LCI Industries
LCIINYSEUSD
- Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
- Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
- Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
- $97.98 Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
- $95.85–$97.74 Regular-session low and high so far today.
- 505.3K Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET.
- Feb 17 projected Projected for 2027-02-17 from the company’s own results filings (SEC 8-K Item 2.02). The company has not confirmed the date.
- $77.58–$159.66 52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.
Understand the Business
Why the Stock Moved
Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.
The core investment thesis
Own LCII if Lippert remains the scaled component platform that captures an RV and adjacent-OEM recovery with better margins and cash conversion than a typical cyclical supplier.
LCII price history
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Investment thesis
What must happen next
Lippert’s embedded component position should let a recovery in RV and related OEM production convert into sales, provided customers do not cut outsourced content or shift share to alternatives.HoldingMateriality: High
GAAP annual revenue increased to $4.122 billion in FY2025 from $3.741 billion in FY2024, a 10.2% year-over-year improvement. If this holds, LCII has operating upside as production normalizes; if it breaks, revenue recovery becomes a low-quality cyclical bounce rather than a durable platform story.
Watch: Major RV OEMs such as Thor Industries, Forest River, or Winnebago reduce production schedules because retail affordability and interest rates keep dealer demand weak.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual revenue increased to $4.122 billion in FY2025 from $3.741 billion in FY2024, a 10.2% year-over-year improvement.
Open source ↗LCII’s scale purchasing, component breadth, and pricing discipline should protect gross profit as volumes recover, unless OEMs regain enough bargaining power to force price concessions or input costs outrun pass-through.StrengtheningMateriality: High
GAAP annual gross profit increased to $980.3 million in FY2025 from $879.7 million in FY2024. Revenue growth only creates owner value if the company keeps enough gross profit dollars after materials, labor, and freight costs.
Watch: Steel, aluminum, resin, freight, or labor inflation accelerates before LCII can reprice contracts.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual gross profit increased to $980.3 million in FY2025 from $879.7 million in FY2024.
Open source ↗The manufacturing footprint should produce operating leverage as volume returns, but the mechanism fails if recovery volume is low-margin, intermittent, or absorbed by labor, warranty, and overhead costs.HoldingMateriality: Medium
GAAP annual operating income rose to $279.9 million in FY2025 from $218.2 million in FY2024, outpacing revenue growth. This determines whether LCII is merely recovering sales or actually compounding earnings power through the cycle.
Watch: OEM orders remain choppy, preventing consistent plant utilization and overhead absorption.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual operating income rose to $279.9 million in FY2025 from $218.2 million in FY2024, outpacing revenue growth.
Open source ↗LCII must convert cycle-normalized earnings into operating cash through working-capital discipline, because growth that requires inventory, receivables, or acquisition spending ahead of demand would weaken the equity story.HoldingMateriality: Medium
GAAP annual operating cash flow was positive in each year shown: $602.5 million in FY2022, $527.2 million in FY2023, $370.3 million in FY2024, and $331.0 million in FY2025. Cash conversion funds dividends, buybacks, acquisitions, debt reduction, and downturn resilience; weak conversion turns accounting recovery into a lower-quality investment.
Watch: Dealer or OEM inventory rebuilds require LCII to carry more working capital before end demand is proven.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual operating cash flow was positive in each year shown: $602.5 million in FY2022, $527.2 million in FY2023, $370.3.
Open source ↗Balance-sheet flexibility can support through-cycle investment only if management prevents liabilities from rising faster than cash generation and equity value during the next OEM downturn.HoldingMateriality: Medium
Total liabilities at FY2025 year-end were $1.815 billion, still slightly below the FY2022 year-end level of $1.866 billion. The more leveraged the company becomes into a cyclical market, the less room it has to invest opportunistically or return capital when demand weakens.
Watch: Liabilities increased from $1.508 billion at FY2024 year-end to $1.815 billion at FY2025 year-end while equity declined from $1.387 billion to $1.361 billion.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Total liabilities at FY2025 year-end were $1.815 billion, still slightly below the FY2022 year-end level of $1.866 billion.
Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence
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Original research
Lippert’s embedded component position should let a recovery in RV and related OEM production convert into sales, provided customers do not cut outsourced content or shift share to alternatives. If this holds, LCII has operating upside as production normalizes; if it breaks, revenue recovery becomes a low-quality cyclical bounce rather than a durable platform story.
LCII’s scale purchasing, component breadth, and pricing discipline should protect gross profit as volumes recover, unless OEMs regain enough bargaining power to force price concessions or input costs outrun pass-through. Revenue growth only creates owner value if the company keeps enough gross profit dollars after materials, labor, and freight costs.
