Green Brick Partners
GRBKNYSEUSD
- Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
- Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
- Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
- $63.84 Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
- $61.97–$63.62 Regular-session low and high so far today.
- 176.5K Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET.
- Not yet confirmed The company has not confirmed its next report date. Reported quarters are available in the chart’s Earnings view.
- $59.12–$83.18 52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.
Understand the Business
Why the Stock Moved
Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.
The core investment thesis
Own GRBK if gross margins stop drifting lower and operating cash flow stays strong.
GRBK price history
Loading recent earnings…
Investment thesis
What must happen next
Owning and controlling a large inventory of land/lots in high-growth Sunbelt submarkets gives Green Brick the supply pipeline and optionality to sustain home delivery growth and capture development margins even if lot prices rise.StrengtheningMateriality: High
Assets increased to $2,534,767,000 as of 2025-12-31 from $1,902,832,000 as of 2023-12-31 (filed balances), consistent with a growing lot and development inventory. If true, GRBK can deliver steady homes and protect return on invested capital without constant expensive lot purchases; if false, the company will face higher cost of goods sold or lost growth.
Watch: Large-scale entitlement failures or multi-market zoning/permit rejections that delay or void lot deliveries (would appear before revenue falls).
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Assets increased to $2,534,767,000 as of 2025-12-31 from $1,902,832,000 as of 2023-12-31 (filed balances), consistent with a growing lot and.
Open source ↗A conservative capital structure (relatively low liabilities vs. equity and material cash) shields Green Brick from financing shocks and allows opportunistic land investment in down cycles.StrengtheningMateriality: High
Liabilities were $601,782,000 as of 2025-12-31 while equity was $1,858,962,000 (filed balances), indicating low relative leverage for a homebuilder. A strong balance sheet reduces the risk of forced asset sales, supports steady development, and preserves optionality to buy attractive land in downturns; if leverage rises materially the company becomes cyclical and more exposed.
Watch: A sudden pullback in construction or acquisition financing that forces reliance on higher-cost debt or credit covenant waivers.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Liabilities were $601,782,000 as of 2025-12-31 while equity was $1,858,962,000 (filed balances), indicating low relative leverage for a homebuilder.
Open source ↗Local operational execution — converting lots into homes and closing sales — drives cash generation and value; operating cash flow is the immediate proof that the conversion engine works.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium
Operating cash flow rose to $213,244,000 in 2025 (annual) versus $25,912,000 in 2024, showing a substantial improvement in cash conversion. Sustained strong operating cash flow funds land development without excessive external capital and supports shareholder returns; if conversion weakens, cash generation will fall and the company will need financing or sell assets.
Watch: Rising cancellations or mortgage-finance dislocation that prevents contract-to-close conversions (would be visible in order/backlog commentary before cash falls).
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Operating cash flow rose to $213,244,000 in 2025 (annual) versus $25,912,000 in 2024, showing a substantial improvement in cash conversion.
Open source ↗Homebuilding gross margins are exposed to promotional pricing, higher incentives, and mix shifts; persistent use of incentives will structurally compress profitability.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium
Gross profit declined from $703,521,000 in 2024 to $640,806,000 in 2025 (filed gross profit), and MD&A explicitly attributes a 330 bps decline in homebuilding gross margin to higher incentives and discounts. If incentives remain necessary to sustain order flow, gross margins and returns on lots will shrink and impair EPS and cash generation; if incentives abate, margins can recover and justify the current valuation.
Watch: A sustained demand rebound that allows price recovery and lowers the need for incentives (would be visible in rising average selling prices and reduced cancellation rates).
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Gross profit declined from $703,521,000 in 2024 to $640,806,000 in 2025 (filed gross profit), and MD&A explicitly attributes a 330.
Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence
Loading the original research archive…
Original research
Owning and controlling a large inventory of land/lots in high-growth Sunbelt submarkets gives Green Brick the supply pipeline and optionality to sustain home delivery growth and capture development margins even if lot prices rise. If true, GRBK can deliver steady homes and protect return on invested capital without constant expensive lot purchases; if false, the company will face higher cost of goods sold or lost growth.
A conservative capital structure (relatively low liabilities vs. equity and material cash) shields Green Brick from financing shocks and allows opportunistic land investment in down cycles. A strong balance sheet reduces the risk of forced asset sales, supports steady development, and preserves optionality to buy attractive land in downturns; if leverage rises materially the company becomes cyclical and more exposed.
Local operational execution — converting lots into homes and closing sales — drives cash generation and value; operating cash flow is the immediate proof that the conversion engine works. Sustained strong operating cash flow funds land development without excessive external capital and supports shareholder returns; if conversion weakens, cash generation will fall and the company will need financing or sell assets.
Homebuilding gross margins are exposed to promotional pricing, higher incentives, and mix shifts; persistent use of incentives will structurally compress profitability. If incentives remain necessary to sustain order flow, gross margins and returns on lots will shrink and impair EPS and cash generation; if incentives abate, margins can recover and justify the current valuation.
All standing thesis claims
Original report summary
gross margins stop drifting lower and operating cash flow stays strong.
Bull case and bear case
Bull case and bear case for Green Brick Partners
Where the evidence on Green Brick Partners stands: Strengthening on the latest evidence (Nov 9, 2026). Of its 4 thesis points, 4 strengthening.
Bull case: what the evidence supports
Owning and controlling a large inventory of land/lots in high-growth Sunbelt submarkets gives Green Brick the supply pipeline and optionality to sustain home delivery growth and capture development margins even if lot prices rise.
A conservative capital structure (relatively low liabilities vs. equity and material cash) shields Green Brick from financing shocks and allows opportunistic land investment in down cycles.
Local operational execution — converting lots into homes and closing sales — drives cash generation and value; operating cash flow is the immediate proof that the conversion engine works.
Homebuilding gross margins are exposed to promotional pricing, higher incentives, and mix shifts; persistent use of incentives will structurally compress profitability.
Bear case: what would count against it
Large-scale entitlement failures or multi-market zoning/permit rejections that delay or void lot deliveries (would appear before revenue falls).
A sudden pullback in construction or acquisition financing that forces reliance on higher-cost debt or credit covenant waivers.
Rising cancellations or mortgage-finance dislocation that prevents contract-to-close conversions (would be visible in order/backlog commentary before cash falls).
Thesis-Break Engine
Thesis-break watch · Green Brick Partners
Loading the break-condition record for Green Brick Partners.
MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT
The numbers behind the thesis
What Changed
- MixedReported results of operations (earnings release).
Green Brick Partners filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-10-28: Reported results of operations (earnings release). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedDirector or principal officer change.
Green Brick Partners filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-10-26: Director or principal officer change. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedDirector or principal officer change.
Green Brick Partners filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-08-27: Director or principal officer change. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
Risks / falsifiers
What could break the thesis
- Large-scale entitlement failures or multi-market zoning/permit rejections that delay or void lot deliveries (would appear before revenue falls).
- A sudden pullback in construction or acquisition financing that forces reliance on higher-cost debt or credit covenant waivers.
- Rising cancellations or mortgage-finance dislocation that prevents contract-to-close conversions (would be visible in order/backlog commentary before cash falls).
- A sustained demand rebound that allows price recovery and lowers the need for incentives (would be visible in rising average selling prices and reduced cancellation rates).
GRBK news
Loading headlines…
Financial statements
GRBK income statement
Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.
GRBK: quick answers
- Have members of Congress traded GRBK?
- Reports made public in the last 90 days disclose 1 trade in GRBK by 1 filer: 0 purchases and 1 sale. They are filed under the STOCK Act by members of Congress, the President and senior officials. Every disclosed GRBK trade