Upstart Holdings
UPSTNASDAQUSD
- Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
- Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
- Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
- $20.41 Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
- $20.42–$21.14 Regular-session low and high so far today.
- 6.3M Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET.
- Not yet confirmed The company has not confirmed its next report date. Reported quarters are available in the chart’s Earnings view.
- $19.71–$52.10 52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.
Understand the Business
Why the Stock Moved
Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.
The core investment thesis
Own UPST if UPST is a high-upside but credit-cycle-sensitive bet that its AI lending marketplace can prove better underwriting at scale without requiring Upstart to fund the loans itself.
UPST price history
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Investment thesis
What must happen next
Upstart’s AI underwriting must keep giving bank and credit-union partners a risk-adjusted approval and pricing advantage over conventional credit-score workflows, so partner demand converts into marketplace volume when funding conditions permit.StrengtheningMateriality: High
The company is described in the available Item 1-derived profile as a leading artificial intelligence lending marketplace. If lenders believe the model improves risk selection, revenue can compound with partner adoption; if not, the marketplace loses its reason to exist.
Watch: Major bank or credit-union partners shift underwriting volume to internal models or competing AI-credit vendors such as FICO, Experian, or Zest AI after finding no superior loss-adjusted approval lift.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
The company is described in the available Item 1-derived profile as a leading artificial intelligence lending marketplace.
Open source ↗The marketplace depends on outside loan buyers and bank balance sheets staying willing to fund Upstart-originated loans; if Upstart has to warehouse more credit risk itself, the asset-light thesis weakens before revenue falls.HoldingMateriality: High
GAAP annual operating cash flow was negative $147.7 million in FY2025 despite positive GAAP net income, showing cash conversion remains vulnerable. This determines whether growth is high-quality fee revenue or growth that consumes capital and exposes shareholders to credit losses.
Watch: Securitization investors, whole-loan buyers, or warehouse lenders demand materially wider spreads or stop buying Upstart loans.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual operating cash flow was negative $147.7 million in FY2025 despite positive GAAP net income, showing cash conversion remains.
Open source ↗If model-driven lending volume scales without proportional human underwriting, servicing, and partner-support cost, Upstart should regain operating leverage rather than spending every incremental dollar to source loans or manage compliance.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium
GAAP annual operating income improved to positive $42.6 million in FY2025 from negative $172.9 million in FY2024 and negative $256.5 million in FY2023. Operating leverage is the bridge from an attractive technology story to durable owner earnings.
Watch: Borrower-acquisition channels become more expensive, forcing Upstart to spend more to generate the same loan demand.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual operating income improved to positive $42.6 million in FY2025 from negative $172.9 million in FY2024 and negative $256.5.
Open source ↗Upstart needs enough liquidity to absorb credit-cycle volatility without issuing distressed equity or shrinking the platform when partners pause.HoldingMateriality: Medium
Cash and cash equivalents were $652.4 million at FY2025 year-end. Liquidity determines whether shareholders can survive the next credit downturn and still own the platform when conditions recover.
Watch: A prolonged consumer-credit funding freeze forces Upstart to retain loans or support funding partners with its own balance sheet.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Cash and cash equivalents were $652.4 million at FY2025 year-end.
Open source ↗For owners, the AI-lending rebound must translate into durable GAAP earnings per share rather than volume subsidized by stock compensation, balance-sheet risk, or capital raises.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium
GAAP diluted EPS was positive $0.45 in FY2025 after negative $1.44 in FY2024 and negative $2.87 in FY2023. A larger platform only creates shareholder value if profits accrue per share and are not offset by dilution or hidden credit risk.
Watch: Heavy stock-based compensation or equity issuance absorbs the economic benefit of revenue growth.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP diluted EPS was positive $0.45 in FY2025 after negative $1.44 in FY2024 and negative $2.87 in FY2023.
Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence
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Original research
Upstart’s AI underwriting must keep giving bank and credit-union partners a risk-adjusted approval and pricing advantage over conventional credit-score workflows, so partner demand converts into marketplace volume when funding conditions permit. If lenders believe the model improves risk selection, revenue can compound with partner adoption; if not, the marketplace loses its reason to exist.
The marketplace depends on outside loan buyers and bank balance sheets staying willing to fund Upstart-originated loans; if Upstart has to warehouse more credit risk itself, the asset-light thesis weakens before revenue falls. This determines whether growth is high-quality fee revenue or growth that consumes capital and exposes shareholders to credit losses.
