Herbalife
HLFNYSEUSD
- Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
- Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
- Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
- $15.59 Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
- $15.29–$15.60 Regular-session low and high so far today.
- 782.4K Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET.
- Feb 17 projected Projected for 2027-02-17 from the company’s own results filings (SEC 8-K Item 2.02). The company has not confirmed the date.
- $8.65–$20.40 52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.
Understand the Business
Why the Stock Moved
Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.
The core investment thesis
Own HLF if coaching-led demand stabilizes and cash goes to debt, but not if regulation, GLP-1s, or DTC competition erode the distributor engine.
HLF price history
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Investment thesis
What must happen next
Independent-member coaching remains differentiated enough that wellness and nutrition demand stabilizes rather than migrating wholesale to cheaper retail, DTC, or medical weight-loss alternatives.HoldingMateriality: High
FY2025 GAAP annual revenue was $5.0375 billion, slightly above FY2024 GAAP annual revenue of $4.9931 billion after prior declines. If the member relationship still drives repeat consumption, revenue stability supports margin repair and deleveraging; if it fails, the model loses its core demand engine.
Watch: Eli Lilly and Novo Nordisk GLP-1 adoption materially reduces consumer reliance on meal-replacement or weight-management programs.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
FY2025 GAAP annual revenue was $5.0375 billion, slightly above FY2024 GAAP annual revenue of $4.9931 billion after prior declines.
Open source ↗The coaching-and-community bundle lets Herbalife sell nutrition products at premium economics rather than competing purely as a commodity supplement vendor.StrengtheningMateriality: High
FY2025 GAAP annual gross_profit was $3.9229 billion on FY2025 GAAP annual revenue of $5.0375 billion, implying a high gross margin. Durable gross margin gives the company room to absorb channel investment, compliance costs, and deleveraging; commoditization would compress the cash engine quickly.
Watch: Private-label nutrition products and DTC supplement brands force Herbalife to cut prices or increase discounts to members.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
FY2025 GAAP annual gross_profit was $3.9229 billion on FY2025 GAAP annual revenue of $5.0375 billion, implying a high gross margin.
Open source ↗Management can convert a mostly stable gross-profit base into higher operating income through cost discipline and scalable manufacturing, distribution, and selling operations rather than relying on aggressive top-line growth.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium
FY2025 GAAP annual operating_income rose to $481.0 million from $385.9 million in FY2024 and $356.4 million in FY2023. If operating leverage is real, modest sales stabilization can still create equity value; if it is temporary cost cutting, reinvestment needs will cap earnings.
Watch: The company must materially increase promotional spending or member incentives to defend recruiting and retention.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
FY2025 GAAP annual operating_income rose to $481.0 million from $385.9 million in FY2024 and $356.4 million in FY2023.
Open source ↗The direct-selling model must keep converting earnings into operating cash flow so leverage can be managed without sacrificing the member network or issuing dilutive equity.HoldingMateriality: Medium
FY2025 GAAP annual operating_cash_flow was $333.3 million, up from $285.4 million in FY2024. For a levered equity, cash conversion determines whether operating improvement accrues to shareholders or is consumed by lenders and refinancing risk.
Watch: Debt refinancing occurs at materially higher coupons, diverting operating cash away from reinvestment and deleveraging.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
FY2025 GAAP annual operating_cash_flow was $333.3 million, up from $285.4 million in FY2024.
Open source ↗Herbalife’s independent-member model remains legally and socially accepted; if regulators recast the model as recruiting-driven rather than product-consumption-driven, the distribution advantage becomes a liability.HoldingMateriality: Medium
The company description explicitly identifies independent members as the network providing individual coaching. The member network is central to demand generation, so a regulatory or reputational break would hit revenue quality before it appears fully in reported sales.
Watch: The FTC or a major international regulator imposes new compensation, income-claim, or recruiting restrictions that require a plan redesign.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
The company description explicitly identifies independent members as the network providing individual coaching.
Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence
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Original research
Independent-member coaching remains differentiated enough that wellness and nutrition demand stabilizes rather than migrating wholesale to cheaper retail, DTC, or medical weight-loss alternatives. If the member relationship still drives repeat consumption, revenue stability supports margin repair and deleveraging; if it fails, the model loses its core demand engine.
The coaching-and-community bundle lets Herbalife sell nutrition products at premium economics rather than competing purely as a commodity supplement vendor. Durable gross margin gives the company room to absorb channel investment, compliance costs, and deleveraging; commoditization would compress the cash engine quickly.
Management can convert a mostly stable gross-profit base into higher operating income through cost discipline and scalable manufacturing, distribution, and selling operations rather than relying on aggressive top-line growth. If operating leverage is real, modest sales stabilization can still create equity value; if it is temporary cost cutting, reinvestment needs will cap earnings.
