FLEX LNG
FLNGNYSEUSD
- Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
- Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
- Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
- $25.31 Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
- $25.31–$26.15 Regular-session low and high so far today.
- 988.7K Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET.
- Not yet confirmed The company has not confirmed its next report date. Reported quarters are available in the chart’s Earnings view.
- $24.14–$33.40 52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.
Understand the Business
Why the Stock Moved
Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.
The core investment thesis
Own FLNG if its LNG carrier capacity remains scarce and financeable enough to keep converting charter demand into cash returns despite a mature, leveraged asset base.
FLNG price history
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Investment thesis
What must happen next
LNG customers’ need for reliable seaborne gas transport, combined with limited acceptable carrier availability, keeps FLNG’s ships employed at rates high enough to avoid a step-down in annual charter revenue.HoldingMateriality: High
GAAP annual revenue stayed broadly stable from FY2021 $343.448 million to FY2025 $347.637 million, with FY2023 peak revenue of $371.022 million. If vessel scarcity holds, FLNG can keep harvesting cash from its fleet; if it breaks, revenue resets before shareholders can rely on the historical earnings base.
Watch: A wave of LNG carrier newbuild deliveries gives charterers excess vessel choice and pushes term-charter rates down before FLNG renewals.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual revenue stayed broadly stable from FY2021 $343.448 million to FY2025 $347.637 million, with FY2023 peak revenue of $371.022.
Open source ↗Technical reliability, vessel uptime, and cost discipline allow FLNG to keep a large share of charter hire flowing through to operating income.HoldingMateriality: High
FY2025 GAAP annual operating income was $175.804 million, about 50.6% of FY2025 GAAP annual revenue. The owner gets paid only if expensive vessels stay available and accepted by charterers; offhire or cost inflation quickly turns stable revenue into weaker cash generation.
Watch: Unplanned offhire, technical incidents, or charterer vetting failures reduce available revenue days before annual results show the damage.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
FY2025 GAAP annual operating income was $175.804 million, about 50.6% of FY2025 GAAP annual revenue.
Open source ↗A large cash balance gives FLNG flexibility to bridge weak charter markets and refinance without being forced to sell vessels or issue equity at unattractive prices.HoldingMateriality: Medium
Cash increased from $332.329 million at FY2022 year-end to $447.632 million at FY2025 year-end. Liquidity determines whether a cyclical downturn is survivable for equity holders or becomes a forced deleveraging event.
Watch: Shipping credit markets tighten or lenders reduce advance rates against LNG carrier collateral.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Cash increased from $332.329 million at FY2022 year-end to $447.632 million at FY2025 year-end.
Open source ↗The debt-funded vessel model compounds equity value only if charter cash yields stay above refinancing and amortization costs; otherwise lenders capture the fleet economics before shareholders do.WeakeningMateriality: Medium
Liabilities were $1.905 billion at FY2025 year-end versus assets of $2.624 billion, making financing a central driver of equity outcomes. Leverage can magnify LNG shipping upside, but it can also turn a modest charter-rate reset into a large equity-value impairment.
Watch: Interest rates or credit spreads remain high when vessel debt must be refinanced.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Liabilities were $1.905 billion at FY2025 year-end versus assets of $2.624 billion, making financing a central driver of equity outcomes.
Open source ↗Because the asset base is not visibly expanding, FLNG’s per-share value must come mainly from harvesting existing vessels through cash returns, debt reduction, or opportunistic capital allocation rather than fleet-driven revenue growth.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium
Assets were $2.624 billion at FY2025 year-end, below $2.680 billion at FY2022 year-end. Owners should underwrite FLNG as a cyclical cash-yield and capital-allocation story, not as a self-funded volume-growth compounder.
Watch: Management orders or acquires additional LNG carriers without secured long-term charters, changing the risk profile from harvest to growth capex.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Assets were $2.624 billion at FY2025 year-end, below $2.680 billion at FY2022 year-end.
Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence
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Original research
LNG customers’ need for reliable seaborne gas transport, combined with limited acceptable carrier availability, keeps FLNG’s ships employed at rates high enough to avoid a step-down in annual charter revenue. If vessel scarcity holds, FLNG can keep harvesting cash from its fleet; if it breaks, revenue resets before shareholders can rely on the historical earnings base.
Technical reliability, vessel uptime, and cost discipline allow FLNG to keep a large share of charter hire flowing through to operating income. The owner gets paid only if expensive vessels stay available and accepted by charterers; offhire or cost inflation quickly turns stable revenue into weaker cash generation.
A large cash balance gives FLNG flexibility to bridge weak charter markets and refinance without being forced to sell vessels or issue equity at unattractive prices. Liquidity determines whether a cyclical downturn is survivable for equity holders or becomes a forced deleveraging event.
The debt-funded vessel model compounds equity value only if charter cash yields stay above refinancing and amortization costs; otherwise lenders capture the fleet economics before shareholders do. Leverage can magnify LNG shipping upside, but it can also turn a modest charter-rate reset into a large equity-value impairment.
Because the asset base is not visibly expanding, FLNG’s per-share value must come mainly from harvesting existing vessels through cash returns, debt reduction, or opportunistic capital allocation rather than fleet-driven revenue growth. Owners should underwrite FLNG as a cyclical cash-yield and capital-allocation story, not as a self-funded volume-growth compounder.
All standing thesis claims
Original report summary
its LNG carrier capacity remains scarce and financeable enough to keep converting charter demand into cash returns despite a mature, leveraged asset base.
Bull case and bear case
Bull case and bear case for Flex LNG
Where the evidence on Flex LNG disagrees: Mixed on the latest evidence (Oct 16, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 1 strengthening, 3 holding and 1 weakening.
Bull case: what the evidence supports
LNG customers’ need for reliable seaborne gas transport, combined with limited acceptable carrier availability, keeps FLNG’s ships employed at rates high enough to avoid a step-down in annual charter revenue.
Technical reliability, vessel uptime, and cost discipline allow FLNG to keep a large share of charter hire flowing through to operating income.
A large cash balance gives FLNG flexibility to bridge weak charter markets and refinance without being forced to sell vessels or issue equity at unattractive prices.
Because the asset base is not visibly expanding, FLNG’s per-share value must come mainly from harvesting existing vessels through cash returns, debt reduction, or opportunistic capital allocation rather than fleet-driven revenue growth.
Bear case: what the evidence questions
The debt-funded vessel model compounds equity value only if charter cash yields stay above refinancing and amortization costs; otherwise lenders capture the fleet economics before shareholders do.
Thesis-Break Engine
Thesis-break watch · Flex LNG
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MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT
The numbers behind the thesis
What Changed
- MixedForeign issuer material report (6-K).
Flex LNG filed an SEC report on 2026-08-19: Foreign issuer material report (6-K). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedForeign issuer material report (6-K).
Flex LNG filed an SEC report on 2026-05-13: Foreign issuer material report (6-K). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
Risks / falsifiers
What could break the thesis
- A wave of LNG carrier newbuild deliveries gives charterers excess vessel choice and pushes term-charter rates down before FLNG renewals.
- Unplanned offhire, technical incidents, or charterer vetting failures reduce available revenue days before annual results show the damage.
- Shipping credit markets tighten or lenders reduce advance rates against LNG carrier collateral.
- Interest rates or credit spreads remain high when vessel debt must be refinanced.
- Management orders or acquires additional LNG carriers without secured long-term charters, changing the risk profile from harvest to growth capex.
FLNG news
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Financial statements
FLNG income statement
Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.
FLNG: quick answers
- Have members of Congress traded FLNG?
- 22 trades in FLNG have been disclosed under the STOCK Act by members of Congress, the President or senior officials, none in reports made public in the last 90 days. Every disclosed FLNG trade
