Intrusion

INTZNASDAQUSD

THESIS ALERT

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$0.59
+$0.03 (+5.97%)Today 1M −16.67%

Updated Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET · Regular session · May be delayed

Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
$0.55
Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
$0.53–$0.59
Regular-session low and high so far today.
111.1K
Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET.
Not yet confirmed
The company has not confirmed its next report date. Reported quarters are available in the chart’s Earnings view.
$0.47–$1.71
52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.

Understand the Business

Why the Stock Moved

Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.

The core investment thesis

Own INTZ if INTZ is a high-risk cybersecurity turnaround whose upside depends on its threat-intelligence niche finally converting into enough customer adoption to cover a fixed cost base before cash burn forces dilution.

INTZ price history

Latest price$0.59Today+$0.03 (+5.97%)
INTZ -11.37%S&P 500 -2.42%Since first plotted close
4 hours

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Investment thesis

What must happen next

5 MATERIAL PROPOSITIONS
  • Intrusion’s threat-intelligence offering remains differentiated enough that security buyers add it instead of relying only on broad security suites.HoldingMateriality: High

    GAAP annual revenue was $7.015 million in FY2025, up from $5.771 million in FY2024. If this holds, revenue growth can become evidence of product-market fit; if it breaks, the company is a small vendor in a crowded market with little scale advantage.

    Watch: Palo Alto Networks, CrowdStrike, Cisco, Fortinet or cloud security platforms bundle comparable prevention and threat-intelligence features into broader contracts.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    GAAP annual revenue was $7.015 million in FY2025, up from $5.771 million in FY2024.

    Open source ↗
  • The product mix retains enough software and data economics to preserve high gross profitability as sales scale.StrengtheningMateriality: High

    GAAP annual gross_profit was $5.380 million in FY2025 on $7.015 million of revenue, an implied gross margin of about 76.7%. High gross profit is what gives a small cybersecurity vendor a path to operating leverage; margin erosion would mean growth is being bought rather than earned.

    Watch: Winning customers requires heavy discounting, reseller concessions or subsidized pilots.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    GAAP annual gross_profit was $5.380 million in FY2025 on $7.015 million of revenue, an implied gross margin of about 76.7%.

    Open source ↗
  • Management can turn a lean operating base into operating leverage rather than needing another spending step-up to compete.HoldingMateriality: Medium

    GAAP annual operating_income improved from a loss of $16.283 million in FY2022 to a loss of $9.164 million in FY2025. The equity only compounds if incremental gross profit eventually covers sales, engineering and public-company costs; otherwise revenue growth still leaves owners funding losses.

    Watch: Enterprise sales cycles require materially larger direct sales, support or compliance spending before revenue scales.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    GAAP annual operating_income improved from a loss of $16.283 million in FY2022 to a loss of $9.164 million in FY2025.

    Open source ↗
  • Customer conversion and expense discipline improve fast enough that liquidity does not force the strategic timetable.WeakeningMateriality: Medium

    Cash was $3.624 million at December 31, 2025, versus $139 thousand at December 31, 2023. If liquidity tightens before adoption proves out, shareholders may bear dilution or strategic constraint even if the product has merit.

    Watch: Large prospects delay purchases or require long unpaid proof-of-concept periods.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    Cash was $3.624 million at December 31, 2025, versus $139 thousand at December 31, 2023.

    Open source ↗
  • A 52-person specialist organization can retain enough engineering, sales and support capability to compete against much larger cybersecurity vendors.HoldingMateriality: Medium

    The company reported 52 employees as of the 2025 filing date. The small team is a source of cost discipline only if it can still deliver enterprise-grade product support and innovation.

    Watch: Key cybersecurity engineers, sales leaders or customer-support personnel leave for larger vendors.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    The company reported 52 employees as of the 2025 filing date.

    Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence

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Original research

Intrusion’s threat-intelligence offering remains differentiated enough that security buyers add it instead of relying only on broad security suites. If this holds, revenue growth can become evidence of product-market fit; if it breaks, the company is a small vendor in a crowded market with little scale advantage.

