Genuine Parts Company
GPCNYSEUSD
- Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
- Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
- Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
- $124.71 Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
- $122.33–$124.55 Regular-session low and high so far today.
- 646.5K Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET.
- Feb 16 projected Projected for 2027-02-16 from the company’s own results filings (SEC 8-K Item 2.02). The company has not confirmed the date.
- $90.78–$151.57 52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.
Understand the Business
Why the Stock Moved
Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.
The core investment thesis
Own GPC if its need-it-now automotive replacement and industrial supply advantages keep gross margins intact while 2025’s profit and cash-flow collapse proves temporary.
GPC price history
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Investment thesis
What must happen next
Need-it-now replacement and industrial parts demand keeps customers using Genuine Parts’ distribution network instead of bypassing distributors, because breadth and availability matter more than pure price for many repair and maintenance purchases.StrengtheningMateriality: High
GAAP annual revenue increased from $18.9 billion in FY2021 to $24.3 billion in FY2025. If this holds, the company can keep compounding a large revenue base; if it breaks, sales pressure will eventually reveal that the network is less essential.
Watch: Large repair, fleet, or industrial customers shift procurement directly to manufacturers, reducing the distributor’s role before reported sales weaken.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual revenue increased from $18.9 billion in FY2021 to $24.3 billion in FY2025.
Open source ↗Purchasing scale, supplier relationships, and product breadth allow Genuine Parts to preserve markup in a competitive wholesale market rather than buying revenue with gross-margin erosion.StrengtheningMateriality: High
GAAP annual gross profit rose from $6.6 billion in FY2021 to $8.9 billion in FY2025. Gross-margin durability is the clearest sign that the distributor still has bargaining power and is not merely passing volume through at lower economics.
Watch: Suppliers move more volume direct to large customers or restrict distributor rebates, weakening Genuine Parts’ purchasing economics.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual gross profit rose from $6.6 billion in FY2021 to $8.9 billion in FY2025.
Open source ↗The distribution model must convert inventory scale into operating cash, and that working-capital discipline is currently strained rather than clearly improving.WeakeningMateriality: Medium
GAAP annual operating cash flow fell to $890.8 million in FY2025 from $1.25 billion in FY2024 and $1.44 billion in FY2023. If cash conversion does not recover, revenue and gross profit growth will not translate into owner value or capital-return capacity.
Watch: Inventory turns deteriorate because parts breadth expands faster than demand, tying up more capital before margin pressure is visible.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual operating cash flow fell to $890.8 million in FY2025 from $1.25 billion in FY2024 and $1.44 billion in.
Open source ↗The equity case requires FY2025’s GAAP profit collapse to be caused by fixable or non-recurring issues, not a structural loss of operating leverage in the parts-distribution model.HoldingMateriality: Medium
GAAP diluted EPS fell to $0.47 in FY2025 from $6.47 in FY2024 and $9.33 in FY2023. If earnings normalize, the stock can be valued on the durable distribution franchise; if the drop is structural, the historical compounder thesis is impaired.
Watch: Management identifies recurring cost inflation, branch inefficiency, or technology costs as the main reason earnings cannot recover.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP diluted EPS fell to $0.47 in FY2025 from $6.47 in FY2024 and $9.33 in FY2023.
Open source ↗Genuine Parts can use scale and consolidation to extend its distribution reach only if liabilities do not crowd out reinvestment, acquisitions, dividends, or buybacks.HoldingMateriality: Medium
Total liabilities increased from $12.7 billion at FY2022 year-end to $16.4 billion at FY2025 year-end. A leveraged distributor has less room to fix operations, fund inventory, and return cash when earnings are under pressure.
Watch: Debt-funded acquisitions fail to produce purchasing, distribution, or back-office synergies.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Total liabilities increased from $12.7 billion at FY2022 year-end to $16.4 billion at FY2025 year-end.
Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence
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Original research
Need-it-now replacement and industrial parts demand keeps customers using Genuine Parts’ distribution network instead of bypassing distributors, because breadth and availability matter more than pure price for many repair and maintenance purchases. If this holds, the company can keep compounding a large revenue base; if it breaks, sales pressure will eventually reveal that the network is less essential.
Purchasing scale, supplier relationships, and product breadth allow Genuine Parts to preserve markup in a competitive wholesale market rather than buying revenue with gross-margin erosion. Gross-margin durability is the clearest sign that the distributor still has bargaining power and is not merely passing volume through at lower economics.
The distribution model must convert inventory scale into operating cash, and that working-capital discipline is currently strained rather than clearly improving. If cash conversion does not recover, revenue and gross profit growth will not translate into owner value or capital-return capacity.
The equity case requires FY2025’s GAAP profit collapse to be caused by fixable or non-recurring issues, not a structural loss of operating leverage in the parts-distribution model. If earnings normalize, the stock can be valued on the durable distribution franchise; if the drop is structural, the historical compounder thesis is impaired.
