Sphere Entertainment Co.
SPHRNYSEUSD
- Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
- Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
- Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
- $122.23 Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
- $122.63–$128.93 Regular-session low and high so far today.
- 591.5K Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET.
- Feb 11 projected Projected for 2027-02-11 from the company’s own results filings (SEC 8-K Item 2.02). The company has not confirmed the date.
- $73.03–$181.63 52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.
Understand the Business
Why the Stock Moved
Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.
The core investment thesis
Own SPHR if Sphere Entertainment is a bet that the Sphere format can turn scarce, technologically differentiated live experiences into repeatable cash flow before its legacy network assets and capital intensity dilute the upside.
SPHR price history
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Investment thesis
What must happen next
Sphere’s immersive venue experience remains differentiated enough that artists, tourists, advertisers, and content partners keep choosing it over conventional arenas, theaters, and media formats.StrengtheningMateriality: High
GAAP annual revenue increased to $1.220 billion in FY2025 from $1.027 billion in FY2024. If the differentiation holds, revenue can compound from utilization, ticketing, sponsorship, and content monetization; if it fades, the fixed-cost asset becomes much harder to support.
Watch: Major artists and promoters choose conventional arenas or stadium residencies instead of Sphere because the economics or production complexity are unattractive.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual revenue increased to $1.220 billion in FY2025 from $1.027 billion in FY2024.
Open source ↗The venue-and-content model must show operating leverage as programming volume rises, because the thesis depends on monetizing a large fixed-cost asset rather than merely buying revenue with high production and operating expense.HoldingMateriality: High
GAAP annual operating loss narrowed to $229.6 million in FY2025 from $341.2 million in FY2024 while revenue increased. Operating leverage is what turns Sphere from a growth story into an investable earnings engine; without it, higher revenue may still destroy value.
Watch: Artist guarantees, production costs, maintenance, security, or content amortization rise fast enough to absorb incremental venue revenue.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual operating loss narrowed to $229.6 million in FY2025 from $341.2 million in FY2024 while revenue increased.
Open source ↗Sphere can fund its operating model from customer, partner, and network cash flows before GAAP profitability fully arrives, but this only matters if cash generation is not consumed by required reinvestment.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium
GAAP annual operating cash flow improved to positive $243.3 million in FY2025 from negative $19.7 million in FY2024. Positive operating cash flow gives management time to prove the platform; if cash conversion reverses, the company becomes more dependent on financing or asset sales.
Watch: Advance ticket sales, sponsorship prepayments, or affiliate-related cash receipts normalize downward before replacement demand appears.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual operating cash flow improved to positive $243.3 million in FY2025 from negative $19.7 million in FY2024.
Open source ↗The balance sheet gives Sphere time to prove the model, but only if management avoids funding expansion so aggressively that liquidity becomes the thesis rather than the backstop.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium
Cash and equivalents were $507.8 million at December 31, 2025, roughly stable versus $502.0 million at December 31, 2024. A cash cushion allows patient platform development; a large new funding need could shift value from common shareholders to creditors or new equity.
Watch: Management commits to new Sphere locations or major technology projects that require substantial debt or equity before the first venue proves steady profitability.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Cash and equivalents were $507.8 million at December 31, 2025, roughly stable versus $502.0 million at December 31, 2024.
Open source ↗Sphere’s asset base can support strategic optionality only if those assets earn acceptable returns; otherwise book value becomes vulnerable to impairment rather than a source of downside protection.HoldingMateriality: Medium
Stockholders’ equity was $2.233 billion at December 31, 2025, slightly above $2.201 billion at December 31, 2024. Owners need the assets to be productive, not just large; impairments or poor returns would weaken both financing capacity and equity value.
Watch: The Sphere venue or related technology assets require impairment because expected event, content, or advertising economics fall short.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Stockholders’ equity was $2.233 billion at December 31, 2025, slightly above $2.201 billion at December 31, 2024.
Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence
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Original research
Sphere’s immersive venue experience remains differentiated enough that artists, tourists, advertisers, and content partners keep choosing it over conventional arenas, theaters, and media formats. If the differentiation holds, revenue can compound from utilization, ticketing, sponsorship, and content monetization; if it fades, the fixed-cost asset becomes much harder to support.
The venue-and-content model must show operating leverage as programming volume rises, because the thesis depends on monetizing a large fixed-cost asset rather than merely buying revenue with high production and operating expense. Operating leverage is what turns Sphere from a growth story into an investable earnings engine; without it, higher revenue may still destroy value.
