Atlassian

TEAMNASDAQUSD

THESIS ALERT

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$152.44
+$3.84 (+2.58%)Today 1M −28.14%
After hours$150.12−1.52%

Updated Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET · Regular session · May be delayed

Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
$148.60
Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
$149.17–$154.19
Regular-session low and high so far today.
3.3M
Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET.
Feb 4 projected
Projected for 2027-02-04 from the company’s own results filings (SEC 8-K Item 2.02). The company has not confirmed the date.
$56.01–$229.96
52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.

Understand the Business

Why the Stock Moved

Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.

The core investment thesis

Own TEAM if Jira-centered workflow entrenchment keeps expanding into cloud subscriptions while scale finally converts high gross margins into GAAP profit and cash.

TEAM price history

Latest price$152.44Today+$3.84 (+2.58%)
TEAM -25.83%S&P 500 -2.42%Since first plotted close
4 hours

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Investment thesis

What must happen next

5 MATERIAL PROPOSITIONS
  • Atlassian’s embedded role in team workflows keeps customer expansion and cloud adoption converting into subscription growth rather than one-time product-cycle demand.StrengtheningMateriality: High

    GAAP annual revenue increased from $3.53 billion in FY2023 to $6.57 billion in FY2026. If workflow lock-in holds, revenue can compound without Atlassian needing to constantly reacquire demand; if it breaks, the company becomes a more ordinary, competitive SaaS vendor.

    Watch: Microsoft uses Teams, Azure DevOps, GitHub, and bundled enterprise agreements to displace Atlassian as the daily workflow layer.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    GAAP annual revenue increased from $3.53 billion in FY2023 to $6.57 billion in FY2026.

    Open source ↗
  • Atlassian’s software platform retains enough pricing power and low marginal delivery cost that cloud hosting, marketplace economics, and AI features do not erode its gross-margin structure.StrengtheningMateriality: High

    GAAP annual gross profit rose from $2.90 billion in FY2023 to $5.58 billion in FY2026. High gross margins are the economic fuel for R&D, sales investment, and eventual operating leverage; gross-margin erosion would make growth far less valuable.

    Watch: Cloud infrastructure or AI inference costs rise faster than Atlassian can pass through in pricing.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    GAAP annual gross profit rose from $2.90 billion in FY2023 to $5.58 billion in FY2026.

    Open source ↗
  • Atlassian’s product-led model and installed-base expansion should allow incremental gross profit to show up as GAAP operating leverage, rather than being fully consumed by R&D, sales, and competitive reinvestment.HoldingMateriality: Medium

    GAAP annual operating income improved from a loss of $345.2 million in FY2023 to positive $10.4 million in FY2026. The stock needs proof that Atlassian is not merely growing but becoming a structurally profitable software platform.

    Watch: Atlassian must materially increase sales spending to compete for enterprise deals against Microsoft, ServiceNow, or GitLab.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    GAAP annual operating income improved from a loss of $345.2 million in FY2023 to positive $10.4 million in FY2026.

    Open source ↗
  • Atlassian’s recurring subscription model must continue producing strong operating cash flow; otherwise growth may be coming with weaker renewal terms, heavier working-capital drag, or rising compensation and infrastructure costs.HoldingMateriality: Medium

    GAAP annual operating cash flow remained positive at $1.35 billion in FY2026. Cash flow is what funds product investment and per-share value creation; if cash conversion weakens while revenue grows, the quality of growth is lower.

    Watch: Enterprise customers shift to shorter billing durations, delayed payments, or more flexible renewal terms.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    GAAP annual operating cash flow remained positive at $1.35 billion in FY2026.

    Open source ↗
  • Atlassian needs enough balance-sheet flexibility to fund cloud, AI, and product investment through competitive cycles without relying on distressed financing or value-destructive dilution.HoldingMateriality: Medium

    Cash and cash equivalents were $1.24 billion at FY2026 year-end. A strong balance sheet gives management time to defend the platform; a weakening one would reduce strategic flexibility just as competition intensifies.

    Watch: Cash continues to decline because acquisitions, buybacks, restructuring, or infrastructure commitments outpace operating cash flow.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    Cash and cash equivalents were $1.24 billion at FY2026 year-end.

    Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence

Loading the original research archive…

Original research

Atlassian’s embedded role in team workflows keeps customer expansion and cloud adoption converting into subscription growth rather than one-time product-cycle demand. If workflow lock-in holds, revenue can compound without Atlassian needing to constantly reacquire demand; if it breaks, the company becomes a more ordinary, competitive SaaS vendor.

Atlassian’s software platform retains enough pricing power and low marginal delivery cost that cloud hosting, marketplace economics, and AI features do not erode its gross-margin structure. High gross margins are the economic fuel for R&D, sales investment, and eventual operating leverage; gross-margin erosion would make growth far less valuable.

Atlassian’s product-led model and installed-base expansion should allow incremental gross profit to show up as GAAP operating leverage, rather than being fully consumed by R&D, sales, and competitive reinvestment. The stock needs proof that Atlassian is not merely growing but becoming a structurally profitable software platform.

Atlassian’s recurring subscription model must continue producing strong operating cash flow; otherwise growth may be coming with weaker renewal terms, heavier working-capital drag, or rising compensation and infrastructure costs. Cash flow is what funds product investment and per-share value creation; if cash conversion weakens while revenue grows, the quality of growth is lower.

Atlassian needs enough balance-sheet flexibility to fund cloud, AI, and product investment through competitive cycles without relying on distressed financing or value-destructive dilution. A strong balance sheet gives management time to defend the platform; a weakening one would reduce strategic flexibility just as competition intensifies.

