Hertz Global Holdings
HTZNASDAQUSD
- Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
- Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
- Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
- $1.50 Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
- $1.48–$1.65 Regular-session low and high so far today.
- 28.2M Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET.
- Not yet confirmed The company has not confirmed its next report date. Reported quarters are available in the chart’s Earnings view.
- $1.45–$8.18 52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.
Understand the Business
Why the Stock Moved
Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.
The core investment thesis
Own HTZ if Hertz converts scale in a capital‑intensive car‑rental fleet into recurring operating cash flow and used‑car remarketing profits; that cash — not stable GAAP earnings — is the real economic engine that must pay down.
HTZ price history
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Investment thesis
What must happen next
Hertz’s primary economic engine is operating cash flow from rental operations and fleet remarketing; if that OCF stays broadly intact, the company can fund capex and service debt without dilutive capital raises.HoldingMateriality: High
NetCashProvidedByUsedInOperatingActivities: $2.474B (2023), $2.224B (2024), $1.625B (2025) — shows meaningful historical cash generation despite earnings volatility. If true, shareholders benefit from gradual deleveraging and rising intrinsic value; if false, the company risks dilution, covenant stress or worse.
Watch: A sustained collapse in used‑car resale prices (for example, from an oversupply or structural shift to OEM subscription models) that erodes remarketing margins.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
NetCashProvidedByUsedInOperatingActivities: $2.474B (2023), $2.224B (2024), $1.625B (2025) — shows meaningful historical cash generation despite earnings volatility.
Open source ↗Hertz’s balance sheet leverage and the 2025 negative equity position make the company dependent on stable remarketing margins and OCF; adverse shocks to those drivers will rapidly pressure solvency and refinancing options.StrengtheningMateriality: High
StockholdersEquity: $3.092B (2023) → $153M (2024) → -$459M (2025), showing a material deterioration in net equity over two years. If levered position remediates, equity value recovers; if shocks occur, debt covenants, refinancing costs, or need for dilutive capital become likely.
Watch: A funding shock (credit markets freeze) preventing routine refinancing of fleet financing or debt maturities.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
StockholdersEquity: $3.092B (2023) → $153M (2024) → -$459M (2025), showing a material deterioration in net equity over two years.
Open source ↗Sustained revenue depends on continued recovery and resilience of travel demand plus the company’s ability to keep average daily rates and utilization up; a persistent drop in demand or aggressive rate competition will reduce utilization and OCF before GAAP shows.HoldingMateriality: Medium
Revenues: $9.371B (2023) → $9.049B (2024) → $8.504B (2025), indicating revenue decline over two years. Revenue and utilization lead to cash generation; declines signal future OCF and balance‑sheet stress and precede reported losses or impairments.
Watch: A prolonged slowdown in leisure or business travel demand (e.g., weaker air travel or corporate travel budgets).
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Revenues: $9.371B (2023) → $9.049B (2024) → $8.504B (2025), indicating revenue decline over two years.
Open source ↗Hertz’s cash balance and continuing OCF provide a near‑term runway to operate without immediate dilution, but continued cash declines would force either asset sales, debt restructuring, or equity raises.HoldingMateriality: Medium
CashAndCashEquivalentsAtCarryingValue: $764M (2023) → $592M (2024) → $565M (2025) — cash has declined but remains material. Maintaining a multi‑quarter cash runway avoids dilutive financing and gives time to repair the balance sheet; failure forces value‑destroying actions.
Watch: A sharp drop in operating_cash_flow (e.g., below fleet financing needs) or a large one‑time cash requirement for fleet purchase or legal settlements.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
CashAndCashEquivalentsAtCarryingValue: $764M (2023) → $592M (2024) → $565M (2025) — cash has declined but remains material.
Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence
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Original research
Hertz’s primary economic engine is operating cash flow from rental operations and fleet remarketing; if that OCF stays broadly intact, the company can fund capex and service debt without dilutive capital raises. If true, shareholders benefit from gradual deleveraging and rising intrinsic value; if false, the company risks dilution, covenant stress or worse.
Hertz’s balance sheet leverage and the 2025 negative equity position make the company dependent on stable remarketing margins and OCF; adverse shocks to those drivers will rapidly pressure solvency and refinancing options. If levered position remediates, equity value recovers; if shocks occur, debt covenants, refinancing costs, or need for dilutive capital become likely.
Sustained revenue depends on continued recovery and resilience of travel demand plus the company’s ability to keep average daily rates and utilization up; a persistent drop in demand or aggressive rate competition will reduce utilization and OCF before GAAP shows. Revenue and utilization lead to cash generation; declines signal future OCF and balance‑sheet stress and precede reported losses or impairments.
