Life Time Group Holdings

LTHNYSEUSD

THESIS ALERT

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$47.52
+$0.10 (+0.21%)Today 1M +16.99%
After hours$47.520.00%

Updated Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET · Regular session · May be delayed

Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
$47.42
Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
$46.89–$47.84
Regular-session low and high so far today.
3.1M
Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET.
Not yet confirmed
The company has not confirmed its next report date. Reported quarters are available in the chart’s Earnings view.
$24.46–$48.61
52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.

Understand the Business

Why the Stock Moved

Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.

The core investment thesis

Own LTH if its premium athletic-country-club model keeps attracting members who pay for an in-person wellness ecosystem, not just a gym, while mature clubs deliver operating leverage faster than new clubs and balance-sheet costs consume it.

LTH price history

Latest price$47.52Today+$0.10 (+0.21%)
LTH +16.04%S&P 500 -2.42%Since first plotted close
4 hours

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Investment thesis

What must happen next

5 MATERIAL PROPOSITIONS
  • Life Time’s differentiated, full-service club experience continues to pull members away from narrower alternatives like low-cost gyms, boutique studios, and home fitness, so demand keeps converting into membership and in-club spend.StrengtheningMateriality: High

    GAAP annual revenue increased from $1.318 billion in FY2021 to $2.995 billion in FY2025. If the destination-club value proposition holds, revenue growth can remain business-quality growth rather than price-cut or promo-driven growth.

    Watch: Equinox, Planet Fitness, boutique studios, or local luxury clubs materially improve their offering or pricing enough to take Life Time members.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    GAAP annual revenue increased from $1.318 billion in FY2021 to $2.995 billion in FY2025.

    Open source ↗
  • As clubs mature and utilization rises, Life Time can spread fixed facility, labor, and corporate costs over more member and service revenue, producing operating leverage rather than merely larger but equally costly revenue.StrengtheningMateriality: High

    GAAP annual operating income rose from $110.6 million in FY2022 to $481.3 million in FY2025. This is the difference between a capital-intensive growth story and a compounding earnings story.

    Watch: New clubs ramp more slowly than expected, increasing pre-opening and early-stage operating drag.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    GAAP annual operating income rose from $110.6 million in FY2022 to $481.3 million in FY2025.

    Open source ↗
  • Life Time’s premium positioning and broad in-club offering support pricing and mix well enough to protect gross profit despite inflation in labor, services, food, facilities, and merchandise costs.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium

    Estimated GAAP annual gross profit increased from $1.032 billion in FY2023 to $1.427 billion in FY2025. If gross profitability erodes, revenue growth could still destroy value by requiring discounts or absorbing higher service costs.

    Watch: Premium-club competitors use aggressive promotions that force Life Time to discount memberships or initiation fees.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    Estimated GAAP annual gross profit increased from $1.032 billion in FY2023 to $1.427 billion in FY2025.

    Open source ↗
  • The membership model can convert reported earnings into substantial operating cash flow, giving Life Time internal funding capacity for maintenance, new clubs, and debt service.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium

    GAAP annual operating cash flow increased from $201.0 million in FY2022 to $870.5 million in FY2025. A capital-intensive club operator must self-fund more of its growth cycle; otherwise equity value can be diluted or pressured by leverage.

    Watch: Member cancellations or fewer prepaid memberships reduce deferred cash inflows before revenue weakness fully appears.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    GAAP annual operating cash flow increased from $201.0 million in FY2022 to $870.5 million in FY2025.

    Open source ↗
  • Life Time’s value creation depends on disciplined club development and financing because large-format clubs require a sizable asset and liability base before member demand is proven.HoldingMateriality: Medium

    Total liabilities were $4.882 billion at FY2025 year-end, large relative to the business and therefore central to the equity case. Even a loved brand can be a poor equity if growth requires too much debt, lease burden, or low-return expansion capital.

    Watch: Management accelerates new club openings into weaker markets or signs expensive leases that lower returns on invested capital.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    Total liabilities were $4.882 billion at FY2025 year-end, large relative to the business and therefore central to the equity case.

    Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence

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Original research

Life Time’s differentiated, full-service club experience continues to pull members away from narrower alternatives like low-cost gyms, boutique studios, and home fitness, so demand keeps converting into membership and in-club spend. If the destination-club value proposition holds, revenue growth can remain business-quality growth rather than price-cut or promo-driven growth.

