What is STNE's short interest?

As of October 30, 2026, 15.2M STNE shares were sold short, up 66.2% from the count before. At the stock's average daily volume that is 1.9 days to cover. FINRA publishes the count twice a month.

Which well-known investors own STNE?

1 of the 37 well-known funds tracked here reported STNE shares in their latest 13F filing. By share of the fund's portfolio: Bridgewater Associates (Ray Dalio), 0.0%.

StoneCo

STNENASDAQUSD

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$7.85

+$0.18 (+2.35%)Today 1M −38.44%

After hours$7.88+0.32%Nov 11, 7:59 PM ET

Updated Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET · Regular session · May be delayed




: $7.67
: $7.79–$8.06
: 5.1M
: Not yet confirmed
: $7.06–$18.19

Understand the Business

Why the Stock Moved

Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.

The core investment thesis

Own STNE if StoneCo is a bet that its Brazilian merchant ecosystem can turn payments relationships into durable, risk-adjusted financial-services profits rather than another commoditized acquiring business.

What must remain true for the stock to work.Explore the thesis

4 hours

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Investment thesis

What must happen next

4 MATERIAL PROPOSITIONS

StoneCo’s local service-led merchant platform must remain differentiated enough for Brazilian SMBs to keep choosing it over bank acquirers, PagSeguro/PagBank, Mercado Pago, Nubank and pure Pix acceptance; otherwise payment economics commoditize before scale can matter.HoldingMateriality: High
FY2023 IFRS annual net_income was BRL 1.600 billion, showing the model can produce accounting profit after prior losses. If merchant differentiation holds, StoneCo can monetize the relationship beyond basic acquiring; if it breaks, the business becomes a lower-margin processor with limited pricing power.
Watch: PagSeguro/PagBank or Mercado Pago matching StoneCo’s service proposition while pricing acquiring and banking more aggressively for SMBs.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
FY2023 IFRS annual net_income was BRL 1.600 billion, showing the model can produce accounting profit after prior losses.
Open source ↗
Merchant credit, prepayment and other financial-services products should deepen StoneCo’s relationship only if underwriting and funding discipline keep working capital from becoming a cash drain; a renewed credit-cycle mistake would break the ecosystem economics.WeakeningMateriality: High
IFRS annual operating_cash_flow was positive in FY2021 at BRL 3.607 billion, FY2022 at BRL 1.684 billion and FY2023 at BRL 1.648 billion. This determines whether financial services are a profit pool attached to payments or a recurring source of losses and liquidity pressure.
Watch: Brazilian SMB credit losses rising faster than pricing or collateral coverage in StoneCo’s merchant credit and prepayment products.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
IFRS annual operating_cash_flow was positive in FY2021 at BRL 3.607 billion, FY2022 at BRL 1.684 billion and FY2023 at BRL.
Open source ↗
StoneCo’s ability to fund settlement, receivables prepayment, merchant banking balances and credit through volatile Brazilian cycles is a prerequisite to competing; if funding becomes confidence-sensitive or structurally more expensive, rivals with larger deposit bases can erode its offer.HoldingMateriality: Medium
Cash was BRL 5.228 billion at FY2024 year-end, up from BRL 2.176 billion at FY2023 year-end. Liquidity strength lets StoneCo stay in the market when merchants need financing; liquidity stress would force retreat or margin-sacrificing funding.
Watch: A Brazilian funding shock that raises StoneCo’s cost of capital relative to bank-owned acquirers and deposit-rich fintechs.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Cash was BRL 5.228 billion at FY2024 year-end, up from BRL 2.176 billion at FY2023 year-end.
Open source ↗
The payments base must support higher-value software, banking and financial-services cross-sell without proportional servicing, technology and risk costs; if cross-sell adds complexity rather than wallet share, per-share earnings will remain volatile.HoldingMateriality: Medium
FY2023 IFRS annual eps_diluted was BRL 4.74, recovering from a FY2022 loss of BRL 1.67 per diluted share. This is the route from a merchant relationship to shareholder compounding; without operating leverage, growth may not create per-share value.
Watch: Vertical software providers or embedded-payment platforms capturing merchant workflow before StoneCo can attach its own software and banking products.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
FY2023 IFRS annual eps_diluted was BRL 4.74, recovering from a FY2022 loss of BRL 1.67 per diluted share.
Open source ↗

Full investment case & evidence

Loading the original research archive…

Original research

StoneCo’s local service-led merchant platform must remain differentiated enough for Brazilian SMBs to keep choosing it over bank acquirers, PagSeguro/PagBank, Mercado Pago, Nubank and pure Pix acceptance; otherwise payment economics commoditize before scale can matter. If merchant differentiation holds, StoneCo can monetize the relationship beyond basic acquiring; if it breaks, the business becomes a lower-margin processor with limited pricing power.

