Parabolic Technologies
PARANASDAQUSD
- Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
- Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
- Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
- $0.08 Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
- $0.06–$0.08 Regular-session low and high so far today.
- 57.9M Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET.
- Not yet confirmed The company has not confirmed its next report date. Reported quarters are available in the chart’s Earnings view.
- $0.06–$392.00 52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.
Understand the Business
Why the Stock Moved
Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.
The core investment thesis
Own PARA if Banzai is an option on a tiny MarTech SaaS business turning 2025’s revenue step-up into repeatable, high-gross-margin growth before cash burn and financing risk overwhelm shareholders.
PARA price history
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Investment thesis
What must happen next
Marketing teams continue to see enough value in Banzai’s standalone MarTech SaaS offering that demand converts into new and retained customer revenue rather than being absorbed by larger marketing suites or AI-native alternatives.StrengtheningMateriality: High
Annual GAAP revenue increased to $12.16 million in FY2025 from $4.53 million in FY2024. If this holds, Banzai has a real growth engine; if it breaks, the 2025 revenue jump becomes a temporary spike rather than a compounding base.
Watch: HubSpot, Salesforce, Adobe, or other broad marketing platforms bundle comparable customer engagement functionality into products customers already use.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Annual GAAP revenue increased to $12.16 million in FY2025 from $4.53 million in FY2024.
Open source ↗Banzai’s SaaS delivery model preserves software-like unit economics as it grows, meaning hosting, services, support, and discounting do not consume the incremental value of revenue.StrengtheningMateriality: High
Annual GAAP gross profit rose to $9.97 million in FY2025 from $3.11 million in FY2024. High gross margin is the bridge from revenue growth to eventual operating leverage; if it compresses, scale will not fix the model.
Watch: Competitors force price discounting to win or retain MarTech customers.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Annual GAAP gross profit rose to $9.97 million in FY2025 from $3.11 million in FY2024.
Open source ↗The company’s sales, product, and overhead spending become scalable enough that incremental gross profit increasingly offsets fixed operating costs, rather than requiring a larger organization and larger losses for each stage of growth.WeakeningMateriality: Medium
FY2025 annual GAAP gross profit expanded materially, giving the company more contribution dollars to absorb operating expenses. This determines whether Banzai can become a business with per-share value instead of a revenue-growth story funded by repeated capital raises.
Watch: Customer acquisition remains highly labor-intensive, requiring more sales headcount or paid marketing spend to sustain growth.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
FY2025 annual GAAP gross profit expanded materially, giving the company more contribution dollars to absorb operating expenses.
Open source ↗Banzai secures enough non-punitive financing, or reduces burn quickly enough, to avoid funding growth through shareholder-dilutive emergency capital.WeakeningMateriality: Medium
Stockholders’ equity improved to positive $8.06 million at FY2025 year-end from negative $2.76 million at FY2024 year-end. For equity owners, even a better product and higher revenue may not matter if dilution or financial distress captures the upside.
Watch: Capital markets are unavailable or only available through highly dilutive convertible securities, warrants, or deeply discounted equity.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Stockholders’ equity improved to positive $8.06 million at FY2025 year-end from negative $2.76 million at FY2024 year-end.
Open source ↗The balance-sheet improvement becomes durable, with lower liabilities and positive equity reflecting a genuine recapitalization rather than a temporary pause before new obligations accumulate.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium
Total liabilities declined to $23.58 million at FY2025 year-end from $37.16 million at FY2023 year-end. A cleaner balance sheet would let shareholders benefit from any operating turnaround; renewed leverage or payables pressure would keep the equity option-like.
Watch: New debt, preferred equity, or convertible instruments replace the liabilities that were reduced.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Total liabilities declined to $23.58 million at FY2025 year-end from $37.16 million at FY2023 year-end.
Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence
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Original research
Marketing teams continue to see enough value in Banzai’s standalone MarTech SaaS offering that demand converts into new and retained customer revenue rather than being absorbed by larger marketing suites or AI-native alternatives. If this holds, Banzai has a real growth engine; if it breaks, the 2025 revenue jump becomes a temporary spike rather than a compounding base.
