EverQuote
EVERNASDAQUSD
- Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
- Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
- Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
- $28.03 Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
- $27.57–$29.24 Regular-session low and high so far today.
- 489.4K Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET.
- Feb 22 projected Projected for 2027-02-22 from the company’s own results filings (SEC 8-K Item 2.02). The company has not confirmed the date.
- $13.88–$31.20 52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.
Understand the Business
Why the Stock Moved
Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.
The core investment thesis
Own EVER if its insurance-shopping marketplace remains a high-ROI customer-acquisition channel for carriers and agents, not just a beneficiary of a temporary rebound in insurer ad budgets.
EVER price history
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Investment thesis
What must happen next
Insurance carriers and agents continue to treat EverQuote as an efficient source of high-intent shoppers, so enough bid density remains in the marketplace to monetize consumer traffic through insurance cycles.StrengtheningMateriality: High
Annual GAAP revenue rose to $692.5 million in FY2025 from $500.2 million in FY2024 and $287.9 million in FY2023, showing that marketplace demand recovered strongly after the 2023 trough. If carrier demand remains broad, EverQuote can grow without becoming dependent on one product cycle; if insurers bypass the marketplace, the revenue engine loses its buyer side.
Watch: Large carriers such as Progressive, GEICO, or State Farm shift acquisition budgets materially toward direct digital channels, captive agents, or embedded distribution partners instead of third-party marketplaces.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Annual GAAP revenue rose to $692.5 million in FY2025 from $500.2 million in FY2024 and $287.9 million in FY2023, showing.
Open source ↗EverQuote’s data-driven traffic acquisition and matching keep the spread between what insurers pay for referrals and what EverQuote pays to acquire shoppers positive, rather than growth being bought with uneconomic marketing.StrengtheningMateriality: High
Annual GAAP operating_income improved to $58.3 million in FY2025 from $31.8 million in FY2024 and a loss of $52.0 million in FY2023. This determines whether growth is valuable: if traffic costs rise faster than insurer monetization, revenue can grow while owner economics deteriorate.
Watch: Google search algorithm changes or paid-search auction inflation materially raise the cost of acquiring insurance shoppers before EverQuote can reprice leads.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Annual GAAP operating_income improved to $58.3 million in FY2025 from $31.8 million in FY2024 and a loss of $52.0 million.
Open source ↗Because EverQuote is a marketplace rather than an underwriter, profitable volume should convert into operating cash instead of requiring insurance capital or claims reserves.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium
Annual GAAP operating_cash_flow was $95.4 million in FY2025, up from $66.6 million in FY2024 and negative $2.8 million in FY2023. If this holds, the business can compound with limited balance-sheet strain; if it breaks, EverQuote would deserve a lower-quality financial profile.
Watch: EverQuote moves into risk-bearing insurance products, agency balance-sheet obligations, or underwriting-adjacent services that require regulatory capital or reserves.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Annual GAAP operating_cash_flow was $95.4 million in FY2025, up from $66.6 million in FY2024 and negative $2.8 million in FY2023.
Open source ↗The cash-rich, low-liability balance sheet gives EverQuote time to keep investing through insurance ad-budget cycles without forced equity issuance or debt-financed survival.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium
Cash was $171.4 million at FY2025 year-end, up from $102.1 million at FY2024 year-end and $38.0 million at FY2023 year-end. Financial durability matters because carrier marketing cycles can turn quickly; a strong balance sheet lets management avoid raising capital at bad prices.
Watch: Management uses the cash balance for an acquisition that does not improve traffic quality, carrier demand, or marketplace economics.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Cash was $171.4 million at FY2025 year-end, up from $102.1 million at FY2024 year-end and $38.0 million at FY2023 year-end.
Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence
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Original research
Insurance carriers and agents continue to treat EverQuote as an efficient source of high-intent shoppers, so enough bid density remains in the marketplace to monetize consumer traffic through insurance cycles. If carrier demand remains broad, EverQuote can grow without becoming dependent on one product cycle; if insurers bypass the marketplace, the revenue engine loses its buyer side.
