Lear
LEANYSEUSD
- Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
- Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
- Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
- $109.60 Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
- $107.89–$110.57 Regular-session low and high so far today.
- 559.9K Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET.
- Feb 3 projected Projected for 2027-02-03 from the company’s own results filings (SEC 8-K Item 2.02). The company has not confirmed the date.
- $99.00–$150.33 52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.
Understand the Business
Why the Stock Moved
Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.
The core investment thesis
Own LEA if its OEM-embedded seating franchise and E-Systems content keep winning vehicle platforms while management restores margins that have slipped since 2023.
LEA price history
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Investment thesis
What must happen next
Lear’s design-in position on OEM vehicle platforms should keep it relevant through model cycles because automakers value launch reliability, just-in-time delivery and global execution over frequent supplier switching.HoldingMateriality: High
GAAP annual revenue was $23.259 billion in FY2025, still materially above $20.892 billion in FY2022. If this holds, Lear remains a core supplier through auto cycles; if it breaks, revenue becomes a share-loss story rather than just an industry-volume story.
Watch: Major OEMs such as Ford, General Motors, Stellantis, Tesla, Toyota or Volkswagen shift future seating or electrical programs away from Lear to Magna, Forvia, Adient, Yanfeng or in-house operations.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual revenue was $23.259 billion in FY2025, still materially above $20.892 billion in FY2022.
Open source ↗Higher seating and electrical content must translate into value capture, not just pass-through sales, because Lear’s moat depends on being paid for engineering, integration and launch complexity.WeakeningMateriality: High
GAAP annual gross profit was $1.504 billion in FY2025, showing the business still converts a large revenue base into positive gross dollars. If content growth carries adequate gross profit, Lear can compound value even in a flat vehicle market; if not, it becomes a high-revenue, low-spread assembler.
Watch: OEMs force price-downs or refuse commercial recoveries for labor, freight, energy and material inflation.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual gross profit was $1.504 billion in FY2025, showing the business still converts a large revenue base into positive.
Open source ↗Lear’s operating model needs productivity, restructuring and customer recoveries to offset labor and launch-cost pressure; otherwise OEM bargaining power captures the economics of its scale.WeakeningMateriality: Medium
GAAP annual operating income was $777.3 million in FY2025, still above $654.3 million in FY2022. This is the main earnings lever: stable revenue does little for owners if operating income keeps leaking away.
Watch: UAW, European or other global labor agreements raise costs faster than Lear can recover them from OEMs.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual operating income was $777.3 million in FY2025, still above $654.3 million in FY2022.
Open source ↗Lear’s platform scale should keep generating enough operating cash to fund working capital and tooling demands through the cycle without forcing balance-sheet stress.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium
GAAP annual operating cash flow was $1.089 billion in FY2025. If cash conversion holds, the company has staying power and optionality; if it fails, cyclical margin pressure becomes a financing and capital-allocation problem.
Watch: A sharp production cut by major OEM customers creates working-capital absorption and underutilized plants.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual operating cash flow was $1.089 billion in FY2025.
Open source ↗For owners to benefit, Lear must turn its operating base into per-share earnings rather than letting cost inflation, acquisitions, restructuring or dilution absorb the economics.WeakeningMateriality: Medium
GAAP diluted EPS was $8.15 in FY2025, above $5.47 in FY2022. A supplier can look strategically important but still be a poor equity if per-share earnings do not compound.
Watch: Management pursues acquisitions or restructuring that do not earn adequate returns and dilute per-share value.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP diluted EPS was $8.15 in FY2025, above $5.47 in FY2022.
Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence
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Original research
Lear’s design-in position on OEM vehicle platforms should keep it relevant through model cycles because automakers value launch reliability, just-in-time delivery and global execution over frequent supplier switching. If this holds, Lear remains a core supplier through auto cycles; if it breaks, revenue becomes a share-loss story rather than just an industry-volume story.
Higher seating and electrical content must translate into value capture, not just pass-through sales, because Lear’s moat depends on being paid for engineering, integration and launch complexity. If content growth carries adequate gross profit, Lear can compound value even in a flat vehicle market; if not, it becomes a high-revenue, low-spread assembler.
Lear’s operating model needs productivity, restructuring and customer recoveries to offset labor and launch-cost pressure; otherwise OEM bargaining power captures the economics of its scale. This is the main earnings lever: stable revenue does little for owners if operating income keeps leaking away.
