Darden Restaurants
DRINYSEUSD
- Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
- Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
- Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
- $228.66 Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
- $225.02–$230.20 Regular-session low and high so far today.
- 909.3K Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET.
- Dec 17 projected Projected for 2026-12-17 from the company’s own results filings (SEC 8-K Item 2.02). The company has not confirmed the date.
- $169.00–$233.98 52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.
Understand the Business
Why the Stock Moved
Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.
The core investment thesis
Own DRI if its company-owned, multi-brand full-service restaurant portfolio keeps guests choosing Olive Garden, LongHorn and its higher-end concepts often enough for scale purchasing and operating discipline to offset food, wage and consumer-pressure cycles.
DRI price history
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Investment thesis
What must happen next
Darden’s breadth of company-owned concepts across Italian, steak, seafood, casual and fine-dining occasions keeps enough guests inside its system even as dining preferences shift.StrengtheningMateriality: High
GAAP annual revenue increased from $12.0767 billion in FY2025 to $13.2109 billion in FY2026. If the portfolio remains relevant, Darden can grow without relying on one brand or one dining occasion; if it loses relevance, revenue growth turns into a traffic problem rather than a unit-growth opportunity.
Watch: Consumers trade down from full-service restaurants to fast casual, quick service or at-home meals as checks rise.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual revenue increased from $12.0767 billion in FY2025 to $13.2109 billion in FY2026.
Open source ↗Darden’s purchasing scale, menu management and brand-level pricing power allow it to absorb commodity volatility without letting restaurant food economics structurally deteriorate.StrengtheningMateriality: High
GAAP annual gross profit increased from $2.4727 billion in FY2025 to $2.6821 billion in FY2026. If this holds, sales growth remains profitable; if it breaks, higher checks or higher traffic will not translate into owner earnings.
Watch: Sustained beef, dairy, seafood or produce inflation outpaces Darden’s ability to raise menu prices without losing traffic.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual gross profit increased from $2.4727 billion in FY2025 to $2.6821 billion in FY2026.
Open source ↗Because Darden owns and operates its restaurants rather than functioning mainly as a franchisor, guest experience, staffing, kitchen execution and cost controls must stay good enough to convert system demand into operating income.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium
GAAP annual operating income increased from $1.3623 billion in FY2025 to $1.5828 billion in FY2026. This is the difference between a good brand story and a profitable restaurant operator; execution failures would show up quickly in margins and brand perception.
Watch: Labor shortages, higher turnover or wage mandates reduce service quality or force staffing costs up faster than sales.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual operating income increased from $1.3623 billion in FY2025 to $1.5828 billion in FY2026.
Open source ↗Darden’s reinvestment in brands and acquisitions must add earnings power without adding enough complexity or capital intensity to dilute per-share compounding.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium
GAAP annual diluted EPS increased from $8.86 in FY2025 to $10.38 in FY2026. Owners are paid on per-share results, not restaurant count; poor acquisition integration or low-return unit growth would turn expansion into value leakage.
Watch: Chuy’s or Ruth’s Chris integration underperforms because brand positioning, cost structure or site economics do not fit Darden’s operating model.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual diluted EPS increased from $8.86 in FY2025 to $10.38 in FY2026.
Open source ↗The balance sheet must remain flexible enough for Darden to fund restaurants, integrate acquisitions and withstand a casual-dining downturn without being forced into defensive capital allocation.HoldingMateriality: Medium
GAAP total assets were $12.8624 billion at FY2026, exceeding GAAP total liabilities of $10.6549 billion. If leverage and lease obligations become constraining, even good brands may have to sacrifice growth, reinvestment or shareholder returns.
Watch: A recession or sharp full-service dining traffic decline reduces cash generation while fixed rent, labor and debt obligations remain.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP total assets were $12.8624 billion at FY2026, exceeding GAAP total liabilities of $10.6549 billion.
Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence
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Original research
Darden’s breadth of company-owned concepts across Italian, steak, seafood, casual and fine-dining occasions keeps enough guests inside its system even as dining preferences shift. If the portfolio remains relevant, Darden can grow without relying on one brand or one dining occasion; if it loses relevance, revenue growth turns into a traffic problem rather than a unit-growth opportunity.
Darden’s purchasing scale, menu management and brand-level pricing power allow it to absorb commodity volatility without letting restaurant food economics structurally deteriorate. If this holds, sales growth remains profitable; if it breaks, higher checks or higher traffic will not translate into owner earnings.
Because Darden owns and operates its restaurants rather than functioning mainly as a franchisor, guest experience, staffing, kitchen execution and cost controls must stay good enough to convert system demand into operating income. This is the difference between a good brand story and a profitable restaurant operator; execution failures would show up quickly in margins and brand perception.
