WaterBridge Infrastructure
WBINYSEUSD
- Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
- Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
- Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
- $26.26 Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
- $26.21–$28.23 Regular-session low and high so far today.
- 479.2K Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET.
- Not yet confirmed The company has not confirmed its next report date. Reported quarters are available in the chart’s Earnings view.
- $18.64–$36.89 52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.
Understand the Business
Why the Stock Moved
Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.
The core investment thesis
Own WBI if produced-water handling keeps moving to scaled, outsourced water infrastructure and its enlarged asset base fills fast enough to overcome leverage and weak bottom-line conversion.
WBI price history
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Investment thesis
What must happen next
Oil and gas producers continue to prefer outsourced water infrastructure over owning and operating water systems themselves, so WaterBridge can keep converting field activity into contracted or repeat service demand.StrengtheningMateriality: High
Annual GAAP revenue increased from $200.8 million in FY2023 to $316.3 million in FY2024 and $525.6 million in FY2025. If outsourcing remains the preferred model, WBI can compound from a larger infrastructure base; if producers internalize water handling, the growth engine weakens before reported revenue rolls over.
Watch: Large E&P customers decide to build or reacquire their own produced-water gathering, recycling, or disposal systems.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Annual GAAP revenue increased from $200.8 million in FY2023 to $316.3 million in FY2024 and $525.6 million in FY2025.
Open source ↗WaterBridge’s local network density and operating know-how let it absorb more volumes without sacrificing per-unit economics to trucking costs, disposal costs, or price competition.StrengtheningMateriality: High
Estimated annual GAAP gross profit rose from $55.3 million in FY2023 to $88.4 million in FY2024 and $142.2 million in FY2025. Durable gross margins would support an infrastructure-like valuation; margin compression would suggest WBI is competing as a commodity oilfield-service provider.
Watch: Producer-owned systems or rival water networks underprice WBI to win volumes, turning water handling into a spot-price service.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Estimated annual GAAP gross profit rose from $55.3 million in FY2023 to $88.4 million in FY2024 and $142.2 million in.
Open source ↗The expanded asset base is integrated and utilized well enough that incremental water volumes flow through to operating income rather than being absorbed by overhead, maintenance, and integration costs.HoldingMateriality: Medium
Annual GAAP operating income increased from $40.5 million in FY2023 to $56.4 million in FY2024 and $78.9 million in FY2025. This determines whether rapid growth creates owner earnings or merely adds scale with lower returns.
Watch: Newly acquired or newly built water assets fail to attract sufficient producer volumes, leaving underutilized fixed infrastructure.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Annual GAAP operating income increased from $40.5 million in FY2023 to $56.4 million in FY2024 and $78.9 million in FY2025.
Open source ↗WaterBridge’s services are cash-generative enough to help fund infrastructure growth internally, reducing dependence on continual external capital.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium
Annual GAAP operating cash flow increased from $48.5 million in FY2023 to $73.9 million in FY2024 and $159.7 million in FY2025. Strong operating cash flow gives equity holders more ways to win; weak cash conversion would force debt, dilution, or slower growth.
Watch: Customers demand longer payment terms or contract structures that delay cash collection during volume growth.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Annual GAAP operating cash flow increased from $48.5 million in FY2023 to $73.9 million in FY2024 and $159.7 million in.
Open source ↗The balance sheet is the main constraint: WBI must finance water infrastructure without letting debt, interest, or preferred claims absorb the economics of the operating business.HoldingMateriality: Medium
Liabilities were $1.85 billion at FY2025 year-end versus $3.70 billion of assets, indicating a substantially funded asset base rather than a purely asset-light service model. Even a good operating network can be a poor equity investment if liabilities capture the cash flow before common owners do.
Watch: Higher interest rates, refinancing pressure, or debt covenant limits restrict WBI’s ability to fund new infrastructure or acquisitions.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Liabilities were $1.85 billion at FY2025 year-end versus $3.70 billion of assets, indicating a substantially funded asset base rather than.
Open source ↗The operating platform must begin translating operating profits into net income attributable to equity holders, not just revenue and EBITDA-like growth.WeakeningMateriality: Medium
The company was GAAP net profitable in FY2023, FY2024, and FY2025 rather than structurally loss-making. This is the bridge between a successful business and a successful common stock; if net income remains negligible, per-share value creation is questionable.
Watch: Interest expense, preferred distributions, noncontrolling interests, or tax structure continue to consume nearly all operating profit.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
The company was GAAP net profitable in FY2023, FY2024, and FY2025 rather than structurally loss-making.
Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence
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Original research
Oil and gas producers continue to prefer outsourced water infrastructure over owning and operating water systems themselves, so WaterBridge can keep converting field activity into contracted or repeat service demand. If outsourcing remains the preferred model, WBI can compound from a larger infrastructure base; if producers internalize water handling, the growth engine weakens before reported revenue rolls over.
WaterBridge’s local network density and operating know-how let it absorb more volumes without sacrificing per-unit economics to trucking costs, disposal costs, or price competition. Durable gross margins would support an infrastructure-like valuation; margin compression would suggest WBI is competing as a commodity oilfield-service provider.
The expanded asset base is integrated and utilized well enough that incremental water volumes flow through to operating income rather than being absorbed by overhead, maintenance, and integration costs. This determines whether rapid growth creates owner earnings or merely adds scale with lower returns.
WaterBridge’s services are cash-generative enough to help fund infrastructure growth internally, reducing dependence on continual external capital. Strong operating cash flow gives equity holders more ways to win; weak cash conversion would force debt, dilution, or slower growth.
The balance sheet is the main constraint: WBI must finance water infrastructure without letting debt, interest, or preferred claims absorb the economics of the operating business. Even a good operating network can be a poor equity investment if liabilities capture the cash flow before common owners do.
The operating platform must begin translating operating profits into net income attributable to equity holders, not just revenue and EBITDA-like growth. This is the bridge between a successful business and a successful common stock; if net income remains negligible, per-share value creation is questionable.
All standing thesis claims
Original report summary
produced-water handling keeps moving to scaled, outsourced water infrastructure and its enlarged asset base fills fast enough to overcome leverage and weak bottom-line conversion.
Bull case and bear case
Bull case and bear case for WaterBridge Infrastructure
Where the evidence on WaterBridge Infrastructure disagrees: Mixed on the latest evidence (Oct 15, 2026). Of its 6 thesis points, 3 strengthening, 2 holding and 1 weakening.
Bull case: what the evidence supports
Oil and gas producers continue to prefer outsourced water infrastructure over owning and operating water systems themselves, so WaterBridge can keep converting field activity into contracted or repeat service demand.
WaterBridge’s local network density and operating know-how let it absorb more volumes without sacrificing per-unit economics to trucking costs, disposal costs, or price competition.
The expanded asset base is integrated and utilized well enough that incremental water volumes flow through to operating income rather than being absorbed by overhead, maintenance, and integration costs.
WaterBridge’s services are cash-generative enough to help fund infrastructure growth internally, reducing dependence on continual external capital.
The balance sheet is the main constraint: WBI must finance water infrastructure without letting debt, interest, or preferred claims absorb the economics of the operating business.
Bear case: what the evidence questions
The operating platform must begin translating operating profits into net income attributable to equity holders, not just revenue and EBITDA-like growth.
Thesis-Break Engine
What has broken in WaterBridge Infrastructure’s thesis
Each break OptimistFi flagged on WaterBridge Infrastructure, dated — with what has historically followed the same kind of break across the market, not a forecast for WaterBridge Infrastructure.
- CEO / officer changecondition set before this filing
Across all companies, this kind of break has happened 16,849 times before. Those stocks trailed comparable companies by a median of 2% over the next six months, and 38% of them trailed it by 10 points or more.
MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT
The numbers behind the thesis
What Changed
- MixedDirector or principal officer change.
WaterBridge Infrastructure filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-09-21: Director or principal officer change. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedEntered a material definitive agreement.
WaterBridge Infrastructure filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-08-18: Entered a material definitive agreement. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedRegulation FD disclosure.
WaterBridge Infrastructure filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-08-13: Regulation FD disclosure. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
Risks / falsifiers
What could break the thesis
- Large E&P customers decide to build or reacquire their own produced-water gathering, recycling, or disposal systems.
- Producer-owned systems or rival water networks underprice WBI to win volumes, turning water handling into a spot-price service.
- Newly acquired or newly built water assets fail to attract sufficient producer volumes, leaving underutilized fixed infrastructure.
- Customers demand longer payment terms or contract structures that delay cash collection during volume growth.
- Higher interest rates, refinancing pressure, or debt covenant limits restrict WBI’s ability to fund new infrastructure or acquisitions.
- Interest expense, preferred distributions, noncontrolling interests, or tax structure continue to consume nearly all operating profit.
WBI news
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Financial statements
WBI income statement
Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.
WBI: quick answers
- Have members of Congress traded WBI?
- 4 trades in WBI have been disclosed under the STOCK Act by members of Congress, the President or senior officials, none in reports made public in the last 90 days. Every disclosed WBI trade
