NuScale Power
SMRNYSEUSD
- Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
- Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
- Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
- $5.22 Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
- $5.18–$5.54 Regular-session low and high so far today.
- 36.2M Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET.
- Not yet confirmed The company has not confirmed its next report date. Reported quarters are available in the chart’s Earnings view.
- $4.28–$27.78 52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.
Understand the Business
Why the Stock Moved
Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.
The core investment thesis
Own SMR if its regulatory/design lead turns into binding, financed reactor deployments before cash burn and competing SMR designs erode the window.
SMR price history
Loading recent earnings…
Investment thesis
What must happen next
NuScale’s regulatory and design lead must become a customer-selection advantage that converts prospective SMR demand into binding engineering, licensing, and deployment work, not just exploratory studies.HoldingMateriality: High
GAAP annual revenue increased from $11.8 million in FY2022 to $22.8 million in FY2023 and $37.0 million in FY2024, showing some customer-funded activity before commercialization. If this holds, revenue becomes evidence of a repeatable commercialization funnel; if it breaks, NuScale remains a costly R&D platform rather than a scalable power-technology company.
Watch: Utilities or industrial buyers choose GE Hitachi BWRX-300, TerraPower Natrium, X-energy Xe-100, Rolls-Royce SMR, or conventional large-reactor options instead of NuScale for first fleet-scale commitments.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual revenue increased from $11.8 million in FY2022 to $22.8 million in FY2023 and $37.0 million in FY2024, showing.
Open source ↗The technology-provider model must let NuScale earn attractive economics without absorbing first-of-a-kind construction risk; otherwise SMR demand can grow while shareholder value does not.HoldingMateriality: High
GAAP annual gross profit was positive in each reported year: $4.5 million in FY2022, $3.8 million in FY2023, $32.1 million in FY2024, and $11.4 million in FY2025. If NuScale keeps the role asset-light, deployment revenue can carry software-like licensing and engineering leverage; if it takes EPC, warranty, or cost-overrun risk, commercialization could destroy capital.
Watch: Customers require NuScale to provide fixed-price delivery guarantees or balance-sheet support for first plants.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual gross profit was positive in each reported year: $4.5 million in FY2022, $3.8 million in FY2023, $32.1 million.
Open source ↗NuScale’s balance sheet must finance the commercialization window long enough for customer deposits, partner funding, or government support to replace internally funded development spend.HoldingMateriality: Medium
Cash and cash equivalents were $836.4 million at FY2025 year-end, up from $401.6 million at FY2024 year-end. If the runway holds, shareholders retain the option value of a first deployment; if burn stays internally funded, dilution or strategic weakness can consume the upside before commercialization arrives.
Watch: Customer projects remain non-binding and fail to provide deposits or cost-sharing while NuScale continues funding design, licensing, and commercialization internally.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Cash and cash equivalents were $836.4 million at FY2025 year-end, up from $401.6 million at FY2024 year-end.
Open source ↗Heavy engineering and commercialization spending must create a standardized, repeatable reactor platform rather than recurring bespoke development for each customer.WeakeningMateriality: Medium
NuScale is still in investment mode, with GAAP annual operating losses of $230.0 million in FY2022, $275.6 million in FY2023, $138.7 million in FY2024, and $689.6 million in FY2025. If spending standardizes the product, later projects can scale with operating leverage; if every project remains custom, NuScale’s cost base may rise faster than monetizable deployments.
Watch: Major design changes are required for each customer site, country, or power configuration, preventing fleet standardization.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
NuScale is still in investment mode, with GAAP annual operating losses of $230.0 million in FY2022, $275.6 million in FY2023.
Open source ↗NuScale’s specialized nuclear engineering workforce is a scarce commercialization asset that must be retained and focused on licensing, standardization, and customer execution.HoldingMateriality: Medium
The profile reports 428 employees as of 2026-02-26, indicating NuScale has built a meaningful internal technical organization for an early-commercial nuclear developer. If talent remains concentrated and productive, NuScale can preserve its technical lead; if key engineers leave or are spread across too many bespoke projects, the lead can disappear before orders scale.
Watch: Experienced nuclear engineers migrate to TerraPower, X-energy, GE Hitachi, Westinghouse, utilities, or government labs as competing SMR programs accelerate.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
The profile reports 428 employees as of 2026-02-26, indicating NuScale has built a meaningful internal technical organization for an early-commercial.
Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence
Loading the original research archive…
Original research
NuScale’s regulatory and design lead must become a customer-selection advantage that converts prospective SMR demand into binding engineering, licensing, and deployment work, not just exploratory studies. If this holds, revenue becomes evidence of a repeatable commercialization funnel; if it breaks, NuScale remains a costly R&D platform rather than a scalable power-technology company.