The direct-selling model must keep converting earnings into operating cash flow so leverage can be managed without sacrificing the member network or issuing dilutive equity. For a levered equity, cash conversion determines whether operating improvement accrues to shareholders or is consumed by lenders and refinancing risk.
Herbalife’s independent-member model remains legally and socially accepted; if regulators recast the model as recruiting-driven rather than product-consumption-driven, the distribution advantage becomes a liability. The member network is central to demand generation, so a regulatory or reputational break would hit revenue quality before it appears fully in reported sales.
All standing thesis claims
Original report summary
coaching-led demand stabilizes and cash goes to debt, but not if regulation, GLP-1s, or DTC competition erode the distributor engine.
Bull case and bear case
Bull case and bear case for Herbalife
Where the evidence on Herbalife stands: Holding on the latest evidence (Oct 16, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 2 strengthening and 3 holding.
Bull case: what the evidence supports
Independent-member coaching remains differentiated enough that wellness and nutrition demand stabilizes rather than migrating wholesale to cheaper retail, DTC, or medical weight-loss alternatives.
The coaching-and-community bundle lets Herbalife sell nutrition products at premium economics rather than competing purely as a commodity supplement vendor.
Management can convert a mostly stable gross-profit base into higher operating income through cost discipline and scalable manufacturing, distribution, and selling operations rather than relying on aggressive top-line growth.
The direct-selling model must keep converting earnings into operating cash flow so leverage can be managed without sacrificing the member network or issuing dilutive equity.
Herbalife’s independent-member model remains legally and socially accepted; if regulators recast the model as recruiting-driven rather than product-consumption-driven, the distribution advantage becomes a liability.
Bear case: what would count against it
Eli Lilly and Novo Nordisk GLP-1 adoption materially reduces consumer reliance on meal-replacement or weight-management programs.
Private-label nutrition products and DTC supplement brands force Herbalife to cut prices or increase discounts to members.
The company must materially increase promotional spending or member incentives to defend recruiting and retention.
Thesis-Break Engine
What has broken in Herbalife’s thesis
Each break OptimistFi flagged on Herbalife, dated — with what has historically followed the same kind of break across the market, not a forecast for Herbalife.
- CEO / officer changecondition set before this filing
Across all companies, this kind of break has happened 16,849 times before. Those stocks trailed comparable companies by a median of 2% over the next six months, and 38% of them trailed it by 10 points or more.
MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT
The numbers behind the thesis
What Changed
- MixedDirector or principal officer change.
Herbalife filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-08-31: Director or principal officer change. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedReported results of operations (earnings release).
Herbalife filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-08-05: Reported results of operations (earnings release). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedReported results of operations (earnings release).
Herbalife filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-05-06: Reported results of operations (earnings release). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
Risks / falsifiers
What could break the thesis
- Eli Lilly and Novo Nordisk GLP-1 adoption materially reduces consumer reliance on meal-replacement or weight-management programs.
- Private-label nutrition products and DTC supplement brands force Herbalife to cut prices or increase discounts to members.
- The company must materially increase promotional spending or member incentives to defend recruiting and retention.
- Debt refinancing occurs at materially higher coupons, diverting operating cash away from reinvestment and deleveraging.
- The FTC or a major international regulator imposes new compensation, income-claim, or recruiting restrictions that require a plan redesign.
HLF news
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Financial statements
HLF income statement
Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.
HLF: quick answers
- When does Herbalife (HLF) report earnings next?
- Herbalife's next results are projected for February 17, 2027, from the dates of its own results filings with the SEC. The company has not confirmed the date. It last reported on November 2, 2026. Earnings calendar
- What is HLF's short interest?
- As of October 30, 2026, 7.5M HLF shares were sold short, 7.14% of its shares outstanding, down 6.3% from the count before. At the stock's average daily volume that is 5.2 days to cover. FINRA publishes the count twice a month. HLF short interest history
- Have members of Congress traded HLF?
- 2 trades in HLF have been disclosed under the STOCK Act by members of Congress, the President or senior officials, none in reports made public in the last 90 days. Every disclosed HLF trade
- Which well-known investors own HLF?
- 2 of the 37 well-known funds tracked here reported HLF shares in their latest 13F filings. By share of the fund's portfolio: Baupost Group (Seth Klarman), 2.3%; Bridgewater Associates (Ray Dalio), 0.0%. Fund portfolios
HLF in well-known investors’ portfolios
2 of 37 funds reported HLF shares in their latest 13F filing. A 13F shows quarter-end positions and arrives up to 45 days later.
| Fund | Of its portfolio | Value | Change | Quarter |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Seth KlarmanBaupost Group | 2.3% | $122M | No change | Q2 2026 |
| Ray DalioBridgewater Associates | 0.01% | $1.5M | −40.0% | Q2 2026 |
