Kura Oncology
KURANASDAQUSD
- Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
- Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
- Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
- $7.57 Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
- $7.61–$8.25 Regular-session low and high so far today.
- 3.7M Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET.
- Jan 11 projected Projected for 2027-01-11 from the company’s own results filings (SEC 8-K Item 2.02). The company has not confirmed the date.
- $6.75–$13.90 52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.
Understand the Business
Why the Stock Moved
Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.
The core investment thesis
Own KURA if Kura is a binary-to-few-shot precision-oncology thesis: shareholder value depends on whether its lead cancer programs can convert partner validation and cash runway into approvals before burn, competition, or dilution consume the upside.
KURA price history
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Investment thesis
What must happen next
Kura’s biomarker-directed oncology programs must remain clinically differentiated enough that partners, regulators, and physicians continue to treat them as fundable drug candidates rather than interchangeable targeted therapies.HoldingMateriality: High
GAAP annual revenue from customer contracts rose from $0 in FY2023 to $53.9 million in FY2024 and $67.5 million in FY2025, consistent with external collaboration validation rather than a purely internally funded program. If differentiation holds, collaboration revenue and approval probability can rise; if it breaks, current revenue support may not translate into product value.
Watch: A rival targeted-oncology program, including a competing menin-inhibitor or other genetically defined AML therapy, shows superior efficacy, safety, or label breadth before Kura reaches approval.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual revenue from customer contracts rose from $0 in FY2023 to $53.9 million in FY2024 and $67.5 million in.
Open source ↗The collaboration model must continue to subsidize clinical development so Kura can reach value-inflecting events without relying primarily on punitive equity issuance.HoldingMateriality: High
GAAP annual operating cash flow was positive $134.3 million in FY2024, despite a GAAP net loss of $174.0 million, indicating collaboration or working-capital cash can materially offset reported losses. If partner cash continues to offset burn, per-share upside is preserved; if it dries up, financing risk can overwhelm pipeline value.
Watch: The strategic partner delays, disputes, or terminates milestone payments tied to development progress.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual operating cash flow was positive $134.3 million in FY2024, despite a GAAP net loss of $174.0 million, indicating.
Open source ↗Kura’s widening operating loss is acceptable only if the incremental spend is buying trial execution, regulatory readiness, and launch capability around assets with rising approval odds, not merely extending an open-ended R&D cycle.WeakeningMateriality: Medium
GAAP annual operating loss widened from $165.8 million in FY2023 to $193.2 million in FY2024 and $303.6 million in FY2025, showing a major step-up in development and operating investment. Efficient spend can create option value; undisciplined spend converts pipeline uncertainty into permanent capital destruction.
Watch: Lead clinical programs miss efficacy, durability, or safety expectations after the company has already built a larger cost base.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual operating loss widened from $165.8 million in FY2023 to $193.2 million in FY2024 and $303.6 million in FY2025.
Open source ↗Kura has a finite but meaningful balance-sheet window, so the thesis requires clinical or regulatory catalysts to arrive before cash burn and liabilities shift negotiating power away from shareholders.HoldingMateriality: Medium
Cash and cash equivalents were $149.1 million at FY2025 year-end. A sufficient cash window lets investors underwrite the pipeline; a shrinking window makes financing terms the dominant driver of returns.
Watch: Clinical programs accelerate spending faster than expected because of larger pivotal trials, manufacturing commitments, or commercial launch preparation.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Cash and cash equivalents were $149.1 million at FY2025 year-end.
Open source ↗Kura’s precision-oncology platform must produce credible follow-on clinical shots beyond the lead program, otherwise the company remains a single-asset-like bet with limited durability.HoldingMateriality: Medium
Kura had 260 full-time employees as of December 31, 2025, indicating infrastructure beyond a minimal virtual biotech model. A broader validated pipeline can justify continued investment after the lead readout; failure to generate follow-ons makes downside more binary.
Watch: Non-lead programs fail to show human proof-of-concept or are discontinued after early safety or efficacy data.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Kura had 260 full-time employees as of December 31, 2025, indicating infrastructure beyond a minimal virtual biotech model.
Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence
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Original research
Kura’s biomarker-directed oncology programs must remain clinically differentiated enough that partners, regulators, and physicians continue to treat them as fundable drug candidates rather than interchangeable targeted therapies. If differentiation holds, collaboration revenue and approval probability can rise; if it breaks, current revenue support may not translate into product value.
