Simmons First National

SFNCNASDAQUSD

THESIS ALERT

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$23.53
−$0.15 (−0.63%)Today 1M +6.76%
After hours$23.530.00%

Updated Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET · Regular session · May be delayed

Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
$23.68
Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
$23.41–$23.87
Regular-session low and high so far today.
1.1M
Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET.
Not yet confirmed
The company has not confirmed its next report date. Reported quarters are available in the chart’s Earnings view.
$17.21–$24.50
52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.

Understand the Business

Why the Stock Moved

Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.

The core investment thesis

Own SFNC if its deposit franchise, credit underwriting, and capital base survive the 2025 earnings shock intact.

SFNC price history

Latest price$23.53Today−$0.15 (-0.63%)
SFNC +4.88%S&P 500 -2.42%Since first plotted close
4 hours

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Investment thesis

What must happen next

5 MATERIAL PROPOSITIONS
  • Simmons’ community-bank model must continue producing reliable liquidity despite higher-yield money-market funds, brokered deposits, and larger-bank competition for customer balances.HoldingMateriality: High

    GAAP cash, cash equivalents, restricted cash and restricted cash equivalents were $711.9 million at FY2025 year-end, up from $687.4 million at FY2024 year-end. If relationship funding holds, Simmons can defend spread income and avoid forced balance-sheet actions; if it breaks, earnings power and capital flexibility deteriorate quickly.

    Watch: Retail and commercial customers move balances to money-market funds, Treasury bills, or brokerage sweep accounts faster than Simmons can reprice deposits.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    GAAP cash, cash equivalents, restricted cash and restricted cash equivalents were $711.9 million at FY2025 year-end, up from $687.4 million.

    Open source ↗
  • The loan book must remain a credit-underwriting asset rather than a hidden liability; Simmons can create value only if local and commercial-credit losses do not overwhelm its capital base.HoldingMateriality: High

    GAAP stockholders’ equity was $3.42 billion at FY2025 year-end versus $3.53 billion at FY2024 year-end, a decline but not a collapse. Regional banks compound book value when credit losses are ordinary, but credit deterioration can erase years of spread income and force capital conservation.

    Watch: Commercial real estate, construction, or small-business borrowers in Simmons’ markets begin showing materially higher nonaccruals before charge-offs peak.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    GAAP stockholders’ equity was $3.42 billion at FY2025 year-end versus $3.53 billion at FY2024 year-end, a decline but not a.

    Open source ↗
  • The reduction in balance-sheet size must be an intentional repositioning toward better risk-adjusted returns, not evidence that Simmons is losing customers, deposits, or profitable loan demand.HoldingMateriality: Medium

    GAAP total assets declined to $24.54 billion at FY2025 year-end from $26.88 billion at FY2024 year-end and $27.35 billion at FY2023 year-end. A smaller but cleaner bank can improve returns; a shrinking franchise with lost relationships deserves a lower valuation and weaker earnings assumptions.

    Watch: Core borrowers refinance away from Simmons to larger regional banks because Simmons cannot match pricing, treasury services, or loan capacity.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    GAAP total assets declined to $24.54 billion at FY2025 year-end from $26.88 billion at FY2024 year-end and $27.35 billion at.

    Open source ↗
  • The FY2025 loss must be driven by temporary or noncash items rather than a permanent impairment of Simmons’ spread economics, fee base, or cost structure.WeakeningMateriality: Medium

    GAAP net income was positive in FY2021, FY2022, FY2023, and FY2024 before turning to a $397.6 million GAAP net loss in FY2025. If earnings normalize, the bank may still compound capital from a depressed base; if the loss reflects structural economics, book value and dividends are at risk.

    Watch: Future filings show the FY2025 loss was caused by recurring credit costs, persistent funding-cost pressure, or core margin compression rather than one-time charges.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    GAAP net income was positive in FY2021, FY2022, FY2023, and FY2024 before turning to a $397.6 million GAAP net loss.

    Open source ↗
  • Simmons’ branch-and-associate relationship model must remain differentiated enough to keep customers from treating banking as a purely rate- or app-driven commodity.WeakeningMateriality: Medium

    Estimated GAAP revenue was relatively stable from FY2021 through FY2024, ranging from $775.6 million to $887.4 million. If relationships defend the revenue base, Simmons can earn acceptable returns without outbidding every competitor for deposits; if not, the model becomes structurally lower-margin.

