The Middleby
MIDDNASDAQUSD
- Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
- Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
- Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
- $138.27 Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
- $135.43–$140.25 Regular-session low and high so far today.
- 541.6K Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET.
- Not yet confirmed The company has not confirmed its next report date. Reported quarters are available in the chart’s Earnings view.
- $89.16–$148.55 52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.
Understand the Business
Why the Stock Moved
Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.
The core investment thesis
Own MIDD if its broad kitchen and food-processing portfolio keeps producing high-margin cash flow and FY2026’s GAAP loss proves to be a portfolio-cleanup event rather than evidence that the roll-up model is maturing.
MIDD price history
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Investment thesis
What must happen next
Middleby’s breadth across commercial foodservice equipment, IoT/controllers, and food-processing systems keeps it relevant as a preferred vendor for kitchen remodels, automation, and production-line upgrades, rather than leaving it exposed as a single-product cyclical supplier.HoldingMateriality: High
Item 1 profile describes Middleby as a leader in design, manufacture, marketing, distribution, and service of a broad line of foodservice equipment, integrated IoT solutions, controllers, and food-processing equipment. If the portfolio remains a preferred-vendor advantage, revenue can recover without heavy discounting; if customers choose narrower or cheaper alternatives, the platform premium disappears.
Watch: Large restaurant chains standardize remodel programs with Ali Group/Welbilt, ITW Food Equipment, Rational, or other competitors instead of Middleby brands.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Item 1 profile describes Middleby as a leader in design, manufacture, marketing, distribution, and service of a broad line of.
Open source ↗Specialized equipment brands and engineered product differentiation allow Middleby to defend price and mix, so lower or uneven volumes do not automatically force gross-profit erosion.StrengtheningMateriality: High
GAAP annual gross profit was essentially flat at $1.252 billion in FY2026 and $1.252 billion in FY2025 despite only modest revenue movement. Durable gross profit supports reinvestment, service coverage, and cash generation; if price/mix breaks, revenue recovery could be low-quality.
Watch: Rational, ITW, Ali Group/Welbilt, or low-cost Asian manufacturers win with lower-priced comparable ovens, fryers, refrigeration, or preparation equipment.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual gross profit was essentially flat at $1.252 billion in FY2026 and $1.252 billion in FY2025 despite only modest.
Open source ↗Middleby’s operating model can convert equipment sales and service activity into cash even when GAAP earnings are depressed by non-cash or portfolio-related charges.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium
GAAP annual operating cash flow was $630.2 million in FY2026 despite a GAAP net loss that year. Cash conversion is what funds debt reduction, acquisitions, buybacks, and resilience through equipment cycles; if it fails, accounting adjustments stop being harmless.
Watch: Inventory builds or supply-chain disruption absorb cash because Middleby must hold more components or finished goods to maintain service levels.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual operating cash flow was $630.2 million in FY2026 despite a GAAP net loss that year.
Open source ↗Middleby’s acquisition-led portfolio strategy must demonstrate that acquired brands are compounding value rather than requiring impairments or divestitures that erase prior capital allocation gains.WeakeningMateriality: Medium
GAAP annual net income was positive in FY2025 at $428.4 million, FY2024 at $400.9 million, and FY2023 at $436.6 million before turning negative. If acquisitions remain value-creating, Middleby can keep widening the portfolio; if they destroy value, per-share compounding and investor trust are impaired.
Watch: Management announces additional goodwill, intangible, or brand impairments tied to prior acquisitions.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual net income was positive in FY2025 at $428.4 million, FY2024 at $400.9 million, and FY2023 at $436.6 million.
Open source ↗Middleby needs management discipline across its many product lines and subsidiaries so scale, sourcing, and distribution efficiency offset portfolio complexity and protect operating profit.HoldingMateriality: Medium
GAAP annual operating income remained substantial at $574.9 million in FY2026. If operating leverage returns, modest revenue growth can compound earnings; if complexity wins, the business can have decent gross profit but weak owner earnings.
Watch: Brand sprawl creates duplicated sales, engineering, factory, or service infrastructure that cannot be rationalized without hurting customers.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual operating income remained substantial at $574.9 million in FY2026.
Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence
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Original research
Middleby’s breadth across commercial foodservice equipment, IoT/controllers, and food-processing systems keeps it relevant as a preferred vendor for kitchen remodels, automation, and production-line upgrades, rather than leaving it exposed as a single-product cyclical supplier. If the portfolio remains a preferred-vendor advantage, revenue can recover without heavy discounting; if customers choose narrower or cheaper alternatives, the platform premium disappears.