All standing thesis claims
Original report summary

Jira-centered workflow entrenchment keeps expanding into cloud subscriptions while scale finally converts high gross margins into GAAP profit and cash.

Evidence assessed Oct 13, 2026. Expand each conclusion for its evidence and what would change it. Thesis evidence—not a buy or sell recommendation.

Bull case and bear case

Bull case and bear case for Atlassian

Where the evidence on Atlassian stands: Holding on the latest evidence (Oct 13, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 2 strengthening and 3 holding.

Bull case: what the evidence supports

  • Atlassian’s embedded role in team workflows keeps customer expansion and cloud adoption converting into subscription growth rather than one-time product-cycle demand.

    sec.gov ↗

  • Atlassian’s software platform retains enough pricing power and low marginal delivery cost that cloud hosting, marketplace economics, and AI features do not erode its gross-margin structure.

    sec.gov ↗

  • Atlassian’s product-led model and installed-base expansion should allow incremental gross profit to show up as GAAP operating leverage, rather than being fully consumed by R&D, sales, and competitive reinvestment.

    sec.gov ↗

  • Atlassian’s recurring subscription model must continue producing strong operating cash flow; otherwise growth may be coming with weaker renewal terms, heavier working-capital drag, or rising compensation and infrastructure costs.

    sec.gov ↗

  • Atlassian needs enough balance-sheet flexibility to fund cloud, AI, and product investment through competitive cycles without relying on distressed financing or value-destructive dilution.

    sec.gov ↗

Bear case: what would count against it

  • Microsoft uses Teams, Azure DevOps, GitHub, and bundled enterprise agreements to displace Atlassian as the daily workflow layer.

    sec.gov ↗

  • Cloud infrastructure or AI inference costs rise faster than Atlassian can pass through in pricing.

    sec.gov ↗

  • Atlassian must materially increase sales spending to compete for enterprise deals against Microsoft, ServiceNow, or GitLab.

    sec.gov ↗

Thesis-Break Engine

What has broken in Atlassian’s thesis

Each break OptimistFi flagged on Atlassian, dated — with what has historically followed the same kind of break across the market, not a forecast for Atlassian.

peers+15%-20%-2%12 mo agonow+6 mo
Daily price, then where similar breaks led across the market: the typical -2% path vs comparable companies over six months, inside the middle-half range (+15% to -20%). A base rate, not a forecast.
  • CEO / officer changecondition set before this filing

    Across all companies, this kind of break has happened 16,849 times before. Those stocks trailed comparable companies by a median of 2% over the next six months, and 38% of them trailed it by 10 points or more.

  • Analyst downgradecondition set before this filing

    Across all companies, this kind of break has happened 12,641 times before. Those stocks trailed comparable companies by a median of 1% over the next six months, and 33% of them trailed it by 10 points or more.

  • Price target fell below the stockcondition set before this filing

    Across all companies, this kind of break has happened 1,809 times before. Those stocks trailed comparable companies by a median of 1% over the next six months, and 33% of them trailed it by 10 points or more.

Several kinds of break have stacked on Atlassian at once. A cluster is a stronger read than any one signal alone.

How the Thesis-Break Engine works →Historical outcomes are measured against comparable companies after past breaks of the same kind, across all companies. Not a prediction.

MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT

The numbers behind the thesis

Sourced from filings and market data

What Changed

  1. Mixed
    Reported results of operations (earnings release).

    Atlassian filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-08-06: Reported results of operations (earnings release). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.

  2. Mixed
    Reported results of operations (earnings release).

    Atlassian filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-04-30: Reported results of operations (earnings release). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.

Risks / falsifiers

What could break the thesis

  • Microsoft uses Teams, Azure DevOps, GitHub, and bundled enterprise agreements to displace Atlassian as the daily workflow layer.
  • Cloud infrastructure or AI inference costs rise faster than Atlassian can pass through in pricing.
  • Atlassian must materially increase sales spending to compete for enterprise deals against Microsoft, ServiceNow, or GitLab.
  • Enterprise customers shift to shorter billing durations, delayed payments, or more flexible renewal terms.
  • Cash continues to decline because acquisitions, buybacks, restructuring, or infrastructure commitments outpace operating cash flow.

TEAM news

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Financial statements

TEAM income statement

Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.

TEAM: quick answers

When does Atlassian (TEAM) report earnings next?
Atlassian's next results are projected for February 4, 2027, from the dates of its own results filings with the SEC. The company has not confirmed the date. It last reported on November 5, 2026. Earnings calendar
What is TEAM's short interest?
As of October 30, 2026, 7.9M TEAM shares were sold short, 5.02% of its shares outstanding, down 16.4% from the count before. At the stock's average daily volume that is 3.2 days to cover. FINRA publishes the count twice a month. TEAM short interest history
Have members of Congress traded TEAM?
Reports made public in the last 90 days disclose 1 trade in TEAM by 1 filer: 0 purchases and 1 sale. They are filed under the STOCK Act by members of Congress, the President and senior officials. Every disclosed TEAM trade
Which well-known investors own TEAM?
1 of the 37 well-known funds tracked here reported TEAM shares in their latest 13F filing. By share of the fund's portfolio: Soros Fund Management (George Soros), 0.4%. Fund portfolios

TEAM in well-known investors’ portfolios

1 of 37 funds reported TEAM shares in their latest 13F filing. A 13F shows quarter-end positions and arrives up to 45 days later.

FundOf its portfolioValueChangeQuarter
George SorosSoros Fund Management0.44%$35.7M−14.3%Q2 2026

Every fund’s portfolio

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