BEKE at a glance
The past year
Chart+6.4% $17.87, close Nov 20
- From the highest close
- −8.8%
- Vs the 200-day average
- +6.1%
Short interest
History22.8M shares
- Since the last report
- −25.6%
- Days to cover
- 6.1 days
- Settled
- Oct 30, 2026
Congress and officials
TradesNone in 90 days
- Disclosed trades on record
- 1
Insider buying, 7 days
FilingsNone filed this week
- Form 4s filed
- Nov 16 – Nov 22
Understand the Business
Why the Stock Moved
Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.
BEKE price history
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Investment thesis
What must happen next
BEKE’s integrated agent-and-platform network remains a preferred route for Chinese residential transactions, so industry demand that exists continues to convert into company-level activity rather than leaking to fragmented brokers or direct channels.StrengtheningMateriality: High
GAAP annual revenue increased from $8.796 billion in FY2022 to $13.525 billion in FY2025. If the network remains the transaction venue, BEKE can compound through cycles; if customers bypass it, revenue growth loses its strategic value.
Watch: Major developers or banks successfully shift new-home and resale transactions to direct sales channels that bypass BEKE’s agent network.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual revenue increased from $8.796 billion in FY2022 to $13.525 billion in FY2025.
Open source ↗BEKE’s trust, data, and coordination role must preserve commission economics; otherwise growth will be increasingly driven by lower-margin mix, subsidies, or fee pressure rather than platform power.HoldingMateriality: High
GAAP annual gross profit rose from $1.998 billion in FY2022 to $3.143 billion in FY2024. This determines whether revenue growth creates economic profit or merely passes through low-margin transaction volume.
Watch: Developers force lower brokerage commissions on new-home transactions to protect their own liquidity.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual gross profit rose from $1.998 billion in FY2022 to $3.143 billion in FY2024.
Open source ↗The platform model must show operating leverage as transaction activity scales; if offline labor, customer acquisition, technology, or expansion costs rise with volume, BEKE is closer to a conventional brokerage than a scalable network.HoldingMateriality: Medium
GAAP annual operating income improved from a loss of $120.8 million in FY2022 to positive $675.7 million in FY2023. Operating leverage is what turns a large housing-services network into owner earnings rather than just a high-volume intermediary.
Watch: BEKE has to keep adding stores, agents, incentives, or advertising at the same pace as revenue to defend traffic and listings.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual operating income improved from a loss of $120.8 million in FY2022 to positive $675.7 million in FY2023.
Open source ↗BEKE’s transaction platform should be structurally cash-generative; if growth requires heavier working capital, delayed collections, or funding of adjacent services, the asset-light thesis is impaired.WeakeningMateriality: Medium
GAAP annual operating cash flow was positive in FY2022, FY2023, and FY2024, including $1.294 billion in FY2024. Cash conversion determines whether reported earnings can fund reinvestment and shareholder value without consuming the balance sheet.
Watch: New-home developer customers delay payments or create receivables pressure as property-sector liquidity remains tight.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual operating cash flow was positive in FY2022, FY2023, and FY2024, including $1.294 billion in FY2024.
Open source ↗BEKE’s balance sheet must remain strong enough to fund the platform through a prolonged housing downturn without forced dilution, leverage, or underinvestment in its agent network.HoldingMateriality: Medium
Cash and cash equivalents were $1.112 billion at FY2025 year-end. Financial resilience gives the company time to outlast weaker brokers; balance-sheet erosion would turn a cyclical downturn into permanent value loss.
Watch: A prolonged China housing slump forces sustained cash burn while BEKE continues to support agents, stores, or customer acquisition.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Cash and cash equivalents were $1.112 billion at FY2025 year-end.
Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence
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Original research
BEKE’s integrated agent-and-platform network remains a preferred route for Chinese residential transactions, so industry demand that exists continues to convert into company-level activity rather than leaking to fragmented brokers or direct channels. If the network remains the transaction venue, BEKE can compound through cycles; if customers bypass it, revenue growth loses its strategic value.
