The Goldman Sachs Group

GSNYSEUSD

THESIS ALERT

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$926.81
+$16.62 (+1.83%)Today 1M +3.52%
After hours$926.810.00%

Updated Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET · Regular session · May be delayed

Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
$910.19
Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
$912.86–$932.49
Regular-session low and high so far today.
1.4M
Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET.
Jan 12 projected
Projected for 2027-01-12 from the company’s own results filings (SEC 8-K Item 2.02). The company has not confirmed the date.
$754.00–$1,153.99
52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.

Understand the Business

Why the Stock Moved

Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.

The core investment thesis

Own GS if Goldman Sachs turns scale in capital markets, trading and balance-sheet deployment into durable earnings by capturing fee pools in investment banking and recurring trading/market‑making spreads, while using its balance sheet and asset-management flows to.

GS price history

Latest price$926.81Today+$16.62 (+1.83%)
GS +3.87%S&P 500 -2.42%Since first plotted close
4 hours

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Investment thesis

What must happen next

5 MATERIAL PROPOSITIONS
  • Goldman's franchise (investment banking fees + institutional trading) is the causal engine that amplifies market volatility and deal activity into recurring high-margin earnings.StrengtheningMateriality: High

    net_income rose from 8,516,000,000 (annual, 2023) to 14,276,000,000 (annual, 2024) to 17,176,000,000 (annual, 2025). If fees and trading spreads remain accessible, earnings and EPS should compound; if competitors or structural changes erode fee pools, earnings will deteriorate before the headline numbers.

    Watch: Prolonged low market volatility and low trading volumes that compress trading spreads and reduce institutional client flow.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    net_income rose from 8,516,000,000 (annual, 2023) to 14,276,000,000 (annual, 2024) to 17,176,000,000 (annual, 2025).

    Open source ↗
  • Goldman's large balance sheet and liquidity position causally enable principal trading, market‑making and underwriting — activities that boost margins and returns when market conditions permit.HoldingMateriality: High

    assets grew from 1,441,799,000,000 (instant, 2022) → 1,675,972,000,000 (instant, 2024) → 1,809,320,000,000 (instant, 2025). Balance‑sheet access is a moat that lets Goldman capture principal profits and underwrite large deals; if funding or regulatory costs rise, that advantage compresses quickly.

    Watch: Regulatory tightening (higher risk‑weighting or capital requirements) or a material increase in funding costs that reduces the return on deployed assets.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    assets grew from 1,441,799,000,000 (instant, 2022) → 1,675,972,000,000 (instant, 2024) → 1,809,320,000,000 (instant, 2025).

    Open source ↗
  • Sustained EPS compounding depends causally on maintaining high net margins and returning excess capital (buybacks/dividends) without materially increasing equity through issuances.HoldingMateriality: Medium

    eps_diluted rose from 22.87 (annual, 2023) → 40.54 (2024) → 51.32 (2025). If margins and capital returns persist, shareholders get compound returns; if capital is retained to shore up the balance sheet or margins fall, EPS growth will slow or reverse.

    Watch: Sustained negative operating cash flow or a need to raise equity (dilution) to meet capital/regulatory demands.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    eps_diluted rose from 22.87 (annual, 2023) → 40.54 (2024) → 51.32 (2025).

    Open source ↗
  • Operating cash flow volatility is a causal early-warning for the business: sustained negative operating cash flow signals that earnings are not converting into durable internal liquidity and that capital returns or balance-sheet deployment may be unsustainable.WeakeningMateriality: Medium

    operating_cash_flow swung from 6,298,000,000 (annual, 2021) and 8,708,000,000 (2022) to negative figures: -12,587,000,000 (2023), -13,212,000,000 (2024) and -45,154,000,000 (2025). If operating cash flow stays negative, Goldman will face pressure to reduce buybacks/dividends or raise capital — cutting EPS upside and raising risk.

    Watch: A continued market dislocation or client settlement timing that causes persistent outflows or reduced net cash provided by operations.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    operating_cash_flow swung from 6,298,000,000 (annual, 2021) and 8,708,000,000 (2022) to negative figures: -12,587,000,000 (2023), -13,212,000,000 (2024) and -45,154,000,000 (2025).

    Open source ↗
  • If Goldman continues to generate sizable net income relative to equity, the firm sustains a high ROE that supports the current price-to-book multiple.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium

    equity increased modestly from 109,926,000,000 (instant, 2021) → 116,905,000,000 (2023) → 121,996,000,000 (2024) → 124,972,000,000 (2025) while net income rose materially in 2023–2025. Strong ROE validates the premium book multiple; if ROE falls due to weaker net income or rising equity, P/B and valuation multiple will compress.

    Watch: Material goodwill/intangible impairments or large losses that erode equity or force write‑downs.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    equity increased modestly from 109,926,000,000 (instant, 2021) → 116,905,000,000 (2023) → 121,996,000,000 (2024) → 124,972,000,000 (2025) while net income rose.

    Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence

Loading the original research archive…

Original research

Goldman's franchise (investment banking fees + institutional trading) is the causal engine that amplifies market volatility and deal activity into recurring high-margin earnings. If fees and trading spreads remain accessible, earnings and EPS should compound; if competitors or structural changes erode fee pools, earnings will deteriorate before the headline numbers.