Genuine Parts can use scale and consolidation to extend its distribution reach only if liabilities do not crowd out reinvestment, acquisitions, dividends, or buybacks. A leveraged distributor has less room to fix operations, fund inventory, and return cash when earnings are under pressure.
All standing thesis claims
Original report summary
its need-it-now automotive replacement and industrial supply advantages keep gross margins intact while 2025’s profit and cash-flow collapse proves temporary.
Bull case and bear case
Bull case and bear case for Genuine Parts Co
Where the evidence on Genuine Parts Co disagrees: Mixed on the latest evidence (Oct 19, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 2 strengthening, 2 holding and 1 weakening.
Bull case: what the evidence supports
Need-it-now replacement and industrial parts demand keeps customers using Genuine Parts’ distribution network instead of bypassing distributors, because breadth and availability matter more than pure price for many repair and maintenance purchases.
Purchasing scale, supplier relationships, and product breadth allow Genuine Parts to preserve markup in a competitive wholesale market rather than buying revenue with gross-margin erosion.
The equity case requires FY2025’s GAAP profit collapse to be caused by fixable or non-recurring issues, not a structural loss of operating leverage in the parts-distribution model.
Genuine Parts can use scale and consolidation to extend its distribution reach only if liabilities do not crowd out reinvestment, acquisitions, dividends, or buybacks.
Bear case: what the evidence questions
The distribution model must convert inventory scale into operating cash, and that working-capital discipline is currently strained rather than clearly improving.
Thesis-Break Engine
What has broken in Genuine Parts Co’s thesis
Each break OptimistFi flagged on Genuine Parts Co, dated — with what has historically followed the same kind of break across the market, not a forecast for Genuine Parts Co.
- CEO / officer changecondition set before this filing
Across all companies, this kind of break has happened 16,849 times before. Those stocks trailed comparable companies by a median of 2% over the next six months, and 38% of them trailed it by 10 points or more.
Early warning
The break condition read on the trailing twelve months through Genuine Parts Co’s latest quarterly report, ahead of the annual figure it is written on.
- Net loss, trailing 12 months
Across all companies, this kind of early warning has happened 2,059 times before. Those stocks beat comparable companies by a median of 1% over the next six months, and 35% of them trailed it by 10 points or more.
Several kinds of break have stacked on Genuine Parts Co at once. A cluster is a stronger read than any one signal alone.
MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT
The numbers behind the thesis
What Changed
- MixedDirector or principal officer change.
Genuine Parts Co filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-09-09: Director or principal officer change. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedOther material event.
Genuine Parts Co filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-08-11: Other material event. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedReported results of operations (earnings release).
Genuine Parts Co filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-07-21: Reported results of operations (earnings release). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
Risks / falsifiers
What could break the thesis
- Large repair, fleet, or industrial customers shift procurement directly to manufacturers, reducing the distributor’s role before reported sales weaken.
- Suppliers move more volume direct to large customers or restrict distributor rebates, weakening Genuine Parts’ purchasing economics.
- Inventory turns deteriorate because parts breadth expands faster than demand, tying up more capital before margin pressure is visible.
- Management identifies recurring cost inflation, branch inefficiency, or technology costs as the main reason earnings cannot recover.
- Debt-funded acquisitions fail to produce purchasing, distribution, or back-office synergies.
GPC news
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Financial statements
GPC income statement
Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.
GPC: quick answers
- When does Genuine Parts Co (GPC) report earnings next?
- Genuine Parts Co's next results are projected for February 16, 2027, from the dates of its own results filings with the SEC. The company has not confirmed the date. It last reported on October 20, 2026. Earnings calendar
- What is GPC's short interest?
- As of October 30, 2026, 6.4M GPC shares were sold short, 4.66% of its shares outstanding, down 5.1% from the count before. At the stock's average daily volume that is 5.1 days to cover. FINRA publishes the count twice a month. GPC short interest history
- Have members of Congress traded GPC?
- Reports made public in the last 90 days disclose 1 trade in GPC by 1 filer: 0 purchases and 1 sale. They are filed under the STOCK Act by members of Congress, the President and senior officials. Every disclosed GPC trade
- Which well-known investors own GPC?
- 2 of the 37 well-known funds tracked here reported GPC shares in their latest 13F filings. By share of the fund's portfolio: Baupost Group (Seth Klarman), 6.1%; Bridgewater Associates (Ray Dalio), 0.0%. Fund portfolios
GPC in well-known investors’ portfolios
2 of 37 funds reported GPC shares in their latest 13F filing. A 13F shows quarter-end positions and arrives up to 45 days later.
| Fund | Of its portfolio | Value | Change | Quarter |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Seth KlarmanBaupost Group | 6.1% | $332M | +89.0% | Q2 2026 |
| Ray DalioBridgewater Associates | 0.02% | $3.7M | +240.3% | Q2 2026 |
