Progress Software
PRGSNASDAQUSD
- Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
- Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
- Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
- $43.80 Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
- $43.55–$44.49 Regular-session low and high so far today.
- 289.8K Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET.
- Jan 19 projected Projected for 2027-01-19 from the company’s own results filings (SEC 8-K Item 2.02). The company has not confirmed the date.
- $23.82–$47.25 52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.
Understand the Business
Why the Stock Moved
Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.
The core investment thesis
Own PRGS if Progress is turning into a higher-recurring‑revenue, enterprise‑software roll‑up: disciplined, accretive M&A (ShareFile, Nuclia, MarkLogic) plus a portfolio of data, security and developer products drives predictable SaaS/maintenance revenue, strong gross margins and cash generation.
PRGS price history
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Investment thesis
What must happen next
Progress’s shift to recurring SaaS (anchored by Share file and complementary SaaS products) will sustain above‑market revenue growth because acquired SaaS ARR converts legacy maintenance/licenses into sticky, high‑visibility recurring revenue.StrengtheningMateriality: High
Total revenue increased 30% to $977.831M in FY2025 versus FY2024, driven primarily by ShareFile (MD&A: ShareFile revenue $261.6M in FY2025). If true, revenue becomes more predictable, valuation multiple is justified, and cash conversion funds M&A and buybacks; if false, growth will be lumpy and the stock will re‑rate lower.
Watch: Material SaaS churn or falling renewal rates for ShareFile/other SaaS that reduce ARR retention before organic upsell fills the gap.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Total revenue increased 30% to $977.831M in FY2025 versus FY2024, driven primarily by ShareFile (MD&A: ShareFile revenue $261.6M in FY2025).
Open source ↗Progress’s capital allocation (accretive M&A funded by operating cash flow, targeted buybacks) will be net accretive to revenue and EPS because operating cash flow is strong and management targets complementary assets that expand recurring revenue.HoldingMateriality: High
Operating cash flow rose to $235.187M in FY2025 from $211.494M in FY2024, giving internal funds for deals/repurchases. If M&A remains accretive, the company can scale ARR and justify the valuation; if M&A becomes dilutive or forces large debt service, EPS and cash returns will suffer.
Watch: Acquisitions that fail to retain customers or accelerate amortization/interest expense could be dilutive (goodwill/intangible write‑downs).
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Operating cash flow rose to $235.187M in FY2025 from $211.494M in FY2024, giving internal funds for deals/repurchases.
Open source ↗Progress’s product mix (enterprise data platforms, secure file transfer, developer tools and semantic AI) yields high gross margins and pricing power that protect operating profitability even as the revenue mix shifts toward SaaS.HoldingMateriality: Medium
Gross profit for FY2025 was $790.250M on $977.831M revenue (implied gross margin ~80%), showing high product margins. If margins hold, cash generation funds M&A and buybacks and supports the current multiple; if pricing power erodes (security breach/commoditization) margins and cash conversion will deteriorate.
Watch: A high‑profile security incident (e.g., MOVEit exploit or similar) damaging reputation and forcing discounts/settlements could materially reduce retention and pricing.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Gross profit for FY2025 was $790.250M on $977.831M revenue (implied gross margin ~80%), showing high product margins.
Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence
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Original research
Progress’s shift to recurring SaaS (anchored by Share file and complementary SaaS products) will sustain above‑market revenue growth because acquired SaaS ARR converts legacy maintenance/licenses into sticky, high‑visibility recurring revenue. If true, revenue becomes more predictable, valuation multiple is justified, and cash conversion funds M&A and buybacks; if false, growth will be lumpy and the stock will re‑rate lower.
Progress’s capital allocation (accretive M&A funded by operating cash flow, targeted buybacks) will be net accretive to revenue and EPS because operating cash flow is strong and management targets complementary assets that expand recurring revenue. If M&A remains accretive, the company can scale ARR and justify the valuation; if M&A becomes dilutive or forces large debt service, EPS and cash returns will suffer.
Progress’s product mix (enterprise data platforms, secure file transfer, developer tools and semantic AI) yields high gross margins and pricing power that protect operating profitability even as the revenue mix shifts toward SaaS. If margins hold, cash generation funds M&A and buybacks and supports the current multiple; if pricing power erodes (security breach/commoditization) margins and cash conversion will deteriorate.
All standing thesis claims
Original report summary
Progress is turning into a higher-recurring‑revenue, enterprise‑software roll‑up: disciplined, accretive M&A (ShareFile, Nuclia, MarkLogic) plus a portfolio of data, security and developer products drives predictable SaaS/maintenance revenue, strong gross margins and cash generation.
Bull case and bear case
Bull case and bear case for Progress Software
Where the evidence on Progress Software stands: Holding on the latest evidence (Nov 6, 2026). Of its 3 thesis points, 1 strengthening and 2 holding.
Bull case: what the evidence supports
Progress’s shift to recurring SaaS (anchored by Share file and complementary SaaS products) will sustain above‑market revenue growth because acquired SaaS ARR converts legacy maintenance/licenses into sticky, high‑visibility recurring revenue.
Progress’s capital allocation (accretive M&A funded by operating cash flow, targeted buybacks) will be net accretive to revenue and EPS because operating cash flow is strong and management targets complementary assets that expand recurring revenue.
Progress’s product mix (enterprise data platforms, secure file transfer, developer tools and semantic AI) yields high gross margins and pricing power that protect operating profitability even as the revenue mix shifts toward SaaS.
Bear case: what would count against it
Material SaaS churn or falling renewal rates for ShareFile/other SaaS that reduce ARR retention before organic upsell fills the gap.
Acquisitions that fail to retain customers or accelerate amortization/interest expense could be dilutive (goodwill/intangible write‑downs).
A high‑profile security incident (e.g., MOVEit exploit or similar) damaging reputation and forcing discounts/settlements could materially reduce retention and pricing.
Thesis-Break Engine
Thesis-break watch · Progress Software
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MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT
The numbers behind the thesis
What Changed
- MixedReported results of operations (earnings release).
Progress Software filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-09-30: Reported results of operations (earnings release). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedCompleted an acquisition or disposition of assets.
Progress Software filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-09-22: Completed an acquisition or disposition of assets. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedReported results of operations (earnings release).
Progress Software filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-07-22: Reported results of operations (earnings release). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
Risks / falsifiers
What could break the thesis
- Material SaaS churn or falling renewal rates for ShareFile/other SaaS that reduce ARR retention before organic upsell fills the gap.
- Acquisitions that fail to retain customers or accelerate amortization/interest expense could be dilutive (goodwill/intangible write‑downs).
- A high‑profile security incident (e.g., MOVEit exploit or similar) damaging reputation and forcing discounts/settlements could materially reduce retention and pricing.
PRGS news
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Financial statements
PRGS income statement
Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.
PRGS: quick answers
- When does Progress Software (PRGS) report earnings next?
- Progress Software's next results are projected for January 19, 2027, from the dates of its own results filings with the SEC. The company has not confirmed the date. It last reported on September 30, 2026. Earnings calendar
- What is PRGS's short interest?
- As of October 30, 2026, 4.6M PRGS shares were sold short, 11.3% of its shares outstanding, down 1.3% from the count before. At the stock's average daily volume that is 11 days to cover. FINRA publishes the count twice a month. PRGS short interest history
- Have members of Congress traded PRGS?
- Reports made public in the last 90 days disclose 1 trade in PRGS by 1 filer: 0 purchases and 1 sale. They are filed under the STOCK Act by members of Congress, the President and senior officials. Every disclosed PRGS trade