If model-driven lending volume scales without proportional human underwriting, servicing, and partner-support cost, Upstart should regain operating leverage rather than spending every incremental dollar to source loans or manage compliance. Operating leverage is the bridge from an attractive technology story to durable owner earnings.
Upstart needs enough liquidity to absorb credit-cycle volatility without issuing distressed equity or shrinking the platform when partners pause. Liquidity determines whether shareholders can survive the next credit downturn and still own the platform when conditions recover.
For owners, the AI-lending rebound must translate into durable GAAP earnings per share rather than volume subsidized by stock compensation, balance-sheet risk, or capital raises. A larger platform only creates shareholder value if profits accrue per share and are not offset by dilution or hidden credit risk.
All standing thesis claims
Original report summary
UPST is a high-upside but credit-cycle-sensitive bet that its AI lending marketplace can prove better underwriting at scale without requiring Upstart to fund the loans itself.
Bull case and bear case
Bull case and bear case for Upstart Holdings
Where the evidence on Upstart Holdings stands: Holding on the latest evidence (Oct 24, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 3 strengthening and 2 holding.
Bull case: what the evidence supports
Upstart’s AI underwriting must keep giving bank and credit-union partners a risk-adjusted approval and pricing advantage over conventional credit-score workflows, so partner demand converts into marketplace volume when funding conditions permit.
The marketplace depends on outside loan buyers and bank balance sheets staying willing to fund Upstart-originated loans; if Upstart has to warehouse more credit risk itself, the asset-light thesis weakens before revenue falls.
If model-driven lending volume scales without proportional human underwriting, servicing, and partner-support cost, Upstart should regain operating leverage rather than spending every incremental dollar to source loans or manage compliance.
Upstart needs enough liquidity to absorb credit-cycle volatility without issuing distressed equity or shrinking the platform when partners pause.
For owners, the AI-lending rebound must translate into durable GAAP earnings per share rather than volume subsidized by stock compensation, balance-sheet risk, or capital raises.
Bear case: what would count against it
Major bank or credit-union partners shift underwriting volume to internal models or competing AI-credit vendors such as FICO, Experian, or Zest AI after finding no superior loss-adjusted approval lift.
Securitization investors, whole-loan buyers, or warehouse lenders demand materially wider spreads or stop buying Upstart loans.
Borrower-acquisition channels become more expensive, forcing Upstart to spend more to generate the same loan demand.
Thesis-Break Engine
Thesis-break watch · Upstart Holdings
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MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT
The numbers behind the thesis
What Changed
- MixedEntered a material definitive agreement.
Upstart Holdings filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-10-20: Entered a material definitive agreement. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedReported results of operations (earnings release).
Upstart Holdings filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-08-04: Reported results of operations (earnings release). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedDirector or principal officer change.
Upstart Holdings filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-05-19: Director or principal officer change. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
Risks / falsifiers
What could break the thesis
- Major bank or credit-union partners shift underwriting volume to internal models or competing AI-credit vendors such as FICO, Experian, or Zest AI after finding no superior loss-adjusted approval lift.
- Securitization investors, whole-loan buyers, or warehouse lenders demand materially wider spreads or stop buying Upstart loans.
- Borrower-acquisition channels become more expensive, forcing Upstart to spend more to generate the same loan demand.
- A prolonged consumer-credit funding freeze forces Upstart to retain loans or support funding partners with its own balance sheet.
- Heavy stock-based compensation or equity issuance absorbs the economic benefit of revenue growth.
UPST news
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Financial statements
UPST income statement
Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.
UPST: quick answers
- Have members of Congress traded UPST?
- Reports made public in the last 90 days disclose 1 trade in UPST by 1 filer: 0 purchases and 1 sale. They are filed under the STOCK Act by members of Congress, the President and senior officials. Every disclosed UPST trade
- Which well-known investors own UPST?
- 1 of the 37 well-known funds tracked here reported UPST shares in their latest 13F filing. By share of the fund's portfolio: Coatue Management (Philippe Laffont), 0.1%. Fund portfolios
UPST in well-known investors’ portfolios
1 of 37 funds reported UPST shares in their latest 13F filing. A 13F shows quarter-end positions and arrives up to 45 days later.
| Fund | Of its portfolio | Value | Change | Quarter |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Philippe LaffontCoatue Management | 0.06% | $30.9M | No change | Q2 2026 |