Genius Sports
GENINYSEUSD
- Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
- Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
- Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
- $6.35 Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
- $6.27–$6.65 Regular-session low and high so far today.
- 5.7M Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET.
- Not yet confirmed The company has not confirmed its next report date. Reported quarters are available in the chart’s Earnings view.
- $3.83–$11.58 52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.
Understand the Business
Why the Stock Moved
Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.
The core investment thesis
Own GENI if official sports data remains mission-critical infrastructure for sportsbooks and the company proves that rights-heavy growth converts into durable gross profit and cash flow, not just larger GAAP losses.
GENI price history
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Investment thesis
What must happen next
Sportsbooks and sports-media customers continue to treat Genius Sports’ official data and technology as mission-critical, so regulated betting and live-betting engagement keep converting into customer demand rather than being bypassed by cheaper alternatives.StrengtheningMateriality: High
GAAP annual revenue increased from $341.0 million in FY2022 to $413.0 million in FY2023, $510.9 million in FY2024, and $669.5 million in FY2025. If this holds, Genius can keep compounding the top line; if it breaks, the business loses the demand engine needed to absorb rights and platform costs.
Watch: Major sportsbook customers such as DraftKings, FanDuel, or bet365 shift incremental live-betting data spend to Sportradar, Stats Perform, or direct league feeds.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual revenue increased from $341.0 million in FY2022 to $413.0 million in FY2023, $510.9 million in FY2024, and $669.5.
Open source ↗Genius Sports’ data-rights portfolio and distribution technology retain enough pricing power that revenue growth is not merely passed through to leagues and data suppliers.HoldingMateriality: High
GAAP annual gross profit rose from $2.9 million in FY2022 to $69.0 million in FY2023, $128.7 million in FY2024, and $153.8 million in FY2025. This determines whether growth creates enterprise value or simply increases low-margin volume.
Watch: Leagues demand materially higher minimum guarantees or revenue shares when data-rights contracts renew.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual gross profit rose from $2.9 million in FY2022 to $69.0 million in FY2023, $128.7 million in FY2024, and.
Open source ↗The platform has enough scale and working-capital discipline to convert a rights-heavy data business into operating cash flow even before GAAP profitability arrives.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium
GAAP annual operating cash flow improved from negative $3.5 million in FY2022 to positive $14.9 million in FY2023. Positive cash generation lowers financing risk and gives management time to prove the GAAP earnings model.
Watch: Sports-data rights renewals require larger upfront payments or minimum guarantees that consume cash before customer revenue is collected.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual operating cash flow improved from negative $3.5 million in FY2022 to positive $14.9 million in FY2023.
Open source ↗Management must prove that technology scale and cost discipline can overcome rights costs, amortization, and operating investment; otherwise the business remains structurally unprofitable despite growth.WeakeningMateriality: Medium
GAAP annual operating loss improved from negative $182.9 million in FY2022 to negative $74.2 million in FY2023 and negative $58.5 million in FY2024. This is the bridge from a useful product to per-share value creation; if operating losses persist, equity holders rely on hope rather than earnings power.
Watch: FY2025 GAAP annual operating loss worsened to negative $151.3 million, suggesting rights costs, amortization, or operating investment can still overwhelm scale benefits.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual operating loss improved from negative $182.9 million in FY2022 to negative $74.2 million in FY2023 and negative $58.5.
Open source ↗The company has enough balance-sheet runway to defend data rights and invest through GAAP losses without being forced into distressed financing.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium
Cash and cash equivalents increased from $100.3 million at FY2023 year-end to $110.2 million at FY2024 year-end and $280.6 million at FY2025 year-end. A cash cushion lets Genius negotiate from strength; a weakened balance sheet would shift value to lenders, leagues, or new equity investors.
Watch: A major league-rights auction requires a large upfront payment that materially reduces cash.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Cash and cash equivalents increased from $100.3 million at FY2023 year-end to $110.2 million at FY2024 year-end and $280.6 million.
Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence
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Original research
Sportsbooks and sports-media customers continue to treat Genius Sports’ official data and technology as mission-critical, so regulated betting and live-betting engagement keep converting into customer demand rather than being bypassed by cheaper alternatives. If this holds, Genius can keep compounding the top line; if it breaks, the business loses the demand engine needed to absorb rights and platform costs.