Darden’s reinvestment in brands and acquisitions must add earnings power without adding enough complexity or capital intensity to dilute per-share compounding. Owners are paid on per-share results, not restaurant count; poor acquisition integration or low-return unit growth would turn expansion into value leakage.
The balance sheet must remain flexible enough for Darden to fund restaurants, integrate acquisitions and withstand a casual-dining downturn without being forced into defensive capital allocation. If leverage and lease obligations become constraining, even good brands may have to sacrifice growth, reinvestment or shareholder returns.
All standing thesis claims
Original report summary
its company-owned, multi-brand full-service restaurant portfolio keeps guests choosing Olive Garden, LongHorn and its higher-end concepts often enough for scale purchasing and operating discipline to offset food, wage and consumer-pressure cycles.
Bull case and bear case
Bull case and bear case for Darden Restaurants
Where the evidence on Darden Restaurants stands: Holding on the latest evidence (Oct 12, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 4 strengthening and 1 holding.
Bull case: what the evidence supports
Darden’s breadth of company-owned concepts across Italian, steak, seafood, casual and fine-dining occasions keeps enough guests inside its system even as dining preferences shift.
Darden’s purchasing scale, menu management and brand-level pricing power allow it to absorb commodity volatility without letting restaurant food economics structurally deteriorate.
Because Darden owns and operates its restaurants rather than functioning mainly as a franchisor, guest experience, staffing, kitchen execution and cost controls must stay good enough to convert system demand into operating income.
Darden’s reinvestment in brands and acquisitions must add earnings power without adding enough complexity or capital intensity to dilute per-share compounding.
The balance sheet must remain flexible enough for Darden to fund restaurants, integrate acquisitions and withstand a casual-dining downturn without being forced into defensive capital allocation.
Bear case: what would count against it
Consumers trade down from full-service restaurants to fast casual, quick service or at-home meals as checks rise.
Sustained beef, dairy, seafood or produce inflation outpaces Darden’s ability to raise menu prices without losing traffic.
Labor shortages, higher turnover or wage mandates reduce service quality or force staffing costs up faster than sales.
Thesis-Break Engine
Thesis-break watch · Darden Restaurants
No break has crossed Darden Restaurants’s thesis. Its break conditions are checked against every new filing as it lands.
MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT
The numbers behind the thesis
What Changed
- MixedReported results of operations (earnings release).
Darden Restaurants filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-09-24: Reported results of operations (earnings release). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedReported results of operations (earnings release).
Darden Restaurants filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-06-25: Reported results of operations (earnings release). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
Risks / falsifiers
What could break the thesis
- Consumers trade down from full-service restaurants to fast casual, quick service or at-home meals as checks rise.
- Sustained beef, dairy, seafood or produce inflation outpaces Darden’s ability to raise menu prices without losing traffic.
- Labor shortages, higher turnover or wage mandates reduce service quality or force staffing costs up faster than sales.
- Chuy’s or Ruth’s Chris integration underperforms because brand positioning, cost structure or site economics do not fit Darden’s operating model.
- A recession or sharp full-service dining traffic decline reduces cash generation while fixed rent, labor and debt obligations remain.
DRI news
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Financial statements
DRI income statement
Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.
DRI: quick answers
- When does Darden Restaurants (DRI) report earnings next?
- Darden Restaurants's next results are projected for December 17, 2026, from the dates of its own results filings with the SEC. The company has not confirmed the date. It last reported on September 24, 2026. Earnings calendar
- What is DRI's short interest?
- As of October 30, 2026, 7.4M DRI shares were sold short, 6.54% of its shares outstanding, up 7.0% from the count before. At the stock's average daily volume that is 8.1 days to cover. FINRA publishes the count twice a month. DRI short interest history
- Have members of Congress traded DRI?
- Reports made public in the last 90 days disclose 1 trade in DRI by 1 filer: 1 purchase and 0 sales. They are filed under the STOCK Act by members of Congress, the President and senior officials. Every disclosed DRI trade
- Which well-known investors own DRI?
- 1 of the 37 well-known funds tracked here reported DRI shares in their latest 13F filing. By share of the fund's portfolio: Bridgewater Associates (Ray Dalio), 0.0%. Fund portfolios
DRI in well-known investors’ portfolios
1 of 37 funds reported DRI shares in their latest 13F filing. A 13F shows quarter-end positions and arrives up to 45 days later.
| Fund | Of its portfolio | Value | Change | Quarter |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ray DalioBridgewater Associates | 0.01% | $1.4M | −9.7% | Q2 2026 |
