United Microelectronics
UMCNYSEUSD
- Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
- Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
- Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
- $15.04 Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
- $15.59–$16.19 Regular-session low and high so far today.
- 13.2M Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET.
- Not yet confirmed The company has not confirmed its next report date. Reported quarters are available in the chart’s Earnings view.
- $6.97–$28.96 52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.
Understand the Business
Why the Stock Moved
Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.
The core investment thesis
Own UMC if qualified specialty capacity stays valuable, but the stock only works if the market is underestimating recovery in utilization and margins rather than already pricing it in.
UMC price history
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Investment thesis
What must happen next
Customers keep using UMC because qualified mature-node and specialty wafer capacity is costly and slow to replace, so demand should recover with end-market inventories rather than permanently migrate away.HoldingMateriality: High
IFRS annual revenue increased to TWD232.3 billion in FY2024 from TWD222.5 billion in FY2023, suggesting some stabilization after the downturn. If qualification friction holds, UMC’s fabs can refill without needing to win a leading-edge technology race; if it fails, revenue becomes more price-sensitive and structurally weaker.
Watch: SMIC or Hua Hong wins major mature-node customers on price, proving requalification friction is not enough to protect UMC.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
IFRS annual revenue increased to TWD232.3 billion in FY2024 from TWD222.5 billion in FY2023, suggesting some stabilization after the downturn.
Open source ↗UMC’s specialty process mix and capacity discipline must offset mature-node commoditization enough to protect wafer pricing and gross profit; current evidence shows this protection is under pressure.WeakeningMateriality: High
IFRS annual gross profit remained positive at USD2.31 billion in FY2024 despite a weaker industry cycle. Revenue growth is not valuable if it comes from filling fabs with lower-priced commodity wafers that dilute gross profit.
Watch: Subsidized Chinese mature-node capacity from SMIC or Hua Hong causes industry wafer pricing to fall faster than UMC can improve mix.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
IFRS annual gross profit remained positive at USD2.31 billion in FY2024 despite a weaker industry cycle.
Open source ↗Because UMC operates capital-intensive fabs with high fixed costs, a real utilization recovery should translate into operating income; if volumes recover only through discounting or higher depreciation, the model’s leverage is impaired.HoldingMateriality: Medium
IFRS annual operating income was USD1.57 billion in FY2024, showing UMC remained profitable through the downturn. This determines whether cyclical revenue recovery becomes owner earnings or merely keeps fabs busy.
Watch: Persistent industry underutilization forces UMC to accept low-margin volume just to absorb fixed fab costs.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
IFRS annual operating income was USD1.57 billion in FY2024, showing UMC remained profitable through the downturn.
Open source ↗UMC’s operating cash generation gives it the resilience to keep investing through semiconductor cycles without relying on distressed financing; the claim fails if capex and dividends consume cash faster than operations replenish it.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium
IFRS annual operating cash flow was USD2.86 billion in FY2024, slightly above USD2.81 billion in FY2023 despite lower net income. A cyclical foundry with cash resilience can defend process capability and shareholder returns during downturns; a cash-strained one loses strategic flexibility.
Watch: A prolonged downturn forces UMC to fund capex, dividends, or working capital from the balance sheet rather than operating cash flow.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
IFRS annual operating cash flow was USD2.86 billion in FY2024, slightly above USD2.81 billion in FY2023 despite lower net income.
Open source ↗UMC’s balance sheet must remain conservative enough that cyclicality does not force value-destructive retrenchment or dilution during downcycles.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium
IFRS liabilities declined to USD5.93 billion at FY2024 year-end from USD6.63 billion at FY2023 year-end. Financial strength is part of the moat in foundry cycles because it lets UMC keep investing while weaker players pull back.
Watch: Debt-funded capacity expansion increases fixed obligations before customer demand is secured.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
IFRS liabilities declined to USD5.93 billion at FY2024 year-end from USD6.63 billion at FY2023 year-end.
Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence
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Original research
Customers keep using UMC because qualified mature-node and specialty wafer capacity is costly and slow to replace, so demand should recover with end-market inventories rather than permanently migrate away. If qualification friction holds, UMC’s fabs can refill without needing to win a leading-edge technology race; if it fails, revenue becomes more price-sensitive and structurally weaker.
