Case todayNot read todayThesis-Break EngineThe case · holding · Nov 3, 2026Own FTLF if FitLife is a small-cap supplement brand compounder whose upside depends on proving that its portfolio of proprietary niche wellness brands can keep growing while recent balance-sheet expansion converts into cash rather than leverage risk.5 conditions3 strengthening · 2 holdingNext resultsFeb 16, 2027Projected from its filing dates

FTLF at a glance

The past year

Chart

−62.2% $6.83, close Nov 17

From the highest close
−63.4%
Vs the 200-day average
−36.1%
Nov 14, 2025Daily close, Fitlife BrandsNov 17, 2026

Short interest

History

64,567 shares

Of shares outstanding
0.69%
Since the last report
+7.8%
Days to cover
5.5 days
Settled
Oct 30, 2026

Insider buying, 7 days

Filings

None filed this week

Form 4s filed
Nov 12 – Nov 18

Understand the Business

Why the Stock Moved

Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.

FTLF price history

Latest price$6.83Today+$0.00 (+0.00%)
FTLF -16.30%S&P 500 -4.78%Since first plotted close
4 hours

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Investment thesis

What must happen next

5 MATERIAL PROPOSITIONS
  • FitLife’s multi-brand portfolio lets it capture recurring health-conscious supplement demand across several fitness and wellness niches instead of depending on one fad product.StrengtheningMateriality: High

    GAAP annual revenue increased from $27.913 million in FY2021 to $64.469 million in FY2024. If this holds, revenue growth has a repeatable demand engine; if it breaks, the company becomes a much riskier product-cycle story.

    Watch: Large supplement platforms or retailers such as GNC, Amazon/private-label brands, or Nestle Health Science take share in FitLife’s core categories through lower pricing or broader distribution.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    GAAP annual revenue increased from $27.913 million in FY2021 to $64.469 million in FY2024.

    Open source ↗
  • The proprietary-brand model should preserve enough pricing power and product mix advantage to offset ingredient, manufacturing, and channel-cost pressure.StrengtheningMateriality: High

    GAAP annual gross profit rose from $12.034 million in FY2022 to $28.080 million in FY2024. Gross profit durability determines whether growth is valuable or merely purchased through discounting.

    Watch: Amazon, GNC, Walmart, or other retailers use private-label supplements to force price compression in FitLife’s categories.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    GAAP annual gross profit rose from $12.034 million in FY2022 to $28.080 million in FY2024.

    Open source ↗
  • FitLife’s centralized brand platform can add sales without requiring proportional increases in overhead, so brand growth should convert into operating income.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium

    GAAP annual operating income increased from $5.701 million in FY2022 to $13.119 million in FY2024. Operating leverage is what turns a collection of small supplement brands into a per-share compounding business.

    Watch: Newly acquired or expanded brands require heavy advertising, sales staff, or retailer support that eliminates operating leverage.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    GAAP annual operating income increased from $5.701 million in FY2022 to $13.119 million in FY2024.

    Open source ↗
  • The supplement portfolio should convert accounting earnings into operating cash flow, giving FitLife internal funding capacity for debt service, reinvestment, and future brand deals.HoldingMateriality: Medium

    GAAP annual operating cash flow rose from $4.220 million in FY2023 to $9.610 million in FY2024. If cash conversion holds, FitLife can compound without relying heavily on external capital; if it weakens, growth may become balance-sheet constrained.

    Watch: Inventory builds, retailer chargebacks, or extended receivables consume cash before revenue weakens.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    GAAP annual operating cash flow rose from $4.220 million in FY2023 to $9.610 million in FY2024.

    Open source ↗
  • Management must prove that the enlarged 2025 balance sheet reflects productive brand acquisitions or investments rather than leverage that dilutes future returns.HoldingMateriality: Medium

    Total assets increased from $58.531 million at FY2024 year-end to $106.320 million at FY2025 year-end. For a small roll-up, capital allocation can create most of the upside or become the main source of permanent loss.

    Watch: Acquired brands fail to retain distribution, forcing impairment, SKU cuts, or restructuring.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    Total assets increased from $58.531 million at FY2024 year-end to $106.320 million at FY2025 year-end.

    Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence

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Original research

FitLife’s multi-brand portfolio lets it capture recurring health-conscious supplement demand across several fitness and wellness niches instead of depending on one fad product. If this holds, revenue growth has a repeatable demand engine; if it breaks, the company becomes a much riskier product-cycle story.

The proprietary-brand model should preserve enough pricing power and product mix advantage to offset ingredient, manufacturing, and channel-cost pressure. Gross profit durability determines whether growth is valuable or merely purchased through discounting.