BEKE’s trust, data, and coordination role must preserve commission economics; otherwise growth will be increasingly driven by lower-margin mix, subsidies, or fee pressure rather than platform power. This determines whether revenue growth creates economic profit or merely passes through low-margin transaction volume.
The platform model must show operating leverage as transaction activity scales; if offline labor, customer acquisition, technology, or expansion costs rise with volume, BEKE is closer to a conventional brokerage than a scalable network. Operating leverage is what turns a large housing-services network into owner earnings rather than just a high-volume intermediary.
BEKE’s transaction platform should be structurally cash-generative; if growth requires heavier working capital, delayed collections, or funding of adjacent services, the asset-light thesis is impaired. Cash conversion determines whether reported earnings can fund reinvestment and shareholder value without consuming the balance sheet.
BEKE’s balance sheet must remain strong enough to fund the platform through a prolonged housing downturn without forced dilution, leverage, or underinvestment in its agent network. Financial resilience gives the company time to outlast weaker brokers; balance-sheet erosion would turn a cyclical downturn into permanent value loss.
All standing thesis claims
Original report summary
BEKE is a China housing-services network bet: its value depends on whether Beike/Lianjia-style trust, listings, agent cooperation, and offline coverage can keep capturing residential transactions while restoring margins and cash conversion in a weak.
Bull case and bear case
Bull case and bear case for KE Holdings
Where the evidence on KE Holdings disagrees: Mixed on the latest evidence (Oct 14, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 1 strengthening, 3 holding and 1 weakening.
Bull case: what the evidence supports
BEKE’s integrated agent-and-platform network remains a preferred route for Chinese residential transactions, so industry demand that exists continues to convert into company-level activity rather than leaking to fragmented brokers or direct channels.
BEKE’s trust, data, and coordination role must preserve commission economics; otherwise growth will be increasingly driven by lower-margin mix, subsidies, or fee pressure rather than platform power.
The platform model must show operating leverage as transaction activity scales; if offline labor, customer acquisition, technology, or expansion costs rise with volume, BEKE is closer to a conventional brokerage than a scalable network.
BEKE’s balance sheet must remain strong enough to fund the platform through a prolonged housing downturn without forced dilution, leverage, or underinvestment in its agent network.
Bear case: what the evidence questions
BEKE’s transaction platform should be structurally cash-generative; if growth requires heavier working capital, delayed collections, or funding of adjacent services, the asset-light thesis is impaired.
Thesis-Break Engine
Thesis-break watch · KE Holdings
No break has crossed KE Holdings’s thesis. Its break conditions are checked against every new filing as it lands.
MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT
The numbers behind the thesis
What Changed
- MixedForeign issuer material report (6-K).
KE Holdings filed an SEC report on 2026-10-13: Foreign issuer material report (6-K). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedForeign issuer material report (6-K).
KE Holdings filed an SEC report on 2026-10-08: Foreign issuer material report (6-K). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedForeign issuer material report (6-K).
KE Holdings filed an SEC report on 2026-10-05: Foreign issuer material report (6-K). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
Risks / falsifiers
What could break the thesis
- Major developers or banks successfully shift new-home and resale transactions to direct sales channels that bypass BEKE’s agent network.
- Developers force lower brokerage commissions on new-home transactions to protect their own liquidity.
- BEKE has to keep adding stores, agents, incentives, or advertising at the same pace as revenue to defend traffic and listings.
- New-home developer customers delay payments or create receivables pressure as property-sector liquidity remains tight.
- A prolonged China housing slump forces sustained cash burn while BEKE continues to support agents, stores, or customer acquisition.
BEKE news
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Financial statements
BEKE income statement
Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.
BEKE: quick answers
- What is BEKE's short interest?
- As of October 30, 2026, 22.8M BEKE shares were sold short, down 25.6% from the count before. At the stock's average daily volume that is 6.1 days to cover. FINRA publishes the count twice a month. BEKE short interest history
- Have members of Congress traded BEKE?
- 1 trade in BEKE has been disclosed under the STOCK Act by members of Congress, the President or senior officials, none in reports made public in the last 90 days. Every disclosed BEKE trade