UMC’s specialty process mix and capacity discipline must offset mature-node commoditization enough to protect wafer pricing and gross profit; current evidence shows this protection is under pressure. Revenue growth is not valuable if it comes from filling fabs with lower-priced commodity wafers that dilute gross profit.
Because UMC operates capital-intensive fabs with high fixed costs, a real utilization recovery should translate into operating income; if volumes recover only through discounting or higher depreciation, the model’s leverage is impaired. This determines whether cyclical revenue recovery becomes owner earnings or merely keeps fabs busy.
UMC’s operating cash generation gives it the resilience to keep investing through semiconductor cycles without relying on distressed financing; the claim fails if capex and dividends consume cash faster than operations replenish it. A cyclical foundry with cash resilience can defend process capability and shareholder returns during downturns; a cash-strained one loses strategic flexibility.
UMC’s balance sheet must remain conservative enough that cyclicality does not force value-destructive retrenchment or dilution during downcycles. Financial strength is part of the moat in foundry cycles because it lets UMC keep investing while weaker players pull back.
All standing thesis claims
Original report summary
qualified specialty capacity stays valuable, but the stock only works if the market is underestimating recovery in utilization and margins rather than already pricing it in.
Bull case and bear case
Bull case and bear case for United Microelectronics
Where the evidence on United Microelectronics disagrees: Mixed on the latest evidence (Oct 14, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 2 strengthening, 2 holding and 1 weakening.
Bull case: what the evidence supports
Customers keep using UMC because qualified mature-node and specialty wafer capacity is costly and slow to replace, so demand should recover with end-market inventories rather than permanently migrate away.
Because UMC operates capital-intensive fabs with high fixed costs, a real utilization recovery should translate into operating income; if volumes recover only through discounting or higher depreciation, the model’s leverage is impaired.
UMC’s operating cash generation gives it the resilience to keep investing through semiconductor cycles without relying on distressed financing; the claim fails if capex and dividends consume cash faster than operations replenish it.
UMC’s balance sheet must remain conservative enough that cyclicality does not force value-destructive retrenchment or dilution during downcycles.
Bear case: what the evidence questions
UMC’s specialty process mix and capacity discipline must offset mature-node commoditization enough to protect wafer pricing and gross profit; current evidence shows this protection is under pressure.
Thesis-Break Engine
Thesis-break watch · United Microelectronics
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MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT
The numbers behind the thesis
What Changed
- MixedForeign issuer material report (6-K).
United Microelectronics filed an SEC report on 2026-10-13: Foreign issuer material report (6-K). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedForeign issuer material report (6-K).
United Microelectronics filed an SEC report on 2026-10-06: Foreign issuer material report (6-K). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedForeign issuer material report (6-K).
United Microelectronics filed an SEC report on 2026-10-05: Foreign issuer material report (6-K). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
Risks / falsifiers
What could break the thesis
- SMIC or Hua Hong wins major mature-node customers on price, proving requalification friction is not enough to protect UMC.
- Subsidized Chinese mature-node capacity from SMIC or Hua Hong causes industry wafer pricing to fall faster than UMC can improve mix.
- Persistent industry underutilization forces UMC to accept low-margin volume just to absorb fixed fab costs.
- A prolonged downturn forces UMC to fund capex, dividends, or working capital from the balance sheet rather than operating cash flow.
- Debt-funded capacity expansion increases fixed obligations before customer demand is secured.
UMC news
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Financial statements
UMC income statement
Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.
UMC: quick answers
- Which well-known investors own UMC?
- 1 of the 37 well-known funds tracked here reported UMC shares in their latest 13F filing. By share of the fund's portfolio: Maverick Capital, 0.0%. Fund portfolios
UMC in well-known investors’ portfolios
1 of 37 funds reported UMC shares in their latest 13F filing. A 13F shows quarter-end positions and arrives up to 45 days later.
| Fund | Of its portfolio | Value | Change | Quarter |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Maverick Capital | 0.01% | $783K | New | Q2 2026 |