The technology-provider model must let NuScale earn attractive economics without absorbing first-of-a-kind construction risk; otherwise SMR demand can grow while shareholder value does not. If NuScale keeps the role asset-light, deployment revenue can carry software-like licensing and engineering leverage; if it takes EPC, warranty, or cost-overrun risk, commercialization could destroy capital.
NuScale’s balance sheet must finance the commercialization window long enough for customer deposits, partner funding, or government support to replace internally funded development spend. If the runway holds, shareholders retain the option value of a first deployment; if burn stays internally funded, dilution or strategic weakness can consume the upside before commercialization arrives.
Heavy engineering and commercialization spending must create a standardized, repeatable reactor platform rather than recurring bespoke development for each customer. If spending standardizes the product, later projects can scale with operating leverage; if every project remains custom, NuScale’s cost base may rise faster than monetizable deployments.
NuScale’s specialized nuclear engineering workforce is a scarce commercialization asset that must be retained and focused on licensing, standardization, and customer execution. If talent remains concentrated and productive, NuScale can preserve its technical lead; if key engineers leave or are spread across too many bespoke projects, the lead can disappear before orders scale.
All standing thesis claims
Original report summary
its regulatory/design lead turns into binding, financed reactor deployments before cash burn and competing SMR designs erode the window.
Bull case and bear case
Bull case and bear case for NUSCALE POWER
Where the evidence on NUSCALE POWER disagrees: Mixed on the latest evidence (Oct 12, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 4 holding and 1 weakening.
Bull case: what the evidence supports
NuScale’s regulatory and design lead must become a customer-selection advantage that converts prospective SMR demand into binding engineering, licensing, and deployment work, not just exploratory studies.
The technology-provider model must let NuScale earn attractive economics without absorbing first-of-a-kind construction risk; otherwise SMR demand can grow while shareholder value does not.
NuScale’s balance sheet must finance the commercialization window long enough for customer deposits, partner funding, or government support to replace internally funded development spend.
NuScale’s specialized nuclear engineering workforce is a scarce commercialization asset that must be retained and focused on licensing, standardization, and customer execution.
Bear case: what the evidence questions
Heavy engineering and commercialization spending must create a standardized, repeatable reactor platform rather than recurring bespoke development for each customer.
Thesis-Break Engine
What has broken in NUSCALE POWER’s thesis
Each break OptimistFi flagged on NUSCALE POWER, dated — with what has historically followed the same kind of break across the market, not a forecast for NUSCALE POWER.
- Analyst downgradecondition set before this filing
Across all companies, this kind of break has happened 12,641 times before. Those stocks trailed comparable companies by a median of 1% over the next six months, and 33% of them trailed it by 10 points or more.
- Price target fell below the stockcondition set before this filing
Across all companies, this kind of break has happened 1,809 times before. Those stocks trailed comparable companies by a median of 1% over the next six months, and 33% of them trailed it by 10 points or more.
Several kinds of break have stacked on NUSCALE POWER at once. A cluster is a stronger read than any one signal alone.
MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT
The numbers behind the thesis
What Changed
- MixedEntered a material definitive agreement.
NUSCALE POWER filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-08-11: Entered a material definitive agreement. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedReported results of operations (earnings release).
NUSCALE POWER filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-08-05: Reported results of operations (earnings release). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedReported results of operations (earnings release).
NUSCALE POWER filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-05-07: Reported results of operations (earnings release). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
Risks / falsifiers
What could break the thesis
- Utilities or industrial buyers choose GE Hitachi BWRX-300, TerraPower Natrium, X-energy Xe-100, Rolls-Royce SMR, or conventional large-reactor options instead of NuScale for first fleet-scale commitments.
- Customers require NuScale to provide fixed-price delivery guarantees or balance-sheet support for first plants.
- Customer projects remain non-binding and fail to provide deposits or cost-sharing while NuScale continues funding design, licensing, and commercialization internally.
- Major design changes are required for each customer site, country, or power configuration, preventing fleet standardization.
- Experienced nuclear engineers migrate to TerraPower, X-energy, GE Hitachi, Westinghouse, utilities, or government labs as competing SMR programs accelerate.
SMR news
Loading headlines…
Financial statements
SMR income statement
Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.
SMR: quick answers
- Have members of Congress traded SMR?
- 1 trade in SMR has been disclosed under the STOCK Act by members of Congress, the President or senior officials, none in reports made public in the last 90 days. Every disclosed SMR trade