FitLife’s centralized brand platform can add sales without requiring proportional increases in overhead, so brand growth should convert into operating income. Operating leverage is what turns a collection of small supplement brands into a per-share compounding business.

The supplement portfolio should convert accounting earnings into operating cash flow, giving FitLife internal funding capacity for debt service, reinvestment, and future brand deals. If cash conversion holds, FitLife can compound without relying heavily on external capital; if it weakens, growth may become balance-sheet constrained.

Management must prove that the enlarged 2025 balance sheet reflects productive brand acquisitions or investments rather than leverage that dilutes future returns. For a small roll-up, capital allocation can create most of the upside or become the main source of permanent loss.

All standing thesis claims
Original report summary

FitLife is a small-cap supplement brand compounder whose upside depends on proving that its portfolio of proprietary niche wellness brands can keep growing while recent balance-sheet expansion converts into cash rather than leverage risk.

Evidence assessed Nov 3, 2026. Expand each conclusion for its evidence and what would change it. Thesis evidence—not a buy or sell recommendation.

Bull case and bear case

Bull case and bear case for Fitlife Brands

Where the evidence on Fitlife Brands stands: Holding on the latest evidence (Nov 3, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 3 strengthening and 2 holding.

Bull case: what the evidence supports

  • FitLife’s multi-brand portfolio lets it capture recurring health-conscious supplement demand across several fitness and wellness niches instead of depending on one fad product.

    sec.gov ↗

  • The proprietary-brand model should preserve enough pricing power and product mix advantage to offset ingredient, manufacturing, and channel-cost pressure.

    sec.gov ↗

  • FitLife’s centralized brand platform can add sales without requiring proportional increases in overhead, so brand growth should convert into operating income.

    sec.gov ↗

  • The supplement portfolio should convert accounting earnings into operating cash flow, giving FitLife internal funding capacity for debt service, reinvestment, and future brand deals.

    sec.gov ↗

  • Management must prove that the enlarged 2025 balance sheet reflects productive brand acquisitions or investments rather than leverage that dilutes future returns.

    sec.gov ↗

Bear case: what would count against it

  • Large supplement platforms or retailers such as GNC, Amazon/private-label brands, or Nestle Health Science take share in FitLife’s core categories through lower pricing or broader distribution.

    sec.gov ↗

  • Amazon, GNC, Walmart, or other retailers use private-label supplements to force price compression in FitLife’s categories.

    sec.gov ↗

  • Newly acquired or expanded brands require heavy advertising, sales staff, or retailer support that eliminates operating leverage.

    sec.gov ↗

Thesis-Break Engine

Thesis-break watch · Fitlife Brands

12 mo agonow
Trailing daily price. No thesis break has crossed here, so there is no break base rate to project.

No break has crossed Fitlife Brands’s thesis. Its break conditions are checked against every new filing as it lands.

How the Thesis-Break Engine works →Historical outcomes are measured against the market after past breaks of the same kind, across all companies. Not a prediction.

MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT

The numbers behind the thesis

Sourced from filings and market data

What Changed

  1. Mixed
    Regulation FD disclosure.

    Fitlife Brands filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-09-09: Regulation FD disclosure. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.

  2. Mixed
    Reported results of operations (earnings release).

    Fitlife Brands filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-08-13: Reported results of operations (earnings release). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.

  3. Mixed
    Director or principal officer change.

    Fitlife Brands filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-05-22: Director or principal officer change. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.

Risks / falsifiers

What could break the thesis

  • Large supplement platforms or retailers such as GNC, Amazon/private-label brands, or Nestle Health Science take share in FitLife’s core categories through lower pricing or broader distribution.
  • Amazon, GNC, Walmart, or other retailers use private-label supplements to force price compression in FitLife’s categories.
  • Newly acquired or expanded brands require heavy advertising, sales staff, or retailer support that eliminates operating leverage.
  • Inventory builds, retailer chargebacks, or extended receivables consume cash before revenue weakens.
  • Acquired brands fail to retain distribution, forcing impairment, SKU cuts, or restructuring.

FTLF news

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Financial statements

FTLF income statement

Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.

FTLF: quick answers

When does Fitlife Brands (FTLF) report earnings next?
Fitlife Brands's next results are projected for February 16, 2027, from the dates of its own results filings with the SEC. The company has not confirmed the date. It last reported on November 17, 2026. Earnings calendar
What is FTLF's short interest?
As of October 30, 2026, 64,567 FTLF shares were sold short, 0.69% of its shares outstanding, up 7.8% from the count before. At the stock's average daily volume that is 5.5 days to cover. FINRA publishes the count twice a month. FTLF short interest history
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