LiveRamp Holdings
RAMPUSD
- Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
- Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
- Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
- — Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
- — Regular-session low and high so far today.
- — Regular-session shares traded.
- Not yet confirmed The company has not confirmed its next report date. Reported quarters are available in the chart’s Earnings view.
- — 52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.
Understand the Business
Why the Stock Moved
Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.
The core investment thesis
Own RAMP if LiveRamp is a privacy-safe data-collaboration and identity layer whose upside depends on marketers and media owners continuing to need a neutral connector outside the walled gardens.
RAMP price history
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Investment thesis
What must happen next
Privacy-safe activation and measurement remain sufficiently complex across marketers and media owners that customers keep paying LiveRamp to serve as a neutral data-collaboration layer rather than relying only on walled gardens or in-house tools.StrengtheningMateriality: High
GAAP annual revenue increased from $528.7 million in FY2022 to $812.9 million in FY2026. If this holds, LiveRamp can keep expanding the revenue base; if it breaks, the core demand engine is being disintermediated.
Watch: Google, Meta, Amazon, or major retail media networks make their own clean-room and identity tools the default workflow for large advertisers.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual revenue increased from $528.7 million in FY2022 to $812.9 million in FY2026.
Open source ↗LiveRamp’s partner ecosystem and Data Marketplace-style revenue-sharing model continue to carry network value, allowing the company to monetize data connectivity without proportional increases in delivery cost.StrengtheningMateriality: High
GAAP annual gross profit rose from $381.2 million in FY2022 to $574.8 million in FY2026. If the ecosystem retains value, incremental revenue should remain high quality; if partners capture the economics, growth becomes less valuable.
Watch: Large media owners, data providers, or retail media networks demand higher revenue shares and reduce LiveRamp’s take rate.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual gross profit rose from $381.2 million in FY2022 to $574.8 million in FY2026.
Open source ↗The platform model is scaling past the investment phase, so incremental demand for identity and data collaboration can convert into GAAP operating income rather than being consumed by sales, engineering, or integration costs.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium
GAAP annual operating income improved from a loss of $125.8 million in FY2023 to income of $83.5 million in FY2026. This determines whether LiveRamp is a durable earnings compounder or merely a growing ad-tech vendor with limited profitability.
Watch: LiveRamp must materially reaccelerate spending to keep up with AI-enabled clean rooms, cloud integrations, or privacy-enhancing technology requirements.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual operating income improved from a loss of $125.8 million in FY2023 to income of $83.5 million in FY2026.
Open source ↗A large cash position gives LiveRamp strategic flexibility to fund product investment, partnerships, and acquisitions through ad-tech cycles without relying on distressed financing.HoldingMateriality: Medium
Cash and cash equivalents were $379.5 million at FY2026 year-end. If this holds, LiveRamp can defend its platform during industry shifts; if cash is misallocated, the balance sheet becomes a drag rather than an advantage.
Watch: Management deploys cash into acquisitions that fail to deepen the clean-room, identity, or data-collaboration moat.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Cash and cash equivalents were $379.5 million at FY2026 year-end.
Open source ↗The turnaround creates shareholder value only if LiveRamp keeps monetization and cost discipline strong enough that identity-platform demand flows through to GAAP EPS rather than being offset by dilution, restructuring, or renewed losses.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium
GAAP diluted EPS improved from a loss of $1.79 in FY2023 to earnings of $2.24 in FY2026. Owners need the business model to compound per share, not just report higher platform activity.
Watch: Stock-based compensation or share issuance rises enough to absorb operating gains before they reach per-share owners.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP diluted EPS improved from a loss of $1.79 in FY2023 to earnings of $2.24 in FY2026.
Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence
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Original research
Privacy-safe activation and measurement remain sufficiently complex across marketers and media owners that customers keep paying LiveRamp to serve as a neutral data-collaboration layer rather than relying only on walled gardens or in-house tools. If this holds, LiveRamp can keep expanding the revenue base; if it breaks, the core demand engine is being disintermediated.
LiveRamp’s partner ecosystem and Data Marketplace-style revenue-sharing model continue to carry network value, allowing the company to monetize data connectivity without proportional increases in delivery cost. If the ecosystem retains value, incremental revenue should remain high quality; if partners capture the economics, growth becomes less valuable.
The platform model is scaling past the investment phase, so incremental demand for identity and data collaboration can convert into GAAP operating income rather than being consumed by sales, engineering, or integration costs. This determines whether LiveRamp is a durable earnings compounder or merely a growing ad-tech vendor with limited profitability.