The product mix retains enough software and data economics to preserve high gross profitability as sales scale. High gross profit is what gives a small cybersecurity vendor a path to operating leverage; margin erosion would mean growth is being bought rather than earned.

Management can turn a lean operating base into operating leverage rather than needing another spending step-up to compete. The equity only compounds if incremental gross profit eventually covers sales, engineering and public-company costs; otherwise revenue growth still leaves owners funding losses.

Customer conversion and expense discipline improve fast enough that liquidity does not force the strategic timetable. If liquidity tightens before adoption proves out, shareholders may bear dilution or strategic constraint even if the product has merit.

A 52-person specialist organization can retain enough engineering, sales and support capability to compete against much larger cybersecurity vendors. The small team is a source of cost discipline only if it can still deliver enterprise-grade product support and innovation.

All standing thesis claims
Original report summary

INTZ is a high-risk cybersecurity turnaround whose upside depends on its threat-intelligence niche finally converting into enough customer adoption to cover a fixed cost base before cash burn forces dilution.

Evidence assessed Nov 4, 2026. Expand each conclusion for its evidence and what would change it. Thesis evidence—not a buy or sell recommendation.

Bull case and bear case

Bull case and bear case for Intrusion

Where the evidence on Intrusion disagrees: Mixed on the latest evidence (Nov 4, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 1 strengthening, 3 holding and 1 weakening.

Bull case: what the evidence supports

  • Intrusion’s threat-intelligence offering remains differentiated enough that security buyers add it instead of relying only on broad security suites.

    sec.gov ↗

  • The product mix retains enough software and data economics to preserve high gross profitability as sales scale.

    sec.gov ↗

  • Management can turn a lean operating base into operating leverage rather than needing another spending step-up to compete.

    sec.gov ↗

  • A 52-person specialist organization can retain enough engineering, sales and support capability to compete against much larger cybersecurity vendors.

    sec.gov ↗

Bear case: what the evidence questions

  • Customer conversion and expense discipline improve fast enough that liquidity does not force the strategic timetable.

    sec.gov ↗

Thesis-Break Engine

What has broken in Intrusion’s thesis

Each break OptimistFi flagged on Intrusion, dated — with what has historically followed the same kind of break across the market, not a forecast for Intrusion.

  • CEO / officer changecondition set before this filing

    Across all companies, this kind of break has happened 16,849 times before. Those stocks trailed comparable companies by a median of 2% over the next six months, and 38% of them trailed it by 10 points or more.

Early warning

The break condition read on the trailing twelve months through Intrusion’s latest quarterly report, ahead of the annual figure it is written on.

  • Revenue decline, trailing 12 months

    Across all companies, this kind of early warning has happened 3,039 times before. Those stocks beat comparable companies by a median of 1% over the next six months, and 32% of them trailed it by 10 points or more.

How the Thesis-Break Engine works →Historical outcomes are measured against comparable companies after past breaks of the same kind, across all companies. Not a prediction.

MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT

The numbers behind the thesis

Sourced from filings and market data

What Changed

  1. Mixed
    Entered a material definitive agreement.

    Intrusion filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-11-02: Entered a material definitive agreement. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.

  2. Mixed
    Director or principal officer change.

    Intrusion filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-09-15: Director or principal officer change. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.

  3. Mixed
    Unregistered sale of equity securities.

    Intrusion filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-09-03: Unregistered sale of equity securities. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.

Risks / falsifiers

What could break the thesis

  • Palo Alto Networks, CrowdStrike, Cisco, Fortinet or cloud security platforms bundle comparable prevention and threat-intelligence features into broader contracts.
  • Winning customers requires heavy discounting, reseller concessions or subsidized pilots.
  • Enterprise sales cycles require materially larger direct sales, support or compliance spending before revenue scales.
  • Large prospects delay purchases or require long unpaid proof-of-concept periods.
  • Key cybersecurity engineers, sales leaders or customer-support personnel leave for larger vendors.

INTZ news

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Financial statements

INTZ income statement

Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.

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