Hertz’s cash balance and continuing OCF provide a near‑term runway to operate without immediate dilution, but continued cash declines would force either asset sales, debt restructuring, or equity raises. Maintaining a multi‑quarter cash runway avoids dilutive financing and gives time to repair the balance sheet; failure forces value‑destroying actions.
All standing thesis claims
Original report summary
Hertz converts scale in a capital‑intensive car‑rental fleet into recurring operating cash flow and used‑car remarketing profits; that cash — not stable GAAP earnings — is the real economic engine that must pay down.
Bull case and bear case
Bull case and bear case for Hertz Global Holdings
Where the evidence on Hertz Global Holdings stands: Holding on the latest evidence (Oct 15, 2026). Of its 4 thesis points, 1 strengthening and 3 holding.
Bull case: what the evidence supports
Hertz’s primary economic engine is operating cash flow from rental operations and fleet remarketing; if that OCF stays broadly intact, the company can fund capex and service debt without dilutive capital raises.
Hertz’s balance sheet leverage and the 2025 negative equity position make the company dependent on stable remarketing margins and OCF; adverse shocks to those drivers will rapidly pressure solvency and refinancing options.
Sustained revenue depends on continued recovery and resilience of travel demand plus the company’s ability to keep average daily rates and utilization up; a persistent drop in demand or aggressive rate competition will reduce utilization and OCF before GAAP shows.
Hertz’s cash balance and continuing OCF provide a near‑term runway to operate without immediate dilution, but continued cash declines would force either asset sales, debt restructuring, or equity raises.
Bear case: what would count against it
A sustained collapse in used‑car resale prices (for example, from an oversupply or structural shift to OEM subscription models) that erodes remarketing margins.
A funding shock (credit markets freeze) preventing routine refinancing of fleet financing or debt maturities.
A prolonged slowdown in leisure or business travel demand (e.g., weaker air travel or corporate travel budgets).
Thesis-Break Engine
What has broken in Hertz Global Holdings’s thesis
Each break OptimistFi flagged on Hertz Global Holdings, dated — with what has historically followed the same kind of break across the market, not a forecast for Hertz Global Holdings.
- Price target fell below the stockcondition set before this filing
Across all companies, this kind of break has happened 1,809 times before. Those stocks trailed comparable companies by a median of 1% over the next six months, and 33% of them trailed it by 10 points or more.
- CEO / officer changecondition set before this filing
Across all companies, this kind of break has happened 16,849 times before. Those stocks trailed comparable companies by a median of 2% over the next six months, and 38% of them trailed it by 10 points or more.
Several kinds of break have stacked on Hertz Global Holdings at once. A cluster is a stronger read than any one signal alone.
MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT
The numbers behind the thesis
What Changed
- MixedDirector or principal officer change.
Hertz Global Holdings filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-10-13: Director or principal officer change. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedDirector or principal officer change.
Hertz Global Holdings filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-10-01: Director or principal officer change. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedDirector or principal officer change.
Hertz Global Holdings filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-09-10: Director or principal officer change. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
Risks / falsifiers
What could break the thesis
- A sustained collapse in used‑car resale prices (for example, from an oversupply or structural shift to OEM subscription models) that erodes remarketing margins.
- A funding shock (credit markets freeze) preventing routine refinancing of fleet financing or debt maturities.
- A prolonged slowdown in leisure or business travel demand (e.g., weaker air travel or corporate travel budgets).
- A sharp drop in operating_cash_flow (e.g., below fleet financing needs) or a large one‑time cash requirement for fleet purchase or legal settlements.
HTZ news
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Financial statements
HTZ income statement
Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.
HTZ: quick answers
- What is HTZ's short interest?
- As of October 30, 2026, 126M HTZ shares were sold short, 35.2% of its shares outstanding, down 0.6% from the count before. At the stock's average daily volume that is 5.7 days to cover. FINRA publishes the count twice a month. HTZ short interest history
- Which well-known investors own HTZ?
- 4 of the 37 well-known funds tracked here reported HTZ shares in their latest 13F filings. By share of the fund's portfolio: Pershing Square (Bill Ackman), 0.2%; Soros Fund Management (George Soros), 0.0%; Bridgewater Associates (Ray Dalio), 0.0%. Fund portfolios
HTZ in well-known investors’ portfolios
4 of 37 funds reported HTZ shares in their latest 13F filing. A 13F shows quarter-end positions and arrives up to 45 days later.
| Fund | Of its portfolio | Value | Change | Quarter |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bill AckmanPershing Square | 0.17% | $34.0M | — | Q2 2026 |
| George SorosSoros Fund Management | 0.01% | $1.0M | New | Q2 2026 |
| Ray DalioBridgewater Associates | 0.00% | $529K | +211.7% | Q2 2026 |
| Philippe LaffontCoatue Management | 0.00% | $242K | No change | Q2 2026 |