A large cash position gives LiveRamp strategic flexibility to fund product investment, partnerships, and acquisitions through ad-tech cycles without relying on distressed financing. If this holds, LiveRamp can defend its platform during industry shifts; if cash is misallocated, the balance sheet becomes a drag rather than an advantage.
The turnaround creates shareholder value only if LiveRamp keeps monetization and cost discipline strong enough that identity-platform demand flows through to GAAP EPS rather than being offset by dilution, restructuring, or renewed losses. Owners need the business model to compound per share, not just report higher platform activity.
All standing thesis claims
Original report summary
LiveRamp is a privacy-safe data-collaboration and identity layer whose upside depends on marketers and media owners continuing to need a neutral connector outside the walled gardens.
Bull case and bear case
Bull case and bear case for LiveRamp Holdings
Where the evidence on LiveRamp Holdings stands: Holding on the latest evidence (Nov 9, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 4 strengthening and 1 holding.
Bull case: what the evidence supports
Privacy-safe activation and measurement remain sufficiently complex across marketers and media owners that customers keep paying LiveRamp to serve as a neutral data-collaboration layer rather than relying only on walled gardens or in-house tools.
LiveRamp’s partner ecosystem and Data Marketplace-style revenue-sharing model continue to carry network value, allowing the company to monetize data connectivity without proportional increases in delivery cost.
The platform model is scaling past the investment phase, so incremental demand for identity and data collaboration can convert into GAAP operating income rather than being consumed by sales, engineering, or integration costs.
A large cash position gives LiveRamp strategic flexibility to fund product investment, partnerships, and acquisitions through ad-tech cycles without relying on distressed financing.
The turnaround creates shareholder value only if LiveRamp keeps monetization and cost discipline strong enough that identity-platform demand flows through to GAAP EPS rather than being offset by dilution, restructuring, or renewed losses.
Bear case: what would count against it
Google, Meta, Amazon, or major retail media networks make their own clean-room and identity tools the default workflow for large advertisers.
Large media owners, data providers, or retail media networks demand higher revenue shares and reduce LiveRamp’s take rate.
LiveRamp must materially reaccelerate spending to keep up with AI-enabled clean rooms, cloud integrations, or privacy-enhancing technology requirements.
Thesis-Break Engine
What has broken in LiveRamp Holdings’s thesis
Each break OptimistFi flagged on LiveRamp Holdings, dated — with what has historically followed the same kind of break across the market, not a forecast for LiveRamp Holdings.
- Late SEC filingcondition set before this filing
Across all companies, this kind of break has happened 4,811 times before. Those stocks trailed comparable companies by a median of 12% over the next six months, and 52% of them trailed it by 10 points or more.
MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT
The numbers behind the thesis
What Changed
- MixedCompleted an acquisition or disposition of assets.
LiveRamp Holdings filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-11-02: Completed an acquisition or disposition of assets. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedDirector or principal officer change.
LiveRamp Holdings filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-10-28: Director or principal officer change. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedDirector or principal officer change.
LiveRamp Holdings filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-08-20: Director or principal officer change. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
Risks / falsifiers
What could break the thesis
- Google, Meta, Amazon, or major retail media networks make their own clean-room and identity tools the default workflow for large advertisers.
- Large media owners, data providers, or retail media networks demand higher revenue shares and reduce LiveRamp’s take rate.
- LiveRamp must materially reaccelerate spending to keep up with AI-enabled clean rooms, cloud integrations, or privacy-enhancing technology requirements.
- Management deploys cash into acquisitions that fail to deepen the clean-room, identity, or data-collaboration moat.
- Stock-based compensation or share issuance rises enough to absorb operating gains before they reach per-share owners.
RAMP news
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Financial statements
RAMP income statement
Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.
RAMP: quick answers
- When does LiveRamp Holdings (RAMP) report earnings next?
- LiveRamp Holdings's next results were projected for November 4, 2026, from the dates of its own results filings with the SEC, and it has not filed them yet. It last reported on August 5, 2026. Earnings calendar
- What is RAMP's short interest?
- As of October 30, 2026, 6.5M RAMP shares were sold short, 10.8% of its shares outstanding, down 4.8% from the count before. At the stock's average daily volume that is 2.9 days to cover. FINRA publishes the count twice a month. RAMP short interest history