Rush Street Interactive

RSINYSEUSD

THESIS ALERT

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$12.24
+$0.27 (+2.26%)Today 1M −36.67%
After hours$12.240.00%

Updated Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET · Regular session · May be delayed

Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
$11.97
Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
$11.71–$12.50
Regular-session low and high so far today.
1.9M
Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET.
Not yet confirmed
The company has not confirmed its next report date. Reported quarters are available in the chart’s Earnings view.
$11.27–$34.53
52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.

Understand the Business

Why the Stock Moved

Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.

The core investment thesis

Own RSI if Rush Street Interactive builds value by using a proprietary, partner-friendly platform and localized brands (BetRivers, PlaySugarHouse, RushBet) to be first-to-market in newly legalized jurisdictions, converting scale into improving margins and cash flow.

RSI price history

Latest price$12.24Today+$0.27 (+2.26%)
RSI -34.69%S&P 500 -2.42%Since first plotted close
4 hours

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Investment thesis

What must happen next

5 MATERIAL PROPOSITIONS
  • RSI’s proprietary platform and partner-centric go‑to‑market allow it to reliably convert newly legalized states into incremental, organic revenue growth.StrengtheningMateriality: High

    Revenue rose from 592,212,000 (2022) to 691,161,000 (2023) to 924,083,000 (2024) to 1,134,428,000 (2025) (fundamentals revenue fields). If true, top-line growth will be repeatable and not dependent on one-off promotions; if false, revenue growth will decelerate as market-entry costs rise or access is denied.

    Watch: Large incumbents or aggregated sportsbook operators (e.g., DraftKings/FanDuel) secure exclusive or preferred partnerships with land-based license holders in new jurisdictions, limiting RSI’s access.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    Revenue rose from 592,212,000 (2022) to 691,161,000 (2023) to 924,083,000 (2024) to 1,134,428,000 (2025) (fundamentals revenue fields).

    Open source ↗
  • As revenue scales in existing and new markets, RSI will convert a higher proportion of gross profit into operating income via fixed-cost absorption and more efficient marketing/loyalty spend, producing durable margin expansion.StrengtheningMateriality: High

    Operating income moved from -124,798,000 (2022) to -51,611,000 (2023) to 25,048,000 (2024) to 87,424,000 (2025) (operating_income fields), showing improving operating leverage. Margin expansion converts revenue growth into sustainable earnings and free cash flow; if it fails, growth may not translate into shareholder value.

    Watch: A competitive escalation in customer-acquisition spend by large incumbents forces RSI to match incentives, raising CAC and compressing margins.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    Operating income moved from -124,798,000 (2022) to -51,611,000 (2023) to 25,048,000 (2024) to 87,424,000 (2025) (operating_income fields), showing improving operating.

    Open source ↗
  • RSI’s business is now cash-generative and that operating cash flow will fund further market entries and product investment without routine dilutive equity raises.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium

    Operating cash flow improved from -60,321,000 (2022) to -5,932,000 (2023) to 106,449,000 (2024) to 165,004,000 (2025) (operating_cash_flow fields). Self-funded growth preserves equity value and supports organic expansion; failure forces dilution or debt that reduces per-share returns.

    Watch: A large acquisition, aggressive stock‑based M&A financing, or an unexpected regulatory penalty/settlement that consumes cash and forces equity issuance.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    Operating cash flow improved from -60,321,000 (2022) to -5,932,000 (2023) to 106,449,000 (2024) to 165,004,000 (2025) (operating_cash_flow fields).

    Open source ↗
  • Localized brands plus a flexible, proprietary platform create distribution/partner advantages and customer retention that raise per-dollar economics versus a white-label competitor.HoldingMateriality: Medium

    Gross profit rose from an estimated 177,548,000 (2022) to 226,147,000 (2023) to 322,047,000 (2024) to 392,764,000 (2025) (gross_profit fields), with gross margin rising modestly. If RSI’s platform & co-branding create stickiness, it supports sustainable gross margin and defends share; without it, RSI risks being undercut by platform suppliers or partners.

    Watch: Major competitors or turnkey suppliers offer better revenue‑share arrangements to land‑based partners, displacing RSI as partner-of-choice.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    Gross profit rose from an estimated 177,548,000 (2022) to 226,147,000 (2023) to 322,047,000 (2024) to 392,764,000 (2025) (gross_profit fields), with.

    Open source ↗
  • If RSI sustains revenue growth and margin expansion without material equity dilution, earnings per share will continue to compound, turning strong operating performance into per-share returns.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium

    Earnings per share improved from -0.61 (2022) to -0.27 (2023) to 0.03 (2024) to 0.31 (2025) (eps_diluted fields), showing rapid EPS recovery. Per-share compounding is what investors ultimately capture; growth that requires dilutive financing can destroy per-share value even with rising revenues.

    Watch: Large equity raises to finance acquisitions or continued heavy use of equity-based comp that materially increases share count.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    Earnings per share improved from -0.61 (2022) to -0.27 (2023) to 0.03 (2024) to 0.31 (2025) (eps_diluted fields), showing rapid.

    Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence

Loading the original research archive…

Original research

RSI’s proprietary platform and partner-centric go‑to‑market allow it to reliably convert newly legalized states into incremental, organic revenue growth. If true, top-line growth will be repeatable and not dependent on one-off promotions; if false, revenue growth will decelerate as market-entry costs rise or access is denied.

