Kyocera
KYOCFOTC Markets OTCPKUSD
- Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
- Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
- Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
- $19.15 Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
- $19.15–$19.15 Regular-session low and high so far today.
- 200 Regular-session shares traded · Nov 10, 4:00 PM ET.
- Not yet confirmed The company has not confirmed its next report date. Reported quarters are available in the chart’s Earnings view.
- $13.00–$25.56 52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.
Understand the Business
Why the Stock Moved
Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.
The core investment thesis
Own KYOCF if its ceramic/component know-how translates into better mix and cash returns, not just cyclical revenue growth.
KYOCF price history
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Investment thesis
What must happen next
Kyocera’s materials and precision-manufacturing edge keeps it relevant in semiconductor-related and industrial electronics supply chains as customers demand reliability in hard-to-qualify components.StrengtheningMateriality: High
US-GAAP annual revenue increased from ¥1.423 trillion in FY2017 to ¥1.577 trillion in FY2018. If this holds, cyclical electronics demand can still compound into durable revenue; if it breaks, Kyocera becomes a replaceable supplier with weak pricing leverage.
Watch: Large customers qualify Murata, TDK, NGK Insulators, CoorsTek, or internal alternatives for ceramic and electronic components, reducing Kyocera’s design-in leverage.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
US-GAAP annual revenue increased from ¥1.423 trillion in FY2017 to ¥1.577 trillion in FY2018.
Open source ↗The materials moat must show up as gross-profit resilience; otherwise Kyocera’s revenue growth is being competed away through pricing pressure or unfavorable mix.HoldingMateriality: High
US-GAAP annual gross profit remained substantial at ¥376.1 billion in FY2018. Gross-profit resilience is the bridge between technical relevance and owner value; without it, sales growth can destroy operating leverage.
Watch: Murata, TDK, Taiyo Yuden, Samsung Electro-Mechanics, or lower-cost Asian suppliers force price concessions in components where performance differentiation narrows.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
US-GAAP annual gross profit remained substantial at ¥376.1 billion in FY2018.
Open source ↗Kyocera’s diversified manufacturing portfolio must generate operating leverage from scale and mix improvement, rather than letting corporate complexity and weaker businesses absorb component gains.HoldingMateriality: Medium
US-GAAP annual operating income was positive at ¥95.6 billion in FY2018. Operating leverage determines whether Kyocera is a compounding industrial franchise or a low-return conglomerate with trapped value.
Watch: Underperforming businesses such as mature office/document equipment, commoditized electronics, or communications hardware consume management attention and fixed costs.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
US-GAAP annual operating income was positive at ¥95.6 billion in FY2018.
Open source ↗Kyocera’s strong balance sheet gives it the option to invest through electronics cycles, support customer qualifications, and avoid distressed capital raising when demand weakens.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium
Cash and cash equivalents were ¥424.9 billion at FY2018 year-end, up from ¥376.2 billion at FY2017 year-end. Financial resilience can turn cyclicality into share gain; if the balance sheet is spent poorly, the asset cushion becomes dead capital.
Watch: Management uses cash for low-return acquisitions or support of structurally challenged businesses instead of higher-return component capacity and technology.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Cash and cash equivalents were ¥424.9 billion at FY2018 year-end, up from ¥376.2 billion at FY2017 year-end.
Open source ↗Per-share value creation requires management to redeploy capital into higher-return niches or return excess capital; simply growing the asset base is not enough.WeakeningMateriality: Medium
US-GAAP annual diluted EPS remained positive at ¥222.43 in FY2018. This is the owner’s test: if EPS does not recover with revenue and cash strength, Kyocera may remain statistically cheap but economically stagnant.
Watch: Management continues allocating capital to mature or low-margin businesses rather than semiconductor-related, automotive, industrial, or other higher-value components.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
US-GAAP annual diluted EPS remained positive at ¥222.43 in FY2018.
Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence
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Original research
Kyocera’s materials and precision-manufacturing edge keeps it relevant in semiconductor-related and industrial electronics supply chains as customers demand reliability in hard-to-qualify components. If this holds, cyclical electronics demand can still compound into durable revenue; if it breaks, Kyocera becomes a replaceable supplier with weak pricing leverage.
The materials moat must show up as gross-profit resilience; otherwise Kyocera’s revenue growth is being competed away through pricing pressure or unfavorable mix. Gross-profit resilience is the bridge between technical relevance and owner value; without it, sales growth can destroy operating leverage.
Kyocera’s diversified manufacturing portfolio must generate operating leverage from scale and mix improvement, rather than letting corporate complexity and weaker businesses absorb component gains. Operating leverage determines whether Kyocera is a compounding industrial franchise or a low-return conglomerate with trapped value.
Kyocera’s strong balance sheet gives it the option to invest through electronics cycles, support customer qualifications, and avoid distressed capital raising when demand weakens. Financial resilience can turn cyclicality into share gain; if the balance sheet is spent poorly, the asset cushion becomes dead capital.
Per-share value creation requires management to redeploy capital into higher-return niches or return excess capital; simply growing the asset base is not enough. This is the owner’s test: if EPS does not recover with revenue and cash strength, Kyocera may remain statistically cheap but economically stagnant.
All standing thesis claims
Original report summary
its ceramic/component know-how translates into better mix and cash returns, not just cyclical revenue growth.
Bull case and bear case
Bull case and bear case for Kyocera
Where the evidence on Kyocera disagrees: Mixed on the latest evidence (Oct 26, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 2 strengthening, 2 holding and 1 weakening.
Bull case: what the evidence supports
Kyocera’s materials and precision-manufacturing edge keeps it relevant in semiconductor-related and industrial electronics supply chains as customers demand reliability in hard-to-qualify components.
The materials moat must show up as gross-profit resilience; otherwise Kyocera’s revenue growth is being competed away through pricing pressure or unfavorable mix.
Kyocera’s diversified manufacturing portfolio must generate operating leverage from scale and mix improvement, rather than letting corporate complexity and weaker businesses absorb component gains.
Kyocera’s strong balance sheet gives it the option to invest through electronics cycles, support customer qualifications, and avoid distressed capital raising when demand weakens.
Bear case: what the evidence questions
Per-share value creation requires management to redeploy capital into higher-return niches or return excess capital; simply growing the asset base is not enough.
Thesis-Break Engine
Thesis-break watch · Kyocera
OptimistFi is watching Kyocera. No break-condition checks are on record yet — they accumulate as new filings are checked.
MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT
The numbers behind the thesis
What Changed
No assessed change was returned in this research window. That can reflect a quiet period or a coverage limit.
Risks / falsifiers
What could break the thesis
- Large customers qualify Murata, TDK, NGK Insulators, CoorsTek, or internal alternatives for ceramic and electronic components, reducing Kyocera’s design-in leverage.
- Murata, TDK, Taiyo Yuden, Samsung Electro-Mechanics, or lower-cost Asian suppliers force price concessions in components where performance differentiation narrows.
- Underperforming businesses such as mature office/document equipment, commoditized electronics, or communications hardware consume management attention and fixed costs.
- Management uses cash for low-return acquisitions or support of structurally challenged businesses instead of higher-return component capacity and technology.
- Management continues allocating capital to mature or low-margin businesses rather than semiconductor-related, automotive, industrial, or other higher-value components.
KYOCF news
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Financial statements
KYOCF income statement
Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.
KYOCF: quick answers
- What is KYOCF's short interest?
- As of October 30, 2026, 2.4M KYOCF shares were sold short, down 19.6% from the count before. At the stock's average daily volume that is 1000 days to cover. FINRA publishes the count twice a month. KYOCF short interest history
- Have members of Congress traded KYOCF?
- 2 trades in KYOCF have been disclosed under the STOCK Act by members of Congress, the President or senior officials, none in reports made public in the last 90 days. Every disclosed KYOCF trade