EverQuote’s data-driven traffic acquisition and matching keep the spread between what insurers pay for referrals and what EverQuote pays to acquire shoppers positive, rather than growth being bought with uneconomic marketing. This determines whether growth is valuable: if traffic costs rise faster than insurer monetization, revenue can grow while owner economics deteriorate.
Because EverQuote is a marketplace rather than an underwriter, profitable volume should convert into operating cash instead of requiring insurance capital or claims reserves. If this holds, the business can compound with limited balance-sheet strain; if it breaks, EverQuote would deserve a lower-quality financial profile.
The cash-rich, low-liability balance sheet gives EverQuote time to keep investing through insurance ad-budget cycles without forced equity issuance or debt-financed survival. Financial durability matters because carrier marketing cycles can turn quickly; a strong balance sheet lets management avoid raising capital at bad prices.
All standing thesis claims
Original report summary
its insurance-shopping marketplace remains a high-ROI customer-acquisition channel for carriers and agents, not just a beneficiary of a temporary rebound in insurer ad budgets.
Bull case and bear case
Bull case and bear case for EverQuote
Where the evidence on EverQuote stands: Strengthening on the latest evidence (Oct 22, 2026). Of its 4 thesis points, 4 strengthening.
Bull case: what the evidence supports
Insurance carriers and agents continue to treat EverQuote as an efficient source of high-intent shoppers, so enough bid density remains in the marketplace to monetize consumer traffic through insurance cycles.
EverQuote’s data-driven traffic acquisition and matching keep the spread between what insurers pay for referrals and what EverQuote pays to acquire shoppers positive, rather than growth being bought with uneconomic marketing.
Because EverQuote is a marketplace rather than an underwriter, profitable volume should convert into operating cash instead of requiring insurance capital or claims reserves.
The cash-rich, low-liability balance sheet gives EverQuote time to keep investing through insurance ad-budget cycles without forced equity issuance or debt-financed survival.
Bear case: what would count against it
Large carriers such as Progressive, GEICO, or State Farm shift acquisition budgets materially toward direct digital channels, captive agents, or embedded distribution partners instead of third-party marketplaces.
Google search algorithm changes or paid-search auction inflation materially raise the cost of acquiring insurance shoppers before EverQuote can reprice leads.
EverQuote moves into risk-bearing insurance products, agency balance-sheet obligations, or underwriting-adjacent services that require regulatory capital or reserves.
Thesis-Break Engine
Thesis-break watch · EverQuote
No break has crossed EverQuote’s thesis. Its break conditions are checked against every new filing as it lands.
MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT
The numbers behind the thesis
What Changed
- MixedEntered a material definitive agreement.
EverQuote filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-10-21: Entered a material definitive agreement. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedReported results of operations (earnings release).
EverQuote filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-08-03: Reported results of operations (earnings release). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedReported results of operations (earnings release).
EverQuote filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-05-04: Reported results of operations (earnings release). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
Risks / falsifiers
What could break the thesis
- Large carriers such as Progressive, GEICO, or State Farm shift acquisition budgets materially toward direct digital channels, captive agents, or embedded distribution partners instead of third-party marketplaces.
- Google search algorithm changes or paid-search auction inflation materially raise the cost of acquiring insurance shoppers before EverQuote can reprice leads.
- EverQuote moves into risk-bearing insurance products, agency balance-sheet obligations, or underwriting-adjacent services that require regulatory capital or reserves.
- Management uses the cash balance for an acquisition that does not improve traffic quality, carrier demand, or marketplace economics.
EVER news
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Financial statements
EVER income statement
Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.
EVER: quick answers
- When does EverQuote (EVER) report earnings next?
- EverQuote's next results are projected for February 22, 2027, from the dates of its own results filings with the SEC. The company has not confirmed the date. It last reported on November 2, 2026. Earnings calendar
- What is EVER's short interest?
- As of October 30, 2026, 6.9M EVER shares were sold short, 21.5% of its shares outstanding, down 0.9% from the count before. At the stock's average daily volume that is 13 days to cover. FINRA publishes the count twice a month. EVER short interest history