As revenue scales in existing and new markets, RSI will convert a higher proportion of gross profit into operating income via fixed-cost absorption and more efficient marketing/loyalty spend, producing durable margin expansion. Margin expansion converts revenue growth into sustainable earnings and free cash flow; if it fails, growth may not translate into shareholder value.

RSI’s business is now cash-generative and that operating cash flow will fund further market entries and product investment without routine dilutive equity raises. Self-funded growth preserves equity value and supports organic expansion; failure forces dilution or debt that reduces per-share returns.

Localized brands plus a flexible, proprietary platform create distribution/partner advantages and customer retention that raise per-dollar economics versus a white-label competitor. If RSI’s platform & co-branding create stickiness, it supports sustainable gross margin and defends share; without it, RSI risks being undercut by platform suppliers or partners.

If RSI sustains revenue growth and margin expansion without material equity dilution, earnings per share will continue to compound, turning strong operating performance into per-share returns. Per-share compounding is what investors ultimately capture; growth that requires dilutive financing can destroy per-share value even with rising revenues.

All standing thesis claims
Original report summary

Rush Street Interactive builds value by using a proprietary, partner-friendly platform and localized brands (BetRivers, PlaySugarHouse, RushBet) to be first-to-market in newly legalized jurisdictions, converting scale into improving margins and cash flow.

Evidence assessed Nov 4, 2026. Expand each conclusion for its evidence and what would change it. Thesis evidence—not a buy or sell recommendation.

Bull case and bear case

Bull case and bear case for Rush Street Interactive

Where the evidence on Rush Street Interactive stands: Holding on the latest evidence (Nov 4, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 4 strengthening and 1 holding.

Bull case: what the evidence supports

  • RSI’s proprietary platform and partner-centric go‑to‑market allow it to reliably convert newly legalized states into incremental, organic revenue growth.

    sec.gov ↗

  • As revenue scales in existing and new markets, RSI will convert a higher proportion of gross profit into operating income via fixed-cost absorption and more efficient marketing/loyalty spend, producing durable margin expansion.

    sec.gov ↗

  • RSI’s business is now cash-generative and that operating cash flow will fund further market entries and product investment without routine dilutive equity raises.

    sec.gov ↗

  • Localized brands plus a flexible, proprietary platform create distribution/partner advantages and customer retention that raise per-dollar economics versus a white-label competitor.

    sec.gov ↗

  • If RSI sustains revenue growth and margin expansion without material equity dilution, earnings per share will continue to compound, turning strong operating performance into per-share returns.

    sec.gov ↗

Bear case: what would count against it

  • Large incumbents or aggregated sportsbook operators (e.g., DraftKings/FanDuel) secure exclusive or preferred partnerships with land-based license holders in new jurisdictions, limiting RSI’s access.

    sec.gov ↗

  • A competitive escalation in customer-acquisition spend by large incumbents forces RSI to match incentives, raising CAC and compressing margins.

    sec.gov ↗

  • A large acquisition, aggressive stock‑based M&A financing, or an unexpected regulatory penalty/settlement that consumes cash and forces equity issuance.

    sec.gov ↗

Thesis-Break Engine

Thesis-break watch · Rush Street Interactive

Loading the break-condition record for Rush Street Interactive.

How the Thesis-Break Engine works →Historical outcomes are measured against the market after past breaks of the same kind, across all companies. Not a prediction.

MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT

The numbers behind the thesis

Sourced from filings and market data

What Changed

  1. Mixed
    Reported results of operations (earnings release).

    Rush Street Interactive filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-10-28: Reported results of operations (earnings release). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.

  2. Mixed
    Reported results of operations (earnings release).

    Rush Street Interactive filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-07-29: Reported results of operations (earnings release). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.

  3. Mixed
    Other material event.

    Rush Street Interactive filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-05-07: Other material event. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.

Risks / falsifiers

What could break the thesis

  • Large incumbents or aggregated sportsbook operators (e.g., DraftKings/FanDuel) secure exclusive or preferred partnerships with land-based license holders in new jurisdictions, limiting RSI’s access.
  • A competitive escalation in customer-acquisition spend by large incumbents forces RSI to match incentives, raising CAC and compressing margins.
  • A large acquisition, aggressive stock‑based M&A financing, or an unexpected regulatory penalty/settlement that consumes cash and forces equity issuance.
  • Major competitors or turnkey suppliers offer better revenue‑share arrangements to land‑based partners, displacing RSI as partner-of-choice.
  • Large equity raises to finance acquisitions or continued heavy use of equity-based comp that materially increases share count.

RSI news

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Financial statements

RSI income statement

Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.

RSI: quick answers

Have members of Congress traded RSI?
Reports made public in the last 90 days disclose 2 trades in RSI by 1 filer: 1 purchase and 1 sale. They are filed under the STOCK Act by members of Congress, the President and senior officials. Every disclosed RSI trade
Which well-known investors own RSI?
2 of the 37 well-known funds tracked here reported RSI shares in their latest 13F filings. By share of the fund's portfolio: Soros Fund Management (George Soros), 0.1%; Bridgewater Associates (Ray Dalio), 0.0%. Fund portfolios

RSI in well-known investors’ portfolios

2 of 37 funds reported RSI shares in their latest 13F filing. A 13F shows quarter-end positions and arrives up to 45 days later.

FundOf its portfolioValueChangeQuarter
George SorosSoros Fund Management0.08%$6.7MNewQ2 2026
Ray DalioBridgewater Associates0.00%$588KNewQ2 2026

Every fund’s portfolio

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