The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company
GTNASDAQUSD
- Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
- Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
- Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
- $4.02 Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
- $3.85–$4.09 Regular-session low and high so far today.
- 12.9M Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET.
- Feb 8 projected Projected for 2027-02-08 from the company’s own results filings (SEC 8-K Item 2.02). The company has not confirmed the date.
- $3.85–$10.62 52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.
Understand the Business
Why the Stock Moved
Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.
The core investment thesis
Own GT if it fully realizes the $1.5B run-rate savings from Goodyear Forward, stabilizes tire-unit volumes/pricing, and converts its brand + service footprint into higher-margin replacement and fleet sales.
GT price history
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Investment thesis
What must happen next
The $1.5B run-rate cost and margin benefits from Goodyear Forward will be realized and will raise recurring operating cash flow enough to materially reduce leverage.HoldingMateriality: High
MD&A: Goodyear Forward delivered ~ $1.5 billion annual run-rate benefits and portfolio optimization proceeds of ~ $2.2 billion in 2025. If true, the company can service debt, stop relying on asset sales for liquidity, and the equity can rerate; if false, leverage and cash stress remain and equity stays depressed.
Watch: A sustained raw-material or energy price shock (natural rubber, oil, petrochemical feedstocks) that wipes out realized savings before they hit margins.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
MD&A: Goodyear Forward delivered ~ $1.5 billion annual run-rate benefits and portfolio optimization proceeds of ~ $2.2 billion in 2025.
Open source ↗A sustained top-line recovery requires a rebound or stabilization in tire unit shipments (replacement and OE); without it, pricing/tiering gains and cost cuts cannot fully offset fixed-cost exposure and revenue will remain under pressure.WeakeningMateriality: High
Revenue declined from $20,066,000,000 in 2023 to $18,280,000,000 in 2025 (filed figures). If units remain down, revenue and margin improvement will be limited and cash generation will be volatile; recovery in shipments is the demand side of the recovery.
Watch: Structural shift toward lower-margin private-label tires or loss of material OE contracts to competitors (Michelin, Bridgestone, etc.).
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Revenue declined from $20,066,000,000 in 2023 to $18,280,000,000 in 2025 (filed figures).
Open source ↗The 2025 divestitures materially improved liquidity and permit leverage reduction, but the related long‑term supply agreements (with minimum purchase obligations/shortfall fees) create a new operational cash obligation that becomes painful if volumes stay weak.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium
MD&A: gross proceeds of approximately $2.2 billion from 2025 divestitures (OTR, Dunlop, Chemical) and descriptions of master supply agreements with minimum purchase obligations. Proceeds reduce near-term leverage, but minimum‑purchase clauses can convert demand shortfalls into guaranteed costs, undermining margins and cash if volumes drop.
Watch: A prolonged demand downturn that triggers shortfall fees under the master supply agreement for polymer chemicals.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
MD&A: gross proceeds of approximately $2.2 billion from 2025 divestitures (OTR, Dunlop, Chemical) and descriptions of master supply agreements with.
Open source ↗Goodyear’s global brand portfolio plus its extensive retail, commercial service and retreading footprint provides the structural levers to extract pricing/mix (premiumization) in replacement and fleet markets, supporting higher gross margins if executed.HoldingMateriality: Medium
Item 1 Business: Goodyear operates ~750 retail outlets, is a leading operator of commercial truck service and retreading centers, and sells multiple global brands. If Goodyear can push more sales to premium-branded tires and higher-margin fleet/service offerings, margins and free cash flow will be less cyclical and earnings more predictable.
Watch: E-commerce and discount channels accelerate private-label/low-cost penetration, eroding replacement pricing.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Item 1 Business: Goodyear operates ~750 retail outlets, is a leading operator of commercial truck service and retreading centers, and.
Open source ↗For equity to recover sustainably, Goodyear must produce recurring positive operating-cash-flow (from operations, not asset sales) large enough to fund capex, interest and pension/legacy obligations; otherwise the low equity value reflects structural cash risk.HoldingMateriality: Medium
operating_cash_flow was positive at $796,000,000 in 2025 but the company still reported a $1,721,000,000 net loss for 2025. If cash generation is structural rather than one‑time, leverage will fall and the company can invest in growth; if not, equity remains a distressed value play.
Watch: A deeper cyclical downturn that turns operating cash flow negative and forces additional asset sales or equity dilution.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
operating_cash_flow was positive at $796,000,000 in 2025 but the company still reported a $1,721,000,000 net loss for 2025.
Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence
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Original research
The $1.5B run-rate cost and margin benefits from Goodyear Forward will be realized and will raise recurring operating cash flow enough to materially reduce leverage. If true, the company can service debt, stop relying on asset sales for liquidity, and the equity can rerate; if false, leverage and cash stress remain and equity stays depressed.
A sustained top-line recovery requires a rebound or stabilization in tire unit shipments (replacement and OE); without it, pricing/tiering gains and cost cuts cannot fully offset fixed-cost exposure and revenue will remain under pressure. If units remain down, revenue and margin improvement will be limited and cash generation will be volatile; recovery in shipments is the demand side of the recovery.