Genius Sports’ data-rights portfolio and distribution technology retain enough pricing power that revenue growth is not merely passed through to leagues and data suppliers. This determines whether growth creates enterprise value or simply increases low-margin volume.
The platform has enough scale and working-capital discipline to convert a rights-heavy data business into operating cash flow even before GAAP profitability arrives. Positive cash generation lowers financing risk and gives management time to prove the GAAP earnings model.
Management must prove that technology scale and cost discipline can overcome rights costs, amortization, and operating investment; otherwise the business remains structurally unprofitable despite growth. This is the bridge from a useful product to per-share value creation; if operating losses persist, equity holders rely on hope rather than earnings power.
The company has enough balance-sheet runway to defend data rights and invest through GAAP losses without being forced into distressed financing. A cash cushion lets Genius negotiate from strength; a weakened balance sheet would shift value to lenders, leagues, or new equity investors.
All standing thesis claims
Original report summary
official sports data remains mission-critical infrastructure for sportsbooks and the company proves that rights-heavy growth converts into durable gross profit and cash flow, not just larger GAAP losses.
Bull case and bear case
Bull case and bear case for Genius Sports
Where the evidence on Genius Sports disagrees: Mixed on the latest evidence (Nov 8, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 3 strengthening, 1 holding and 1 weakening.
Bull case: what the evidence supports
Sportsbooks and sports-media customers continue to treat Genius Sports’ official data and technology as mission-critical, so regulated betting and live-betting engagement keep converting into customer demand rather than being bypassed by cheaper alternatives.
Genius Sports’ data-rights portfolio and distribution technology retain enough pricing power that revenue growth is not merely passed through to leagues and data suppliers.
The platform has enough scale and working-capital discipline to convert a rights-heavy data business into operating cash flow even before GAAP profitability arrives.
The company has enough balance-sheet runway to defend data rights and invest through GAAP losses without being forced into distressed financing.
Bear case: what the evidence questions
Management must prove that technology scale and cost discipline can overcome rights costs, amortization, and operating investment; otherwise the business remains structurally unprofitable despite growth.
Thesis-Break Engine
Thesis-break watch · Genius Sports
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MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT
The numbers behind the thesis
What Changed
- MixedForeign issuer material report (6-K).
Genius Sports filed an SEC report on 2026-11-06: Foreign issuer material report (6-K). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedForeign issuer material report (6-K).
Genius Sports filed an SEC report on 2026-11-05: Foreign issuer material report (6-K). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedForeign issuer material report (6-K).
Genius Sports filed an SEC report on 2026-08-06: Foreign issuer material report (6-K). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
Risks / falsifiers
What could break the thesis
- Major sportsbook customers such as DraftKings, FanDuel, or bet365 shift incremental live-betting data spend to Sportradar, Stats Perform, or direct league feeds.
- Leagues demand materially higher minimum guarantees or revenue shares when data-rights contracts renew.
- Sports-data rights renewals require larger upfront payments or minimum guarantees that consume cash before customer revenue is collected.
- FY2025 GAAP annual operating loss worsened to negative $151.3 million, suggesting rights costs, amortization, or operating investment can still overwhelm scale benefits.
- A major league-rights auction requires a large upfront payment that materially reduces cash.
GENI news
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Financial statements
GENI income statement
Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.
GENI: quick answers
- Which well-known investors own GENI?
- 2 of the 37 well-known funds tracked here reported GENI shares in their latest 13F filings. By share of the fund's portfolio: Glenview Capital Management, 1.5%; ARK Investment Management (Cathie Wood), 0.1%. Fund portfolios
GENI in well-known investors’ portfolios
2 of 37 funds reported GENI shares in their latest 13F filing. A 13F shows quarter-end positions and arrives up to 45 days later.
| Fund | Of its portfolio | Value | Change | Quarter |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Glenview Capital Management | 1.5% | $81.8M | +57.6% | Q2 2026 |
| Cathie WoodARK Investment Management | 0.12% | $18.6M | −8.0% | Q2 2026 |