The manufacturing footprint should produce operating leverage as volume returns, but the mechanism fails if recovery volume is low-margin, intermittent, or absorbed by labor, warranty, and overhead costs. This determines whether LCII is merely recovering sales or actually compounding earnings power through the cycle.
LCII must convert cycle-normalized earnings into operating cash through working-capital discipline, because growth that requires inventory, receivables, or acquisition spending ahead of demand would weaken the equity story. Cash conversion funds dividends, buybacks, acquisitions, debt reduction, and downturn resilience; weak conversion turns accounting recovery into a lower-quality investment.
Balance-sheet flexibility can support through-cycle investment only if management prevents liabilities from rising faster than cash generation and equity value during the next OEM downturn. The more leveraged the company becomes into a cyclical market, the less room it has to invest opportunistically or return capital when demand weakens.
All standing thesis claims
Original report summary
Lippert remains the scaled component platform that captures an RV and adjacent-OEM recovery with better margins and cash conversion than a typical cyclical supplier.
Bull case and bear case
Bull case and bear case for Lci Industries
Where the evidence on Lci Industries stands: Holding on the latest evidence (Nov 7, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 1 strengthening and 4 holding.
Bull case: what the evidence supports
Lippert’s embedded component position should let a recovery in RV and related OEM production convert into sales, provided customers do not cut outsourced content or shift share to alternatives.
LCII’s scale purchasing, component breadth, and pricing discipline should protect gross profit as volumes recover, unless OEMs regain enough bargaining power to force price concessions or input costs outrun pass-through.
The manufacturing footprint should produce operating leverage as volume returns, but the mechanism fails if recovery volume is low-margin, intermittent, or absorbed by labor, warranty, and overhead costs.
LCII must convert cycle-normalized earnings into operating cash through working-capital discipline, because growth that requires inventory, receivables, or acquisition spending ahead of demand would weaken the equity story.
Balance-sheet flexibility can support through-cycle investment only if management prevents liabilities from rising faster than cash generation and equity value during the next OEM downturn.
Bear case: what would count against it
Major RV OEMs such as Thor Industries, Forest River, or Winnebago reduce production schedules because retail affordability and interest rates keep dealer demand weak.
Steel, aluminum, resin, freight, or labor inflation accelerates before LCII can reprice contracts.
OEM orders remain choppy, preventing consistent plant utilization and overhead absorption.
Thesis-Break Engine
Thesis-break watch · Lci Industries
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MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT
The numbers behind the thesis
What Changed
- MixedRegulation FD disclosure.
Lci Industries filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-11-05: Regulation FD disclosure. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedReported results of operations (earnings release).
Lci Industries filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-11-05: Reported results of operations (earnings release). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedOther material event.
Lci Industries filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-10-30: Other material event. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
Risks / falsifiers
What could break the thesis
- Major RV OEMs such as Thor Industries, Forest River, or Winnebago reduce production schedules because retail affordability and interest rates keep dealer demand weak.
- Steel, aluminum, resin, freight, or labor inflation accelerates before LCII can reprice contracts.
- OEM orders remain choppy, preventing consistent plant utilization and overhead absorption.
- Dealer or OEM inventory rebuilds require LCII to carry more working capital before end demand is proven.
- Liabilities increased from $1.508 billion at FY2024 year-end to $1.815 billion at FY2025 year-end while equity declined from $1.387 billion to $1.361 billion.
LCII news
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Financial statements
LCII income statement
Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.
LCII: quick answers
- When does Lci Industries (LCII) report earnings next?
- Lci Industries's next results are projected for February 17, 2027, from the dates of its own results filings with the SEC. The company has not confirmed the date. It last reported on November 5, 2026. Earnings calendar
- What is LCII's short interest?
- As of October 30, 2026, 1.9M LCII shares were sold short, 7.78% of its shares outstanding, down 12.9% from the count before. At the stock's average daily volume that is 2.4 days to cover. FINRA publishes the count twice a month. LCII short interest history
- Have members of Congress traded LCII?
- Reports made public in the last 90 days disclose 1 trade in LCII by 1 filer: 1 purchase and 0 sales. They are filed under the STOCK Act by members of Congress, the President and senior officials. Every disclosed LCII trade
- Which well-known investors own LCII?
- 1 of the 37 well-known funds tracked here reported LCII shares in their latest 13F filing. By share of the fund's portfolio: Bridgewater Associates (Ray Dalio), 0.0%. Fund portfolios
LCII in well-known investors’ portfolios
1 of 37 funds reported LCII shares in their latest 13F filing. A 13F shows quarter-end positions and arrives up to 45 days later.
| Fund | Of its portfolio | Value | Change | Quarter |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ray DalioBridgewater Associates | 0.01% | $1.3M | +61.3% | Q2 2026 |