Goldman's large balance sheet and liquidity position causally enable principal trading, market‑making and underwriting — activities that boost margins and returns when market conditions permit. Balance‑sheet access is a moat that lets Goldman capture principal profits and underwrite large deals; if funding or regulatory costs rise, that advantage compresses quickly.

Sustained EPS compounding depends causally on maintaining high net margins and returning excess capital (buybacks/dividends) without materially increasing equity through issuances. If margins and capital returns persist, shareholders get compound returns; if capital is retained to shore up the balance sheet or margins fall, EPS growth will slow or reverse.

Operating cash flow volatility is a causal early-warning for the business: sustained negative operating cash flow signals that earnings are not converting into durable internal liquidity and that capital returns or balance-sheet deployment may be unsustainable. If operating cash flow stays negative, Goldman will face pressure to reduce buybacks/dividends or raise capital — cutting EPS upside and raising risk.

If Goldman continues to generate sizable net income relative to equity, the firm sustains a high ROE that supports the current price-to-book multiple. Strong ROE validates the premium book multiple; if ROE falls due to weaker net income or rising equity, P/B and valuation multiple will compress.

All standing thesis claims
Original report summary

Goldman Sachs turns scale in capital markets, trading and balance-sheet deployment into durable earnings by capturing fee pools in investment banking and recurring trading/market‑making spreads, while using its balance sheet and asset-management flows to.

Evidence assessed Nov 11, 2026. Expand each conclusion for its evidence and what would change it. Thesis evidence—not a buy or sell recommendation.

Bull case and bear case

Bull case and bear case for Goldman Sachs Group

Where the evidence on Goldman Sachs Group disagrees: Mixed on the latest evidence (Nov 11, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 2 strengthening, 2 holding and 1 weakening.

Bull case: what the evidence supports

  • Goldman's franchise (investment banking fees + institutional trading) is the causal engine that amplifies market volatility and deal activity into recurring high-margin earnings.

    sec.gov ↗

  • Goldman's large balance sheet and liquidity position causally enable principal trading, market‑making and underwriting — activities that boost margins and returns when market conditions permit.

    sec.gov ↗

  • Sustained EPS compounding depends causally on maintaining high net margins and returning excess capital (buybacks/dividends) without materially increasing equity through issuances.

    sec.gov ↗

  • If Goldman continues to generate sizable net income relative to equity, the firm sustains a high ROE that supports the current price-to-book multiple.

    sec.gov ↗

Bear case: what the evidence questions

  • Operating cash flow volatility is a causal early-warning for the business: sustained negative operating cash flow signals that earnings are not converting into durable internal liquidity and that capital returns or balance-sheet deployment may be unsustainable.

    sec.gov ↗

Thesis-Break Engine

Thesis-break watch · Goldman Sachs Group

12 mo agonow
Trailing daily price. No thesis break has crossed here, so there is no break base rate to project.

No break has crossed Goldman Sachs Group’s thesis. Its break conditions are checked against every new filing as it lands.

How the Thesis-Break Engine works →Historical outcomes are measured against the market after past breaks of the same kind, across all companies. Not a prediction.

MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT

The numbers behind the thesis

Sourced from filings and market data

What Changed

  1. Mixed
    Reported results of operations (earnings release).

    Goldman Sachs Group filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-10-13: Reported results of operations (earnings release). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.

  2. Mixed
    Material modification to security holder rights.

    Goldman Sachs Group filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-07-27: Material modification to security holder rights. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.

  3. Mixed
    Other material event.

    Goldman Sachs Group filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-07-20: Other material event. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.

Risks / falsifiers

What could break the thesis

  • Prolonged low market volatility and low trading volumes that compress trading spreads and reduce institutional client flow.
  • Regulatory tightening (higher risk‑weighting or capital requirements) or a material increase in funding costs that reduces the return on deployed assets.
  • Sustained negative operating cash flow or a need to raise equity (dilution) to meet capital/regulatory demands.
  • A continued market dislocation or client settlement timing that causes persistent outflows or reduced net cash provided by operations.
  • Material goodwill/intangible impairments or large losses that erode equity or force write‑downs.

GS news

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Financial statements

GS income statement

Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.

GS: quick answers

When does Goldman Sachs Group (GS) report earnings next?
Goldman Sachs Group's next results are projected for January 12, 2027, from the dates of its own results filings with the SEC. The company has not confirmed the date. It last reported on October 13, 2026. Earnings calendar
What is GS's short interest?
As of October 30, 2026, 6.3M GS shares were sold short, down 9.0% from the count before. At the stock's average daily volume that is 3.0 days to cover. FINRA publishes the count twice a month. GS short interest history
Have members of Congress traded GS?
Reports made public in the last 90 days disclose 3 trades in GS by 3 filers: 2 purchases and 1 sale. They are filed under the STOCK Act by members of Congress, the President and senior officials. Every disclosed GS trade
Which well-known investors own GS?
1 of the 37 well-known funds tracked here reported GS shares in their latest 13F filing. By share of the fund's portfolio: Markel Group (Tom Gayner), 2.5%. Fund portfolios

GS in well-known investors’ portfolios

1 of 37 funds reported GS shares in their latest 13F filing. A 13F shows quarter-end positions and arrives up to 45 days later.

FundOf its portfolioValueChangeQuarter
Tom GaynerMarkel Group2.5%$324MNo changeQ3 2026

Every fund’s portfolio

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