Merchant credit, prepayment and other financial-services products should deepen StoneCo’s relationship only if underwriting and funding discipline keep working capital from becoming a cash drain; a renewed credit-cycle mistake would break the ecosystem economics. This determines whether financial services are a profit pool attached to payments or a recurring source of losses and liquidity pressure.

StoneCo’s ability to fund settlement, receivables prepayment, merchant banking balances and credit through volatile Brazilian cycles is a prerequisite to competing; if funding becomes confidence-sensitive or structurally more expensive, rivals with larger deposit bases can erode its offer. Liquidity strength lets StoneCo stay in the market when merchants need financing; liquidity stress would force retreat or margin-sacrificing funding.

The payments base must support higher-value software, banking and financial-services cross-sell without proportional servicing, technology and risk costs; if cross-sell adds complexity rather than wallet share, per-share earnings will remain volatile. This is the route from a merchant relationship to shareholder compounding; without operating leverage, growth may not create per-share value.

All standing thesis claims

Original report summary

StoneCo is a bet that its Brazilian merchant ecosystem can turn payments relationships into durable, risk-adjusted financial-services profits rather than another commoditized acquiring business.

Bull case and bear case

Bull case and bear case for StoneCo

Where the evidence on StoneCo disagrees: Mixed on the latest evidence (Oct 26, 2026). Of its 4 thesis points, 3 holding and 1 weakening.

Bull case: what the evidence supports

StoneCo’s local service-led merchant platform must remain differentiated enough for Brazilian SMBs to keep choosing it over bank acquirers, PagSeguro/PagBank, Mercado Pago, Nubank and pure Pix acceptance; otherwise payment economics commoditize before scale can matter.
sec.gov ↗
StoneCo’s ability to fund settlement, receivables prepayment, merchant banking balances and credit through volatile Brazilian cycles is a prerequisite to competing; if funding becomes confidence-sensitive or structurally more expensive, rivals with larger deposit bases can erode its offer.
sec.gov ↗
The payments base must support higher-value software, banking and financial-services cross-sell without proportional servicing, technology and risk costs; if cross-sell adds complexity rather than wallet share, per-share earnings will remain volatile.
sec.gov ↗

Bear case: what the evidence questions

Merchant credit, prepayment and other financial-services products should deepen StoneCo’s relationship only if underwriting and funding discipline keep working capital from becoming a cash drain; a renewed credit-cycle mistake would break the ecosystem economics.
sec.gov ↗

Thesis-Break Engine

Thesis-break watch · StoneCo

No break has crossed StoneCo’s thesis. Its break conditions are checked against every new filing as it lands.

How the Thesis-Break Engine works →Historical outcomes are measured against the market after past breaks of the same kind, across all companies. Not a prediction.

MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT

The numbers behind the thesis

Sourced from filings and market data

What Changed

MixedAug 13, 2026
Foreign issuer material report (6-K).
StoneCo filed an SEC report on 2026-08-13: Foreign issuer material report (6-K). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
MixedMay 14, 2026
Foreign issuer material report (6-K).
StoneCo filed an SEC report on 2026-05-14: Foreign issuer material report (6-K). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
MixedApr 23, 2026
Foreign issuer material report (6-K).
StoneCo filed an SEC report on 2026-04-23: Foreign issuer material report (6-K). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.

Evidence assessed 2026-10-26 · Page updated 2026-10-26

Risks / falsifiers

What could break the thesis

PagSeguro/PagBank or Mercado Pago matching StoneCo’s service proposition while pricing acquiring and banking more aggressively for SMBs.
Brazilian SMB credit losses rising faster than pricing or collateral coverage in StoneCo’s merchant credit and prepayment products.
A Brazilian funding shock that raises StoneCo’s cost of capital relative to bank-owned acquirers and deposit-rich fintechs.
Vertical software providers or embedded-payment platforms capturing merchant workflow before StoneCo can attach its own software and banking products.

STNE news

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Financial statements

STNE income statement

Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.

STNE: quick answers

What is STNE's short interest?: As of October 30, 2026, 15.2M STNE shares were sold short, up 66.2% from the count before. At the stock's average daily volume that is 1.9 days to cover. FINRA publishes the count twice a month. STNE short interest history
Which well-known investors own STNE?: 1 of the 37 well-known funds tracked here reported STNE shares in their latest 13F filing. By share of the fund's portfolio: Bridgewater Associates (Ray Dalio), 0.0%. Fund portfolios

STNE in well-known investors’ portfolios

1 of 37 funds reported STNE shares in their latest 13F filing. A 13F shows quarter-end positions and arrives up to 45 days later.

Fund	Of its portfolio	Value	Change	Quarter
Ray DalioBridgewater Associates	0.00%	$214K	New	Q2 2026

Every fund’s portfolio