    Watch: Customers migrate primary accounts to national banks, fintechs, or brokerage platforms because Simmons’ service relationship is not enough to offset better rates or digital functionality.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    Estimated GAAP revenue was relatively stable from FY2021 through FY2024, ranging from $775.6 million to $887.4 million.

    Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence

Loading the original research archive…

Original research

Simmons’ community-bank model must continue producing reliable liquidity despite higher-yield money-market funds, brokered deposits, and larger-bank competition for customer balances. If relationship funding holds, Simmons can defend spread income and avoid forced balance-sheet actions; if it breaks, earnings power and capital flexibility deteriorate quickly.

The loan book must remain a credit-underwriting asset rather than a hidden liability; Simmons can create value only if local and commercial-credit losses do not overwhelm its capital base. Regional banks compound book value when credit losses are ordinary, but credit deterioration can erase years of spread income and force capital conservation.

The reduction in balance-sheet size must be an intentional repositioning toward better risk-adjusted returns, not evidence that Simmons is losing customers, deposits, or profitable loan demand. A smaller but cleaner bank can improve returns; a shrinking franchise with lost relationships deserves a lower valuation and weaker earnings assumptions.

The FY2025 loss must be driven by temporary or noncash items rather than a permanent impairment of Simmons’ spread economics, fee base, or cost structure. If earnings normalize, the bank may still compound capital from a depressed base; if the loss reflects structural economics, book value and dividends are at risk.

Simmons’ branch-and-associate relationship model must remain differentiated enough to keep customers from treating banking as a purely rate- or app-driven commodity. If relationships defend the revenue base, Simmons can earn acceptable returns without outbidding every competitor for deposits; if not, the model becomes structurally lower-margin.

All standing thesis claims
Original report summary

its deposit franchise, credit underwriting, and capital base survive the 2025 earnings shock intact.

Evidence assessed Oct 19, 2026. Expand each conclusion for its evidence and what would change it. Thesis evidence—not a buy or sell recommendation.

Bull case and bear case

Bull case and bear case for Simmons First National

Where the evidence on Simmons First National disagrees: Mixed on the latest evidence (Oct 19, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 3 holding and 2 weakening.

Bull case: what the evidence supports

  • Simmons’ community-bank model must continue producing reliable liquidity despite higher-yield money-market funds, brokered deposits, and larger-bank competition for customer balances.

    sec.gov ↗

  • The loan book must remain a credit-underwriting asset rather than a hidden liability; Simmons can create value only if local and commercial-credit losses do not overwhelm its capital base.

    sec.gov ↗

  • The reduction in balance-sheet size must be an intentional repositioning toward better risk-adjusted returns, not evidence that Simmons is losing customers, deposits, or profitable loan demand.

    sec.gov ↗

Bear case: what the evidence questions

  • The FY2025 loss must be driven by temporary or noncash items rather than a permanent impairment of Simmons’ spread economics, fee base, or cost structure.

    sec.gov ↗

  • Simmons’ branch-and-associate relationship model must remain differentiated enough to keep customers from treating banking as a purely rate- or app-driven commodity.

    sec.gov ↗

Thesis-Break Engine

Thesis-break watch · Simmons First National

Loading the break-condition record for Simmons First National.

How the Thesis-Break Engine works →Historical outcomes are measured against the market after past breaks of the same kind, across all companies. Not a prediction.

MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT

The numbers behind the thesis

Sourced from filings and market data

What Changed

  1. Mixed
    Reported results of operations (earnings release).

    Simmons First National filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-10-15: Reported results of operations (earnings release). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.

  2. Mixed
    Costs associated with exit or disposal activities.

    Simmons First National filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-09-03: Costs associated with exit or disposal activities. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.

  3. Mixed
    Reported results of operations (earnings release).

    Simmons First National filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-07-16: Reported results of operations (earnings release). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.

Risks / falsifiers

What could break the thesis

  • Retail and commercial customers move balances to money-market funds, Treasury bills, or brokerage sweep accounts faster than Simmons can reprice deposits.
  • Commercial real estate, construction, or small-business borrowers in Simmons’ markets begin showing materially higher nonaccruals before charge-offs peak.
  • Core borrowers refinance away from Simmons to larger regional banks because Simmons cannot match pricing, treasury services, or loan capacity.
  • Future filings show the FY2025 loss was caused by recurring credit costs, persistent funding-cost pressure, or core margin compression rather than one-time charges.
  • Customers migrate primary accounts to national banks, fintechs, or brokerage platforms because Simmons’ service relationship is not enough to offset better rates or digital functionality.

SFNC news

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Financial statements

SFNC income statement

Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.

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