Dynatrace
DTNYSEUSD
- Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
- Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
- Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
- $43.49 Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
- $43.88–$45.27 Regular-session low and high so far today.
- 6.4M Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET.
- Not yet confirmed The company has not confirmed its next report date. Reported quarters are available in the chart’s Earnings view.
- $31.64–$66.30 52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.
Understand the Business
Why the Stock Moved
Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.
The core investment thesis
Own DT if its integrated observability, application-security, and AI-operations platform remains the enterprise control plane for increasingly complex cloud environments.
DT price history
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Investment thesis
What must happen next
Enterprise cloud complexity keeps making Dynatrace’s integrated observability, runtime security, and AI-operations platform mission-critical rather than discretionary.StrengtheningMateriality: High
GAAP annual revenue increased from $1.159 billion in FY2023 to $2.018 billion in FY2026. If this holds, Dynatrace can keep converting complexity into subscription growth; if it breaks, growth becomes a budget-cycle or replacement-sale story.
Watch: Large enterprises standardize on Datadog or Cisco/Splunk as the single observability vendor instead of expanding Dynatrace deployments.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual revenue increased from $1.159 billion in FY2023 to $2.018 billion in FY2026.
Open source ↗Dynatrace’s integrated platform remains differentiated enough to preserve premium software gross economics despite competition in logs, metrics, traces, and security telemetry.StrengtheningMateriality: High
GAAP gross profit rose from $935.6 million in FY2023 to $1.646 billion in FY2026. Gross-margin durability is the clearest sign that growth is not being bought with discounting or rising delivery costs.
Watch: Datadog, Cisco/Splunk, New Relic, Elastic, or Grafana win deals by pricing observability data ingestion materially below Dynatrace.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP gross profit rose from $935.6 million in FY2023 to $1.646 billion in FY2026.
Open source ↗The single-platform SaaS model gives Dynatrace operating leverage as revenue scales, rather than requiring expenses to rise one-for-one with growth.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium
GAAP annual operating income increased from $92.8 million in FY2023 to $245.4 million in FY2026. If operating leverage persists, owners get profit growth faster than revenue growth; if it fails, the business may be growing but not creating much incremental value.
Watch: Sales efficiency deteriorates because Datadog, Cisco/Splunk, hyperscalers, and open-source alternatives raise win costs and extend enterprise sales cycles.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual operating income increased from $92.8 million in FY2023 to $245.4 million in FY2026.
Open source ↗Dynatrace’s mission-critical, recurring software role should keep converting revenue into operating cash rather than tying up capital.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium
GAAP annual operating cash flow increased from $354.9 million in FY2023 to $561.9 million in FY2026. Cash conversion funds product investment, acquisitions, and potential buybacks without stressing the balance sheet.
Watch: Customers shift from prepaid or annual contracts toward shorter-duration, usage-based, or monthly commitments that weaken billings and collections.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual operating cash flow increased from $354.9 million in FY2023 to $561.9 million in FY2026.
Open source ↗Dynatrace’s cash-rich balance sheet gives it strategic flexibility to invest through competition, but value creation depends on disciplined capital allocation.HoldingMateriality: Medium
Cash and cash equivalents were $1.097 billion at March 31, 2026. A strong balance sheet lowers financing risk, but poor acquisitions or dilution could transfer value away from shareholders.
Watch: Management uses cash for acquisitions that do not improve platform differentiation or customer expansion.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Cash and cash equivalents were $1.097 billion at March 31, 2026.
Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence
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Original research
Enterprise cloud complexity keeps making Dynatrace’s integrated observability, runtime security, and AI-operations platform mission-critical rather than discretionary. If this holds, Dynatrace can keep converting complexity into subscription growth; if it breaks, growth becomes a budget-cycle or replacement-sale story.
Dynatrace’s integrated platform remains differentiated enough to preserve premium software gross economics despite competition in logs, metrics, traces, and security telemetry. Gross-margin durability is the clearest sign that growth is not being bought with discounting or rising delivery costs.
The single-platform SaaS model gives Dynatrace operating leverage as revenue scales, rather than requiring expenses to rise one-for-one with growth. If operating leverage persists, owners get profit growth faster than revenue growth; if it fails, the business may be growing but not creating much incremental value.
Dynatrace’s mission-critical, recurring software role should keep converting revenue into operating cash rather than tying up capital. Cash conversion funds product investment, acquisitions, and potential buybacks without stressing the balance sheet.
Dynatrace’s cash-rich balance sheet gives it strategic flexibility to invest through competition, but value creation depends on disciplined capital allocation. A strong balance sheet lowers financing risk, but poor acquisitions or dilution could transfer value away from shareholders.