Banzai’s SaaS delivery model preserves software-like unit economics as it grows, meaning hosting, services, support, and discounting do not consume the incremental value of revenue. High gross margin is the bridge from revenue growth to eventual operating leverage; if it compresses, scale will not fix the model.
The company’s sales, product, and overhead spending become scalable enough that incremental gross profit increasingly offsets fixed operating costs, rather than requiring a larger organization and larger losses for each stage of growth. This determines whether Banzai can become a business with per-share value instead of a revenue-growth story funded by repeated capital raises.
Banzai secures enough non-punitive financing, or reduces burn quickly enough, to avoid funding growth through shareholder-dilutive emergency capital. For equity owners, even a better product and higher revenue may not matter if dilution or financial distress captures the upside.
The balance-sheet improvement becomes durable, with lower liabilities and positive equity reflecting a genuine recapitalization rather than a temporary pause before new obligations accumulate. A cleaner balance sheet would let shareholders benefit from any operating turnaround; renewed leverage or payables pressure would keep the equity option-like.
All standing thesis claims
Original report summary
Banzai is an option on a tiny MarTech SaaS business turning 2025’s revenue step-up into repeatable, high-gross-margin growth before cash burn and financing risk overwhelm shareholders.
Bull case and bear case
Bull case and bear case for Banzai International
Where the evidence on Banzai International disagrees: Mixed on the latest evidence (Nov 4, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 3 strengthening and 2 weakening.
Bull case: what the evidence supports
Marketing teams continue to see enough value in Banzai’s standalone MarTech SaaS offering that demand converts into new and retained customer revenue rather than being absorbed by larger marketing suites or AI-native alternatives.
Banzai’s SaaS delivery model preserves software-like unit economics as it grows, meaning hosting, services, support, and discounting do not consume the incremental value of revenue.
The balance-sheet improvement becomes durable, with lower liabilities and positive equity reflecting a genuine recapitalization rather than a temporary pause before new obligations accumulate.
Bear case: what the evidence questions
The company’s sales, product, and overhead spending become scalable enough that incremental gross profit increasingly offsets fixed operating costs, rather than requiring a larger organization and larger losses for each stage of growth.
Banzai secures enough non-punitive financing, or reduces burn quickly enough, to avoid funding growth through shareholder-dilutive emergency capital.
Thesis-Break Engine
Thesis-break watch · Banzai International
No break has crossed Banzai International’s thesis. Its break conditions are checked against every new filing as it lands.
MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT
The numbers behind the thesis
What Changed
- MixedDelisting notice or listing-rule failure.
Banzai International filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-10-30: Delisting notice or listing-rule failure. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedMaterial modification to security holder rights.
Banzai International filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-10-22: Material modification to security holder rights. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedEntered a material definitive agreement.
Banzai International filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-10-21: Entered a material definitive agreement. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
Risks / falsifiers
What could break the thesis
- HubSpot, Salesforce, Adobe, or other broad marketing platforms bundle comparable customer engagement functionality into products customers already use.
- Competitors force price discounting to win or retain MarTech customers.
- Customer acquisition remains highly labor-intensive, requiring more sales headcount or paid marketing spend to sustain growth.
- Capital markets are unavailable or only available through highly dilutive convertible securities, warrants, or deeply discounted equity.
- New debt, preferred equity, or convertible instruments replace the liabilities that were reduced.
PARA news
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Financial statements
PARA income statement
Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.
PARA: quick answers
- What is PARA's short interest?
- As of October 30, 2026, 52,128 PARA shares were sold short, down 79.7% from the count before. At the stock's average daily volume that is 1.0 day to cover. FINRA publishes the count twice a month. PARA short interest history
- Have members of Congress traded PARA?
- 11 trades in PARA have been disclosed under the STOCK Act by members of Congress, the President or senior officials, none in reports made public in the last 90 days. Every disclosed PARA trade
