Stellantis N.V.
STLANYSEUSD
- Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
- Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
- Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
- $4.26 Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
- $4.09–$4.21 Regular-session low and high so far today.
- 39.2M Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET.
- Not yet confirmed The company has not confirmed its next report date. Reported quarters are available in the chart’s Earnings view.
- $3.92–$12.22 52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.
Understand the Business
Why the Stock Moved
Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.
The core investment thesis
Own STLA if Stellantis is a balance-sheet-backed automaker turnaround whose value depends on proving that the 2025 loss was a reset of pricing, inventory, and cost structure rather than a permanent break in competitiveness.
STLA price history
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Investment thesis
What must happen next
Stellantis' vehicle portfolio and distribution must remain relevant enough that demand stabilizes without the company relying on permanent incentives and price cuts; otherwise scale stops being an advantage and becomes excess capacity.HoldingMateriality: High
IFRS annual revenue remained large at €153.508 billion in FY2025 despite a severe profit downturn. If demand stabilizes at acceptable pricing, revenue can support fixed-cost absorption; if not, the equity story becomes a prolonged restructuring.
Watch: BYD and other Chinese EV makers gain material share in Europe and export markets by undercutting Stellantis on price and battery cost.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
IFRS annual revenue remained large at €153.508 billion in FY2025 despite a severe profit downturn.
Open source ↗The turnaround depends on management converting its manufacturing scale back into cost absorption rather than letting underutilized plants, supplier inflation, and restructuring costs permanently overwhelm vehicle gross economics.WeakeningMateriality: High
IFRS annual operating income was €20.276 billion in FY2022 and €22.376 billion in FY2023, evidence the asset base has generated strong profits before. This is the bridge between being a large automaker and being a profitable automaker; if it fails, revenue size will not protect owners.
Watch: Labor agreements, plant closures, or supplier contracts prevent Stellantis from reducing fixed costs as volumes normalize.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
IFRS annual operating income was €20.276 billion in FY2022 and €22.376 billion in FY2023, evidence the asset base has generated.
Open source ↗Stellantis' cash reserve must buy enough time to fund restructuring, product investment, and the EV transition without forced equity dilution or distressed financing.HoldingMateriality: Medium
Cash and cash equivalents were €30.146 billion at FY2025 year-end. A strong liquidity position can preserve optionality through a cyclical or execution reset; persistent burn would transfer value away from shareholders.
Watch: Operating losses continue while working capital and restructuring outflows require additional external funding.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Cash and cash equivalents were €30.146 billion at FY2025 year-end.
Open source ↗The dealer, inventory, and supplier cash cycle must normalize so that any accounting recovery becomes real operating cash rather than being trapped in inventory support, receivables, or incentives.WeakeningMateriality: Medium
IFRS annual operating cash flow was €19.959 billion in FY2022 and €17.954 billion in FY2023, showing the model historically converted operations into cash. Cash conversion determines whether the turnaround can self-fund and eventually return capital; without it, reported earnings would be low quality.
Watch: Dealers require higher incentives, floorplan support, or inventory buybacks to clear vehicles.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
IFRS annual operating cash flow was €19.959 billion in FY2022 and €17.954 billion in FY2023, showing the model historically converted.
Open source ↗The balance sheet must remain credible enough for suppliers, regulators, employees, and customers to trust Stellantis through warranties, product launches, and electrification commitments.HoldingMateriality: Medium
IFRS equity was €54.001 billion at FY2025 year-end, leaving a material book-capital base after the loss year. If equity keeps eroding, the company loses negotiating leverage and may have to prioritize balance-sheet repair over shareholder value.
Watch: Additional impairments, restructuring charges, or pension and labor obligations materially reduce book equity.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
IFRS equity was €54.001 billion at FY2025 year-end, leaving a material book-capital base after the loss year.
Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence
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Original research
Stellantis' vehicle portfolio and distribution must remain relevant enough that demand stabilizes without the company relying on permanent incentives and price cuts; otherwise scale stops being an advantage and becomes excess capacity. If demand stabilizes at acceptable pricing, revenue can support fixed-cost absorption; if not, the equity story becomes a prolonged restructuring.
The turnaround depends on management converting its manufacturing scale back into cost absorption rather than letting underutilized plants, supplier inflation, and restructuring costs permanently overwhelm vehicle gross economics. This is the bridge between being a large automaker and being a profitable automaker; if it fails, revenue size will not protect owners.