Sphere can fund its operating model from customer, partner, and network cash flows before GAAP profitability fully arrives, but this only matters if cash generation is not consumed by required reinvestment. Positive operating cash flow gives management time to prove the platform; if cash conversion reverses, the company becomes more dependent on financing or asset sales.
The balance sheet gives Sphere time to prove the model, but only if management avoids funding expansion so aggressively that liquidity becomes the thesis rather than the backstop. A cash cushion allows patient platform development; a large new funding need could shift value from common shareholders to creditors or new equity.
Sphere’s asset base can support strategic optionality only if those assets earn acceptable returns; otherwise book value becomes vulnerable to impairment rather than a source of downside protection. Owners need the assets to be productive, not just large; impairments or poor returns would weaken both financing capacity and equity value.
All standing thesis claims
Original report summary
Sphere Entertainment is a bet that the Sphere format can turn scarce, technologically differentiated live experiences into repeatable cash flow before its legacy network assets and capital intensity dilute the upside.
Bull case and bear case
Bull case and bear case for Sphere Entertainment Co.
Where the evidence on Sphere Entertainment Co. stands: Holding on the latest evidence (Oct 12, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 3 strengthening and 2 holding.
Bull case: what the evidence supports
Sphere’s immersive venue experience remains differentiated enough that artists, tourists, advertisers, and content partners keep choosing it over conventional arenas, theaters, and media formats.
The venue-and-content model must show operating leverage as programming volume rises, because the thesis depends on monetizing a large fixed-cost asset rather than merely buying revenue with high production and operating expense.
Sphere can fund its operating model from customer, partner, and network cash flows before GAAP profitability fully arrives, but this only matters if cash generation is not consumed by required reinvestment.
The balance sheet gives Sphere time to prove the model, but only if management avoids funding expansion so aggressively that liquidity becomes the thesis rather than the backstop.
Sphere’s asset base can support strategic optionality only if those assets earn acceptable returns; otherwise book value becomes vulnerable to impairment rather than a source of downside protection.
Bear case: what would count against it
Major artists and promoters choose conventional arenas or stadium residencies instead of Sphere because the economics or production complexity are unattractive.
Artist guarantees, production costs, maintenance, security, or content amortization rise fast enough to absorb incremental venue revenue.
Advance ticket sales, sponsorship prepayments, or affiliate-related cash receipts normalize downward before replacement demand appears.
Thesis-Break Engine
What has broken in Sphere Entertainment Co.’s thesis
Each break OptimistFi flagged on Sphere Entertainment Co., dated — with what has historically followed the same kind of break across the market, not a forecast for Sphere Entertainment Co..
- Sharp drawdowncondition set before this filing
Across all companies, this kind of break has happened 15,428 times before. Those stocks beat comparable companies by a median of 1% over the next six months, and 33% of them trailed it by 10 points or more.
MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT
The numbers behind the thesis
What Changed
- MixedReported results of operations (earnings release).
Sphere Entertainment Co. filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-07-30: Reported results of operations (earnings release). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedReported results of operations (earnings release).
Sphere Entertainment Co. filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-05-05: Reported results of operations (earnings release). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
Risks / falsifiers
What could break the thesis
- Major artists and promoters choose conventional arenas or stadium residencies instead of Sphere because the economics or production complexity are unattractive.
- Artist guarantees, production costs, maintenance, security, or content amortization rise fast enough to absorb incremental venue revenue.
- Advance ticket sales, sponsorship prepayments, or affiliate-related cash receipts normalize downward before replacement demand appears.
- Management commits to new Sphere locations or major technology projects that require substantial debt or equity before the first venue proves steady profitability.
- The Sphere venue or related technology assets require impairment because expected event, content, or advertising economics fall short.
SPHR news
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Financial statements
SPHR income statement
Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.
SPHR: quick answers
- When does Sphere Entertainment Co. (SPHR) report earnings next?
- Sphere Entertainment Co.'s next results are projected for February 11, 2027, from the dates of its own results filings with the SEC. The company has not confirmed the date. It last reported on November 5, 2026. Earnings calendar
- What is SPHR's short interest?
- As of October 30, 2026, 6.9M SPHR shares were sold short, 23.3% of its shares outstanding, down 7.3% from the count before. At the stock's average daily volume that is 9.7 days to cover. FINRA publishes the count twice a month. SPHR short interest history
- Have members of Congress traded SPHR?
- Reports made public in the last 90 days disclose 4 trades in SPHR by 1 filer: 2 purchases and 2 sales. They are filed under the STOCK Act by members of Congress, the President and senior officials. Every disclosed SPHR trade