Specialized equipment brands and engineered product differentiation allow Middleby to defend price and mix, so lower or uneven volumes do not automatically force gross-profit erosion. Durable gross profit supports reinvestment, service coverage, and cash generation; if price/mix breaks, revenue recovery could be low-quality.
Middleby’s operating model can convert equipment sales and service activity into cash even when GAAP earnings are depressed by non-cash or portfolio-related charges. Cash conversion is what funds debt reduction, acquisitions, buybacks, and resilience through equipment cycles; if it fails, accounting adjustments stop being harmless.
Middleby’s acquisition-led portfolio strategy must demonstrate that acquired brands are compounding value rather than requiring impairments or divestitures that erase prior capital allocation gains. If acquisitions remain value-creating, Middleby can keep widening the portfolio; if they destroy value, per-share compounding and investor trust are impaired.
Middleby needs management discipline across its many product lines and subsidiaries so scale, sourcing, and distribution efficiency offset portfolio complexity and protect operating profit. If operating leverage returns, modest revenue growth can compound earnings; if complexity wins, the business can have decent gross profit but weak owner earnings.
All standing thesis claims
Original report summary
its broad kitchen and food-processing portfolio keeps producing high-margin cash flow and FY2026’s GAAP loss proves to be a portfolio-cleanup event rather than evidence that the roll-up model is maturing.
Bull case and bear case
Bull case and bear case for MIDDLEBY
Where the evidence on MIDDLEBY disagrees: Mixed on the latest evidence (Nov 7, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 2 strengthening, 2 holding and 1 weakening.
Bull case: what the evidence supports
Middleby’s breadth across commercial foodservice equipment, IoT/controllers, and food-processing systems keeps it relevant as a preferred vendor for kitchen remodels, automation, and production-line upgrades, rather than leaving it exposed as a single-product cyclical supplier.
Specialized equipment brands and engineered product differentiation allow Middleby to defend price and mix, so lower or uneven volumes do not automatically force gross-profit erosion.
Middleby’s operating model can convert equipment sales and service activity into cash even when GAAP earnings are depressed by non-cash or portfolio-related charges.
Middleby needs management discipline across its many product lines and subsidiaries so scale, sourcing, and distribution efficiency offset portfolio complexity and protect operating profit.
Bear case: what the evidence questions
Middleby’s acquisition-led portfolio strategy must demonstrate that acquired brands are compounding value rather than requiring impairments or divestitures that erase prior capital allocation gains.
Thesis-Break Engine
Thesis-break watch · MIDDLEBY
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MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT
The numbers behind the thesis
What Changed
- MixedDirector or principal officer change.
MIDDLEBY filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-11-05: Director or principal officer change. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedReported results of operations (earnings release).
MIDDLEBY filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-11-05: Reported results of operations (earnings release). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedEntered a material definitive agreement.
MIDDLEBY filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-11-04: Entered a material definitive agreement. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
Risks / falsifiers
What could break the thesis
- Large restaurant chains standardize remodel programs with Ali Group/Welbilt, ITW Food Equipment, Rational, or other competitors instead of Middleby brands.
- Rational, ITW, Ali Group/Welbilt, or low-cost Asian manufacturers win with lower-priced comparable ovens, fryers, refrigeration, or preparation equipment.
- Inventory builds or supply-chain disruption absorb cash because Middleby must hold more components or finished goods to maintain service levels.
- Management announces additional goodwill, intangible, or brand impairments tied to prior acquisitions.
- Brand sprawl creates duplicated sales, engineering, factory, or service infrastructure that cannot be rationalized without hurting customers.
MIDD news
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Financial statements
MIDD income statement
Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.
MIDD: quick answers
- Have members of Congress traded MIDD?
- Reports made public in the last 90 days disclose 6 trades in MIDD by 1 filer: 0 purchases and 6 sales. They are filed under the STOCK Act by members of Congress, the President and senior officials. Every disclosed MIDD trade
- Which well-known investors own MIDD?
- 2 of the 37 well-known funds tracked here reported MIDD shares in their latest 13F filings. By share of the fund's portfolio: Soros Fund Management (George Soros), 0.3%; Bridgewater Associates (Ray Dalio), 0.0%. Fund portfolios
MIDD in well-known investors’ portfolios
2 of 37 funds reported MIDD shares in their latest 13F filing. A 13F shows quarter-end positions and arrives up to 45 days later.
| Fund | Of its portfolio | Value | Change | Quarter |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| George SorosSoros Fund Management | 0.26% | $21.3M | New | Q2 2026 |
| Ray DalioBridgewater Associates | 0.02% | $4.2M | New | Q2 2026 |