Stellantis' cash reserve must buy enough time to fund restructuring, product investment, and the EV transition without forced equity dilution or distressed financing. A strong liquidity position can preserve optionality through a cyclical or execution reset; persistent burn would transfer value away from shareholders.
The dealer, inventory, and supplier cash cycle must normalize so that any accounting recovery becomes real operating cash rather than being trapped in inventory support, receivables, or incentives. Cash conversion determines whether the turnaround can self-fund and eventually return capital; without it, reported earnings would be low quality.
The balance sheet must remain credible enough for suppliers, regulators, employees, and customers to trust Stellantis through warranties, product launches, and electrification commitments. If equity keeps eroding, the company loses negotiating leverage and may have to prioritize balance-sheet repair over shareholder value.
All standing thesis claims
Original report summary
Stellantis is a balance-sheet-backed automaker turnaround whose value depends on proving that the 2025 loss was a reset of pricing, inventory, and cost structure rather than a permanent break in competitiveness.
Bull case and bear case
Bull case and bear case for Stellantis N.V.
Where the evidence on Stellantis N.V. disagrees: Mixed on the latest evidence (Oct 17, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 3 holding and 2 weakening.
Bull case: what the evidence supports
Stellantis' vehicle portfolio and distribution must remain relevant enough that demand stabilizes without the company relying on permanent incentives and price cuts; otherwise scale stops being an advantage and becomes excess capacity.
Stellantis' cash reserve must buy enough time to fund restructuring, product investment, and the EV transition without forced equity dilution or distressed financing.
The balance sheet must remain credible enough for suppliers, regulators, employees, and customers to trust Stellantis through warranties, product launches, and electrification commitments.
Bear case: what the evidence questions
The turnaround depends on management converting its manufacturing scale back into cost absorption rather than letting underutilized plants, supplier inflation, and restructuring costs permanently overwhelm vehicle gross economics.
The dealer, inventory, and supplier cash cycle must normalize so that any accounting recovery becomes real operating cash rather than being trapped in inventory support, receivables, or incentives.
Thesis-Break Engine
What has broken in Stellantis N.V.’s thesis
Each break OptimistFi flagged on Stellantis N.V., dated — with what has historically followed the same kind of break across the market, not a forecast for Stellantis N.V..
- Analyst downgradecondition set before this filing
Across all companies, this kind of break has happened 12,641 times before. Those stocks trailed comparable companies by a median of 1% over the next six months, and 33% of them trailed it by 10 points or more.
MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT
The numbers behind the thesis
What Changed
- MixedForeign issuer material report (6-K).
Stellantis N.V. filed an SEC report on 2026-10-15: Foreign issuer material report (6-K). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedForeign issuer material report (6-K).
Stellantis N.V. filed an SEC report on 2026-10-13: Foreign issuer material report (6-K). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedForeign issuer material report (6-K).
Stellantis N.V. filed an SEC report on 2026-09-16: Foreign issuer material report (6-K). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
Risks / falsifiers
What could break the thesis
- BYD and other Chinese EV makers gain material share in Europe and export markets by undercutting Stellantis on price and battery cost.
- Labor agreements, plant closures, or supplier contracts prevent Stellantis from reducing fixed costs as volumes normalize.
- Operating losses continue while working capital and restructuring outflows require additional external funding.
- Dealers require higher incentives, floorplan support, or inventory buybacks to clear vehicles.
- Additional impairments, restructuring charges, or pension and labor obligations materially reduce book equity.
STLA news
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Financial statements
STLA income statement
Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.
STLA: quick answers
- What is STLA's short interest?
- As of October 30, 2026, 181M STLA shares were sold short, up 2.0% from the count before. At the stock's average daily volume that is 4.2 days to cover. FINRA publishes the count twice a month. STLA short interest history
- Have members of Congress traded STLA?
- Reports made public in the last 90 days disclose 1 trade in STLA by 1 filer: 0 purchases and 1 sale. They are filed under the STOCK Act by members of Congress, the President and senior officials. Every disclosed STLA trade
- Which well-known investors own STLA?
- 1 of the 37 well-known funds tracked here reported STLA shares in their latest 13F filing. By share of the fund's portfolio: Soros Fund Management (George Soros), 0.0%. Fund portfolios
STLA in well-known investors’ portfolios
1 of 37 funds reported STLA shares in their latest 13F filing. A 13F shows quarter-end positions and arrives up to 45 days later.
| Fund | Of its portfolio | Value | Change | Quarter |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| George SorosSoros Fund Management | 0.01% | $762K | −64.9% | Q2 2026 |