The collaboration model must continue to subsidize clinical development so Kura can reach value-inflecting events without relying primarily on punitive equity issuance. If partner cash continues to offset burn, per-share upside is preserved; if it dries up, financing risk can overwhelm pipeline value.
Kura’s widening operating loss is acceptable only if the incremental spend is buying trial execution, regulatory readiness, and launch capability around assets with rising approval odds, not merely extending an open-ended R&D cycle. Efficient spend can create option value; undisciplined spend converts pipeline uncertainty into permanent capital destruction.
Kura has a finite but meaningful balance-sheet window, so the thesis requires clinical or regulatory catalysts to arrive before cash burn and liabilities shift negotiating power away from shareholders. A sufficient cash window lets investors underwrite the pipeline; a shrinking window makes financing terms the dominant driver of returns.
Kura’s precision-oncology platform must produce credible follow-on clinical shots beyond the lead program, otherwise the company remains a single-asset-like bet with limited durability. A broader validated pipeline can justify continued investment after the lead readout; failure to generate follow-ons makes downside more binary.
All standing thesis claims
Original report summary
Kura is a binary-to-few-shot precision-oncology thesis: shareholder value depends on whether its lead cancer programs can convert partner validation and cash runway into approvals before burn, competition, or dilution consume the upside.
Bull case and bear case
Bull case and bear case for KURA Oncology
Where the evidence on KURA Oncology disagrees: Mixed on the latest evidence (Nov 12, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 4 holding and 1 weakening.
Bull case: what the evidence supports
Kura’s biomarker-directed oncology programs must remain clinically differentiated enough that partners, regulators, and physicians continue to treat them as fundable drug candidates rather than interchangeable targeted therapies.
The collaboration model must continue to subsidize clinical development so Kura can reach value-inflecting events without relying primarily on punitive equity issuance.
Kura has a finite but meaningful balance-sheet window, so the thesis requires clinical or regulatory catalysts to arrive before cash burn and liabilities shift negotiating power away from shareholders.
Kura’s precision-oncology platform must produce credible follow-on clinical shots beyond the lead program, otherwise the company remains a single-asset-like bet with limited durability.
Bear case: what the evidence questions
Kura’s widening operating loss is acceptable only if the incremental spend is buying trial execution, regulatory readiness, and launch capability around assets with rising approval odds, not merely extending an open-ended R&D cycle.
Thesis-Break Engine
Thesis-break watch · KURA Oncology
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MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT
The numbers behind the thesis
What Changed
- MixedReported results of operations (earnings release).
KURA Oncology filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-11-10: Reported results of operations (earnings release). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedOther material event.
KURA Oncology filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-09-09: Other material event. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedDirector or principal officer change.
KURA Oncology filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-09-08: Director or principal officer change. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
Risks / falsifiers
What could break the thesis
- A rival targeted-oncology program, including a competing menin-inhibitor or other genetically defined AML therapy, shows superior efficacy, safety, or label breadth before Kura reaches approval.
- The strategic partner delays, disputes, or terminates milestone payments tied to development progress.
- Lead clinical programs miss efficacy, durability, or safety expectations after the company has already built a larger cost base.
- Clinical programs accelerate spending faster than expected because of larger pivotal trials, manufacturing commitments, or commercial launch preparation.
- Non-lead programs fail to show human proof-of-concept or are discontinued after early safety or efficacy data.
KURA news
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Financial statements
KURA income statement
Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.
KURA: quick answers
- When does KURA Oncology (KURA) report earnings next?
- KURA Oncology's next results are projected for January 11, 2027, from the dates of its own results filings with the SEC. The company has not confirmed the date. It last reported on November 10, 2026. Earnings calendar
- What is KURA's short interest?
- As of October 30, 2026, 12.6M KURA shares were sold short, 13.8% of its shares outstanding, down 11.7% from the count before. At the stock's average daily volume that is 7.9 days to cover. FINRA publishes the count twice a month. KURA short interest history
- Have members of Congress traded KURA?
- 1 trade in KURA has been disclosed under the STOCK Act by members of Congress, the President or senior officials, none in reports made public in the last 90 days. Every disclosed KURA trade