The 2025 divestitures materially improved liquidity and permit leverage reduction, but the related long‑term supply agreements (with minimum purchase obligations/shortfall fees) create a new operational cash obligation that becomes painful if volumes stay weak. Proceeds reduce near-term leverage, but minimum‑purchase clauses can convert demand shortfalls into guaranteed costs, undermining margins and cash if volumes drop.
Goodyear’s global brand portfolio plus its extensive retail, commercial service and retreading footprint provides the structural levers to extract pricing/mix (premiumization) in replacement and fleet markets, supporting higher gross margins if executed. If Goodyear can push more sales to premium-branded tires and higher-margin fleet/service offerings, margins and free cash flow will be less cyclical and earnings more predictable.
For equity to recover sustainably, Goodyear must produce recurring positive operating-cash-flow (from operations, not asset sales) large enough to fund capex, interest and pension/legacy obligations; otherwise the low equity value reflects structural cash risk. If cash generation is structural rather than one‑time, leverage will fall and the company can invest in growth; if not, equity remains a distressed value play.
All standing thesis claims
Original report summary
it fully realizes the $1.5B run-rate savings from Goodyear Forward, stabilizes tire-unit volumes/pricing, and converts its brand + service footprint into higher-margin replacement and fleet sales.
Bull case and bear case
Bull case and bear case for Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co
Where the evidence on Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co disagrees: Mixed on the latest evidence (Nov 7, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 1 strengthening, 3 holding and 1 weakening.
Bull case: what the evidence supports
The $1.5B run-rate cost and margin benefits from Goodyear Forward will be realized and will raise recurring operating cash flow enough to materially reduce leverage.
The 2025 divestitures materially improved liquidity and permit leverage reduction, but the related long‑term supply agreements (with minimum purchase obligations/shortfall fees) create a new operational cash obligation that becomes painful if volumes stay weak.
Goodyear’s global brand portfolio plus its extensive retail, commercial service and retreading footprint provides the structural levers to extract pricing/mix (premiumization) in replacement and fleet markets, supporting higher gross margins if executed.
For equity to recover sustainably, Goodyear must produce recurring positive operating-cash-flow (from operations, not asset sales) large enough to fund capex, interest and pension/legacy obligations; otherwise the low equity value reflects structural cash risk.
Bear case: what the evidence questions
A sustained top-line recovery requires a rebound or stabilization in tire unit shipments (replacement and OE); without it, pricing/tiering gains and cost cuts cannot fully offset fixed-cost exposure and revenue will remain under pressure.
Thesis-Break Engine
What has broken in Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co’s thesis
Each break OptimistFi flagged on Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co, dated — with what has historically followed the same kind of break across the market, not a forecast for Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
- CEO / officer changecondition set before this filing
Across all companies, this kind of break has happened 16,849 times before. Those stocks trailed comparable companies by a median of 2% over the next six months, and 38% of them trailed it by 10 points or more.
MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT
The numbers behind the thesis
What Changed
- MixedDirector or principal officer change.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-11-05: Director or principal officer change. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedReported results of operations (earnings release).
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-11-04: Reported results of operations (earnings release). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedDirector or principal officer change.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-10-27: Director or principal officer change. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
Risks / falsifiers
What could break the thesis
- A sustained raw-material or energy price shock (natural rubber, oil, petrochemical feedstocks) that wipes out realized savings before they hit margins.
- Structural shift toward lower-margin private-label tires or loss of material OE contracts to competitors (Michelin, Bridgestone, etc.).
- A prolonged demand downturn that triggers shortfall fees under the master supply agreement for polymer chemicals.
- E-commerce and discount channels accelerate private-label/low-cost penetration, eroding replacement pricing.
- A deeper cyclical downturn that turns operating cash flow negative and forces additional asset sales or equity dilution.
GT news
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Financial statements
GT income statement
Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.
GT: quick answers
- When does Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co (GT) report earnings next?
- Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co's next results are projected for February 8, 2027, from the dates of its own results filings with the SEC. The company has not confirmed the date. It last reported on November 4, 2026. Earnings calendar
- What is GT's short interest?
- As of October 30, 2026, 56.3M GT shares were sold short, 19.5% of its shares outstanding, down 1.1% from the count before. At the stock's average daily volume that is 7.5 days to cover. FINRA publishes the count twice a month. GT short interest history
- Have members of Congress traded GT?
- Reports made public in the last 90 days disclose 3 trades in GT by 1 filer: 1 purchase and 2 sales. They are filed under the STOCK Act by members of Congress, the President and senior officials. Every disclosed GT trade
- Which well-known investors own GT?
- 2 of the 37 well-known funds tracked here reported GT shares in their latest 13F filings. By share of the fund's portfolio: Appaloosa (David Tepper), 0.1%; Bridgewater Associates (Ray Dalio), 0.0%. Fund portfolios
GT in well-known investors’ portfolios
2 of 37 funds reported GT shares in their latest 13F filing. A 13F shows quarter-end positions and arrives up to 45 days later.
| Fund | Of its portfolio | Value | Change | Quarter |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| David TepperAppaloosa | 0.13% | $10.0M | New | Q2 2026 |
| Ray DalioBridgewater Associates | 0.01% | $1.8M | +258.9% | Q2 2026 |