Lear’s platform scale should keep generating enough operating cash to fund working capital and tooling demands through the cycle without forcing balance-sheet stress. If cash conversion holds, the company has staying power and optionality; if it fails, cyclical margin pressure becomes a financing and capital-allocation problem.
For owners to benefit, Lear must turn its operating base into per-share earnings rather than letting cost inflation, acquisitions, restructuring or dilution absorb the economics. A supplier can look strategically important but still be a poor equity if per-share earnings do not compound.
All standing thesis claims
Original report summary
its OEM-embedded seating franchise and E-Systems content keep winning vehicle platforms while management restores margins that have slipped since 2023.
Bull case and bear case
Bull case and bear case for Lear
Where the evidence on Lear disagrees: Mixed on the latest evidence (Oct 15, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 1 strengthening, 1 holding and 3 weakening.
Bull case: what the evidence supports
Lear’s design-in position on OEM vehicle platforms should keep it relevant through model cycles because automakers value launch reliability, just-in-time delivery and global execution over frequent supplier switching.
Lear’s platform scale should keep generating enough operating cash to fund working capital and tooling demands through the cycle without forcing balance-sheet stress.
Bear case: what the evidence questions
Higher seating and electrical content must translate into value capture, not just pass-through sales, because Lear’s moat depends on being paid for engineering, integration and launch complexity.
Lear’s operating model needs productivity, restructuring and customer recoveries to offset labor and launch-cost pressure; otherwise OEM bargaining power captures the economics of its scale.
For owners to benefit, Lear must turn its operating base into per-share earnings rather than letting cost inflation, acquisitions, restructuring or dilution absorb the economics.
Thesis-Break Engine
What has broken in Lear’s thesis
Each break OptimistFi flagged on Lear, dated — with what has historically followed the same kind of break across the market, not a forecast for Lear.
- CEO / officer changecondition set before this filing
Across all companies, this kind of break has happened 16,849 times before. Those stocks trailed comparable companies by a median of 2% over the next six months, and 38% of them trailed it by 10 points or more.
- Analyst downgradecondition set before this filing
Across all companies, this kind of break has happened 12,641 times before. Those stocks trailed comparable companies by a median of 1% over the next six months, and 33% of them trailed it by 10 points or more.
Several kinds of break have stacked on Lear at once. A cluster is a stronger read than any one signal alone.
MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT
The numbers behind the thesis
What Changed
- MixedOther material event.
Lear filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-09-24: Other material event. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedReported results of operations (earnings release).
Lear filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-07-31: Reported results of operations (earnings release). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedReported results of operations (earnings release).
Lear filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-05-01: Reported results of operations (earnings release). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
Risks / falsifiers
What could break the thesis
- Major OEMs such as Ford, General Motors, Stellantis, Tesla, Toyota or Volkswagen shift future seating or electrical programs away from Lear to Magna, Forvia, Adient, Yanfeng or in-house operations.
- OEMs force price-downs or refuse commercial recoveries for labor, freight, energy and material inflation.
- UAW, European or other global labor agreements raise costs faster than Lear can recover them from OEMs.
- A sharp production cut by major OEM customers creates working-capital absorption and underutilized plants.
- Management pursues acquisitions or restructuring that do not earn adequate returns and dilute per-share value.
LEA news
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Financial statements
LEA income statement
Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.
LEA: quick answers
- When does Lear (LEA) report earnings next?
- Lear's next results are projected for February 3, 2027, from the dates of its own results filings with the SEC. The company has not confirmed the date. It last reported on October 30, 2026. Earnings calendar
- What is LEA's short interest?
- As of October 30, 2026, 3.4M LEA shares were sold short, 7.02% of its shares outstanding, up 12.0% from the count before. At the stock's average daily volume that is 6.7 days to cover. FINRA publishes the count twice a month. LEA short interest history
- Have members of Congress traded LEA?
- 16 trades in LEA have been disclosed under the STOCK Act by members of Congress, the President or senior officials, none in reports made public in the last 90 days. Every disclosed LEA trade
- Which well-known investors own LEA?
- 1 of the 37 well-known funds tracked here reported LEA shares in their latest 13F filing. By share of the fund's portfolio: Bridgewater Associates (Ray Dalio), 0.0%. Fund portfolios
LEA in well-known investors’ portfolios
1 of 37 funds reported LEA shares in their latest 13F filing. A 13F shows quarter-end positions and arrives up to 45 days later.
| Fund | Of its portfolio | Value | Change | Quarter |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ray DalioBridgewater Associates | 0.02% | $4.2M | +131.4% | Q2 2026 |