All standing thesis claims
Original report summary
its integrated observability, application-security, and AI-operations platform remains the enterprise control plane for increasingly complex cloud environments.
Bull case and bear case
Bull case and bear case for Dynatrace
Where the evidence on Dynatrace stands: Holding on the latest evidence (Oct 15, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 4 strengthening and 1 holding.
Bull case: what the evidence supports
Enterprise cloud complexity keeps making Dynatrace’s integrated observability, runtime security, and AI-operations platform mission-critical rather than discretionary.
Dynatrace’s integrated platform remains differentiated enough to preserve premium software gross economics despite competition in logs, metrics, traces, and security telemetry.
The single-platform SaaS model gives Dynatrace operating leverage as revenue scales, rather than requiring expenses to rise one-for-one with growth.
Dynatrace’s mission-critical, recurring software role should keep converting revenue into operating cash rather than tying up capital.
Dynatrace’s cash-rich balance sheet gives it strategic flexibility to invest through competition, but value creation depends on disciplined capital allocation.
Bear case: what would count against it
Large enterprises standardize on Datadog or Cisco/Splunk as the single observability vendor instead of expanding Dynatrace deployments.
Datadog, Cisco/Splunk, New Relic, Elastic, or Grafana win deals by pricing observability data ingestion materially below Dynatrace.
Sales efficiency deteriorates because Datadog, Cisco/Splunk, hyperscalers, and open-source alternatives raise win costs and extend enterprise sales cycles.
Thesis-Break Engine
What has broken in Dynatrace’s thesis
Each break OptimistFi flagged on Dynatrace, dated — with what has historically followed the same kind of break across the market, not a forecast for Dynatrace.
- Price target fell below the stockcondition set before this filing
Across all companies, this kind of break has happened 1,809 times before. Those stocks trailed comparable companies by a median of 1% over the next six months, and 33% of them trailed it by 10 points or more.
- Analyst downgradecondition set before this filing
Across all companies, this kind of break has happened 12,641 times before. Those stocks trailed comparable companies by a median of 1% over the next six months, and 33% of them trailed it by 10 points or more.
Several kinds of break have stacked on Dynatrace at once. A cluster is a stronger read than any one signal alone.
MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT
The numbers behind the thesis
What Changed
- MixedEntered a material definitive agreement.
Dynatrace filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-09-25: Entered a material definitive agreement. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedEntered a material definitive agreement.
Dynatrace filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-08-20: Entered a material definitive agreement. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedReported results of operations (earnings release).
Dynatrace filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-08-05: Reported results of operations (earnings release). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
Risks / falsifiers
What could break the thesis
- Large enterprises standardize on Datadog or Cisco/Splunk as the single observability vendor instead of expanding Dynatrace deployments.
- Datadog, Cisco/Splunk, New Relic, Elastic, or Grafana win deals by pricing observability data ingestion materially below Dynatrace.
- Sales efficiency deteriorates because Datadog, Cisco/Splunk, hyperscalers, and open-source alternatives raise win costs and extend enterprise sales cycles.
- Customers shift from prepaid or annual contracts toward shorter-duration, usage-based, or monthly commitments that weaken billings and collections.
- Management uses cash for acquisitions that do not improve platform differentiation or customer expansion.
DT news
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Financial statements
DT income statement
Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.
DT: quick answers
- What is DT's short interest?
- As of October 30, 2026, 14.2M DT shares were sold short, 4.94% of its shares outstanding, down 20.9% from the count before. At the stock's average daily volume that is 1.9 days to cover. FINRA publishes the count twice a month. DT short interest history
- Have members of Congress traded DT?
- 24 trades in DT have been disclosed under the STOCK Act by members of Congress, the President or senior officials, none in reports made public in the last 90 days. Every disclosed DT trade
- Which well-known investors own DT?
- 2 of the 37 well-known funds tracked here reported DT shares in their latest 13F filings. By share of the fund's portfolio: Starboard Value (Jeff Smith), 8.6%; Bridgewater Associates (Ray Dalio), 0.1%. Fund portfolios
DT in well-known investors’ portfolios
2 of 37 funds reported DT shares in their latest 13F filing. A 13F shows quarter-end positions and arrives up to 45 days later.
| Fund | Of its portfolio | Value | Change | Quarter |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jeff SmithStarboard Value | 8.6% | $389M | New | Q2 2026 |
| Ray DalioBridgewater Associates | 0.07% | $16.2M | +126.5% | Q2 2026 |