As clubs mature and utilization rises, Life Time can spread fixed facility, labor, and corporate costs over more member and service revenue, producing operating leverage rather than merely larger but equally costly revenue. This is the difference between a capital-intensive growth story and a compounding earnings story.

Life Time’s premium positioning and broad in-club offering support pricing and mix well enough to protect gross profit despite inflation in labor, services, food, facilities, and merchandise costs. If gross profitability erodes, revenue growth could still destroy value by requiring discounts or absorbing higher service costs.

The membership model can convert reported earnings into substantial operating cash flow, giving Life Time internal funding capacity for maintenance, new clubs, and debt service. A capital-intensive club operator must self-fund more of its growth cycle; otherwise equity value can be diluted or pressured by leverage.

Life Time’s value creation depends on disciplined club development and financing because large-format clubs require a sizable asset and liability base before member demand is proven. Even a loved brand can be a poor equity if growth requires too much debt, lease burden, or low-return expansion capital.

All standing thesis claims
Original report summary

its premium athletic-country-club model keeps attracting members who pay for an in-person wellness ecosystem, not just a gym, while mature clubs deliver operating leverage faster than new clubs and balance-sheet costs consume it.

Evidence assessed Oct 18, 2026. Expand each conclusion for its evidence and what would change it. Thesis evidence—not a buy or sell recommendation.

Bull case and bear case

Bull case and bear case for Life Time Group Holdings

Where the evidence on Life Time Group Holdings stands: Holding on the latest evidence (Oct 18, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 4 strengthening and 1 holding.

Bull case: what the evidence supports

  • Life Time’s differentiated, full-service club experience continues to pull members away from narrower alternatives like low-cost gyms, boutique studios, and home fitness, so demand keeps converting into membership and in-club spend.

    sec.gov ↗

  • As clubs mature and utilization rises, Life Time can spread fixed facility, labor, and corporate costs over more member and service revenue, producing operating leverage rather than merely larger but equally costly revenue.

    sec.gov ↗

  • Life Time’s premium positioning and broad in-club offering support pricing and mix well enough to protect gross profit despite inflation in labor, services, food, facilities, and merchandise costs.

    sec.gov ↗

  • The membership model can convert reported earnings into substantial operating cash flow, giving Life Time internal funding capacity for maintenance, new clubs, and debt service.

    sec.gov ↗

  • Life Time’s value creation depends on disciplined club development and financing because large-format clubs require a sizable asset and liability base before member demand is proven.

    sec.gov ↗

Bear case: what would count against it

  • Equinox, Planet Fitness, boutique studios, or local luxury clubs materially improve their offering or pricing enough to take Life Time members.

    sec.gov ↗

  • New clubs ramp more slowly than expected, increasing pre-opening and early-stage operating drag.

    sec.gov ↗

  • Premium-club competitors use aggressive promotions that force Life Time to discount memberships or initiation fees.

    sec.gov ↗

Thesis-Break Engine

Thesis-break watch · Life Time Group Holdings

Loading the break-condition record for Life Time Group Holdings.

How the Thesis-Break Engine works →Historical outcomes are measured against the market after past breaks of the same kind, across all companies. Not a prediction.

MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT

The numbers behind the thesis

Sourced from filings and market data

What Changed

  1. Mixed
    Director or principal officer change.

    Life Time Group Holdings filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-08-27: Director or principal officer change. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.

  2. Mixed
    Entered a material definitive agreement.

    Life Time Group Holdings filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-08-13: Entered a material definitive agreement. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.

  3. Mixed
    Reported results of operations (earnings release).

    Life Time Group Holdings filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-07-30: Reported results of operations (earnings release). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.

Risks / falsifiers

What could break the thesis

  • Equinox, Planet Fitness, boutique studios, or local luxury clubs materially improve their offering or pricing enough to take Life Time members.
  • New clubs ramp more slowly than expected, increasing pre-opening and early-stage operating drag.
  • Premium-club competitors use aggressive promotions that force Life Time to discount memberships or initiation fees.
  • Member cancellations or fewer prepaid memberships reduce deferred cash inflows before revenue weakness fully appears.
  • Management accelerates new club openings into weaker markets or signs expensive leases that lower returns on invested capital.

LTH news

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Financial statements

LTH income statement

Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.

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