-03: REPORT OF FOREIGN PRIVATE ISSUER. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedREPORT OF FOREIGN PRIVATE ISSUER.
Helport AI filed an SEC report on 2026-07-10: REPORT OF FOREIGN PRIVATE ISSUER. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedREPORT OF FOREIGN PRIVATE ISSUER.
Helport AI filed an SEC report on 2026-06-26: REPORT OF FOREIGN PRIVATE ISSUER. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
Risks / falsifiers
What could break the thesis
- Large contact-center platforms such as NICE, Genesys, Five9, and Talkdesk bundle AI agent-assist and automation features that reduce the need for a specialist vendor.
- The business shifts toward bespoke enterprise integrations or managed operations that require more delivery headcount per dollar of revenue.
- Competing with better-funded AI and contact-center vendors requires a step-change in R&D and sales spending.
- Enterprise customers demand longer payment terms or milestone-based billing as deals become larger.
- A capital raise is completed on dilutive terms because cash on hand is insufficient for AI product investment or working capital.
HPAIW news
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Financial statements
HPAIW income statement
Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.
HPAIW: quick answers
- What is HPAIW's short interest?
- As of October 30, 2026, 38,001 HPAIW shares were sold short, up 52.3% from the count before. At the stock's average daily volume that is 1.0 day to cover. FINRA publishes the count twice a month. HPAIW short interest history

