Liveperson
LPSNUSD
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- Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
- Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
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- — Regular-session shares traded.
- Not yet confirmed The company has not confirmed its next report date. Reported quarters are available in the chart’s Earnings view.
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Understand the Business
Why the Stock Moved
Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.
The core investment thesis
Own LPSN if enterprise demand stabilizes before liquidity and balance-sheet pressure force a bad financing.
LPSN price history
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Investment thesis
What must happen next
Enterprise customers must still see LivePerson’s conversational-AI platform as a differentiated system of engagement rather than a replaceable feature inside broader CRM or contact-center suites.WeakeningMateriality: High
LivePerson describes itself as a leader in digital customer conversation and conversational AI in the company profile evidence. If the platform remains mission-critical, revenue can stabilize; if customers migrate, the turnaround has no demand base to cut its way into.
Watch: Salesforce Service Cloud/Einstein, Zendesk AI, Genesys Cloud AI, NICE CXone, or Five9 bundle comparable AI conversation tools into platforms customers already use.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
LivePerson describes itself as a leader in digital customer conversation and conversational AI in the company profile evidence.
Open source ↗LivePerson’s AI automation model must preserve software-like unit economics instead of letting LLM inference, cloud hosting, and support costs absorb the value customers receive.HoldingMateriality: High
FY2025 annual gross_profit was $174.350 million on $243.742 million of GAAP revenue, implying a software-like gross margin. High gross profit gives management room to fix operating losses; gross-margin erosion would make even stabilized revenue much less valuable.
Watch: Hyperscale AI and LLM vendors capture more of the economics through higher inference and model-access costs.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
FY2025 annual gross_profit was $174.350 million on $243.742 million of GAAP revenue, implying a software-like gross margin.
Open source ↗Management’s cost reset must create real operating leverage on the retained revenue base, not merely shrink the company while losses persist.HoldingMateriality: Medium
FY2025 annual GAAP operating_income was -$78.699 million, improved from -$183.195 million in FY2024. The equity needs a path from software gross profit to operating profit; otherwise the company remains dependent on financing despite having recurring revenue.
Watch: Sales and product cuts impair LivePerson’s ability to retain and win enterprise accounts in a fast-moving AI category.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
FY2025 annual GAAP operating_income was -$78.699 million, improved from -$183.195 million in FY2024.
Open source ↗The turnaround must be funded from the existing cash base and improving operations before liquidity pressure forces dilutive capital or creditor-led decisions.WeakeningMateriality: Medium
Cash was $95.004 million at December 31, 2025, so the company still had liquidity at year-end. Even if the product strategy is fixable, common shareholders may not capture the upside if the balance sheet consumes the option value first.
Watch: Continuing customer losses keep operating cash flow negative and accelerate cash depletion.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Cash was $95.004 million at December 31, 2025, so the company still had liquidity at year-end.
Open source ↗LivePerson must turn its conversational-AI revenue base into cash generation rather than funding customer retention and product relevance with continuing operating cash burn.WeakeningMateriality: Medium
FY2025 annual GAAP operating_cash_flow was -$30.435 million, materially less negative than FY2022’s -$62.101 million. Cash conversion is the bridge between a surviving software platform and per-share value creation; persistent burn transfers value to financiers.
Watch: Renewal pressure from CRM and contact-center AI competitors requires discounts, concessions, or implementation spending that consumes cash.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
FY2025 annual GAAP operating_cash_flow was -$30.435 million, materially less negative than FY2022’s -$62.101 million.
Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence
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Original research
Enterprise customers must still see LivePerson’s conversational-AI platform as a differentiated system of engagement rather than a replaceable feature inside broader CRM or contact-center suites. If the platform remains mission-critical, revenue can stabilize; if customers migrate, the turnaround has no demand base to cut its way into.
LivePerson’s AI automation model must preserve software-like unit economics instead of letting LLM inference, cloud hosting, and support costs absorb the value customers receive. High gross profit gives management room to fix operating losses; gross-margin erosion would make even stabilized revenue much less valuable.
Management’s cost reset must create real operating leverage on the retained revenue base, not merely shrink the company while losses persist. The equity needs a path from software gross profit to operating profit; otherwise the company remains dependent on financing despite having recurring revenue.
The turnaround must be funded from the existing cash base and improving operations before liquidity pressure forces dilutive capital or creditor-led decisions. Even if the product strategy is fixable, common shareholders may not capture the upside if the balance sheet consumes the option value first.
LivePerson must turn its conversational-AI revenue base into cash generation rather than funding customer retention and product relevance with continuing operating cash burn. Cash conversion is the bridge between a surviving software platform and per-share value creation; persistent burn transfers value to financiers.
All standing thesis claims
Original report summary
enterprise demand stabilizes before liquidity and balance-sheet pressure force a bad financing.
Bull case and bear case
Bull case and bear case for Liveperson
Where the evidence on Liveperson disagrees: Mixed on the latest evidence (Oct 13, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 2 holding and 3 weakening.
Bull case: what the evidence supports
LivePerson’s AI automation model must preserve software-like unit economics instead of letting LLM inference, cloud hosting, and support costs absorb the value customers receive.
Management’s cost reset must create real operating leverage on the retained revenue base, not merely shrink the company while losses persist.
Bear case: what the evidence questions
Enterprise customers must still see LivePerson’s conversational-AI platform as a differentiated system of engagement rather than a replaceable feature inside broader CRM or contact-center suites.
The turnaround must be funded from the existing cash base and improving operations before liquidity pressure forces dilutive capital or creditor-led decisions.
LivePerson must turn its conversational-AI revenue base into cash generation rather than funding customer retention and product relevance with continuing operating cash burn.
Thesis-Break Engine
Thesis-break watch · Liveperson
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MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT
The numbers behind the thesis
What Changed
No assessed change was returned in this research window. That can reflect a quiet period or a coverage limit.
Risks / falsifiers
What could break the thesis
- Salesforce Service Cloud/Einstein, Zendesk AI, Genesys Cloud AI, NICE CXone, or Five9 bundle comparable AI conversation tools into platforms customers already use.
- Hyperscale AI and LLM vendors capture more of the economics through higher inference and model-access costs.
- Sales and product cuts impair LivePerson’s ability to retain and win enterprise accounts in a fast-moving AI category.
- Continuing customer losses keep operating cash flow negative and accelerate cash depletion.
- Renewal pressure from CRM and contact-center AI competitors requires discounts, concessions, or implementation spending that consumes cash.
LPSN news
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Financial statements
LPSN income statement
Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.
