e.l.f. Beauty

ELFNYSEUSD

THESIS ALERT

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$118.46
−$0.05 (−0.04%)Today 1M +8.50%
After hours$118.45−0.01%

Updated Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET · Regular session · May be delayed

Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
$118.51
Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
$115.30–$119.74
Regular-session low and high so far today.
1.3M
Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET.
Feb 3 projected
Projected for 2027-02-03 from the company’s own results filings (SEC 8-K Item 2.02). The company has not confirmed the date.
$48.82–$123.13
52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.

Understand the Business

Why the Stock Moved

Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.

The core investment thesis

Own ELF if its accessible, clean, vegan, cruelty-free beauty positioning keeps taking share while management turns brand heat and acquired scale back into operating leverage.

ELF price history

Latest price$118.46Today−$0.05 (-0.04%)
ELF +9.09%S&P 500 -2.42%Since first plotted close
4 hours

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Investment thesis

What must happen next

5 MATERIAL PROPOSITIONS
  • e.l.f.’s accessible, inclusive, clean, vegan and cruelty-free positioning keeps attracting consumers from legacy mass and prestige beauty alternatives, so consumer demand continues to convert into category share gains rather than one-time product-cycle spikes.StrengtheningMateriality: High

    GAAP annual revenue increased from $578.8 million in FY2023 to $1.024 billion in FY2024, $1.314 billion in FY2025 and $1.636 billion in FY2026. If this holds, revenue growth is driven by brand pull and distribution productivity; if it breaks, e.l.f. becomes a normal beauty brand fighting for shelf space and promotion.

    Watch: L’Oréal’s Maybelline or NYX, Coty, or private-label beauty lines successfully match e.l.f.’s price-value and trend cadence, reducing the distinctiveness of the accessible-clean proposition.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    GAAP annual revenue increased from $578.8 million in FY2023 to $1.024 billion in FY2024, $1.314 billion in FY2025 and $1.636.

    Open source ↗
  • The brand can offer low accessible prices without becoming a low-margin commodity because product design, sourcing, mix and brand desirability preserve premium gross profit economics.StrengtheningMateriality: High

    GAAP annual gross profit rose from $390.4 million in FY2023 to $724.1 million in FY2024, $935.7 million in FY2025 and $1.157 billion in FY2026. Gross margin is the bridge between e.l.f.’s value proposition and investable economics; if it erodes, growth becomes less valuable even if sales keep rising.

    Watch: A tariff, freight, packaging or ingredient-cost shock raises landed costs faster than e.l.f. can reprice its accessible products.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    GAAP annual gross profit rose from $390.4 million in FY2023 to $724.1 million in FY2024, $935.7 million in FY2025 and.

    Open source ↗
  • Brand-building, product innovation and integration spending must eventually scale rather than absorb the economics of growth; FY2026 needs to prove it was an investment/acquisition-cycle reset, not a permanent cost to sustain demand.WeakeningMateriality: Medium

    GAAP annual operating income was positive in each reported year: $68.1 million in FY2023, $149.7 million in FY2024, $158.0 million in FY2025 and $73.6 million in FY2026. This determines whether e.l.f. is a high-growth revenue story or a compounding earnings story; shareholders need operating leverage, not just sales growth.

    Watch: Influencer, creator, digital advertising or retailer activation costs become structurally higher because consumer discovery in beauty becomes more expensive.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    GAAP annual operating income was positive in each reported year: $68.1 million in FY2023, $149.7 million in FY2024, $158.0 million.

    Open source ↗
  • The model should self-fund inventory, product launches and brand investment through operating cash generation rather than depending on repeated external capital.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium

    GAAP annual operating cash flow was positive in every reported year: $101.9 million in FY2023, $71.2 million in FY2024, $133.8 million in FY2025 and $212.5 million in FY2026. If cash conversion holds, e.l.f. can keep investing through product cycles; if it weakens, growth may require debt, dilution or lower reinvestment.

    Watch: Retailer receivables stretch or inventory builds ahead of demand, tying up cash before revenue quality visibly deteriorates.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    GAAP annual operating cash flow was positive in every reported year: $101.9 million in FY2023, $71.2 million in FY2024, $133.8.

    Open source ↗
  • Multi-brand expansion in cosmetics and skin care must add durable consumer franchises without turning e.l.f. from an agile brand compounder into a leveraged acquisition story.HoldingMateriality: Medium

    The profile describes e.l.f. as a multi-brand beauty company, not only a single cosmetics label. Acquisitions can widen the addressable market, but if they add balance-sheet risk or distract management, the equity deserves a lower quality premium.

    Watch: A major acquired or incubated brand loses consumer relevance, forcing impairment, discounting or incremental marketing spend.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    The profile describes e.l.f. as a multi-brand beauty company, not only a single cosmetics label.

    Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence

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Original research

e.l.f.’s accessible, inclusive, clean, vegan and cruelty-free positioning keeps attracting consumers from legacy mass and prestige beauty alternatives, so consumer demand continues to convert into category share gains rather than one-time product-cycle spikes. If this holds, revenue growth is driven by brand pull and distribution productivity; if it breaks, e.l.f. becomes a normal beauty brand fighting for shelf space and promotion.

The brand can offer low accessible prices without becoming a low-margin commodity because product design, sourcing, mix and brand desirability preserve premium gross profit economics. Gross margin is the bridge between e.l.f.’s value proposition and investable economics; if it erodes, growth becomes less valuable even if sales keep rising.

Brand-building, product innovation and integration spending must eventually scale rather than absorb the economics of growth; FY2026 needs to prove it was an investment/acquisition-cycle reset, not a permanent cost to sustain demand. This determines whether e.l.f. is a high-growth revenue story or a compounding earnings story; shareholders need operating leverage, not just sales growth.

The model should self-fund inventory, product launches and brand investment through operating cash generation rather than depending on repeated external capital. If cash conversion holds, e.l.f. can keep investing through product cycles; if it weakens, growth may require debt, dilution or lower reinvestment.

Multi-brand expansion in cosmetics and skin care must add durable consumer franchises without turning e.l.f. from an agile brand compounder into a leveraged acquisition story. Acquisitions can widen the addressable market, but if they add balance-sheet risk or distract management, the equity deserves a lower quality premium.

All standing thesis claims
Original report summary

its accessible, clean, vegan, cruelty-free beauty positioning keeps taking share while management turns brand heat and acquired scale back into operating leverage.

Evidence assessed Oct 15, 2026. Expand each conclusion for its evidence and what would change it. Thesis evidence—not a buy or sell recommendation.

Bull case and bear case

Bull case and bear case for e.l.f. Beauty

Where the evidence on e.l.f. Beauty disagrees: Mixed on the latest evidence (Oct 15, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 3 strengthening, 1 holding and 1 weakening.

Bull case: what the evidence supports

  • e.l.f.’s accessible, inclusive, clean, vegan and cruelty-free positioning keeps attracting consumers from legacy mass and prestige beauty alternatives, so consumer demand continues to convert into category share gains rather than one-time product-cycle spikes.

    sec.gov ↗

  • The brand can offer low accessible prices without becoming a low-margin commodity because product design, sourcing, mix and brand desirability preserve premium gross profit economics.

    sec.gov ↗

  • The model should self-fund inventory, product launches and brand investment through operating cash generation rather than depending on repeated external capital.

    sec.gov ↗

  • Multi-brand expansion in cosmetics and skin care must add durable consumer franchises without turning e.l.f. from an agile brand compounder into a leveraged acquisition story.

    sec.gov ↗

Bear case: what the evidence questions

  • Brand-building, product innovation and integration spending must eventually scale rather than absorb the economics of growth; FY2026 needs to prove it was an investment/acquisition-cycle reset, not a permanent cost to sustain demand.

    sec.gov ↗

Thesis-Break Engine

What has broken in e.l.f. Beauty’s thesis

Each break OptimistFi flagged on e.l.f. Beauty, dated — with what has historically followed the same kind of break across the market, not a forecast for e.l.f. Beauty.

  • Insider-selling clustercondition set before this filing

    Across all companies, this kind of break has happened 9,137 times before. Those stocks beat comparable companies by a median of 1% over the next six months, and 30% of them trailed it by 10 points or more.

  • Price target fell below the stockcondition set before this filing

    Across all companies, this kind of break has happened 1,809 times before. Those stocks trailed comparable companies by a median of 1% over the next six months, and 33% of them trailed it by 10 points or more.

Several kinds of break have stacked on e.l.f. Beauty at once. A cluster is a stronger read than any one signal alone.

How the Thesis-Break Engine works →Historical outcomes are measured against comparable companies after past breaks of the same kind, across all companies. Not a prediction.

MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT

The numbers behind the thesis

Sourced from filings and market data

What Changed

  1. Mixed
    Reported results of operations (earnings release).

    e.l.f. Beauty filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-08-05: Reported results of operations (earnings release). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.

  2. Mixed
    Reported results of operations (earnings release).

    e.l.f. Beauty filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-05-20: Reported results of operations (earnings release). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.

Risks / falsifiers

What could break the thesis

  • L’Oréal’s Maybelline or NYX, Coty, or private-label beauty lines successfully match e.l.f.’s price-value and trend cadence, reducing the distinctiveness of the accessible-clean proposition.
  • A tariff, freight, packaging or ingredient-cost shock raises landed costs faster than e.l.f. can reprice its accessible products.
  • Influencer, creator, digital advertising or retailer activation costs become structurally higher because consumer discovery in beauty becomes more expensive.
  • Retailer receivables stretch or inventory builds ahead of demand, tying up cash before revenue quality visibly deteriorates.
  • A major acquired or incubated brand loses consumer relevance, forcing impairment, discounting or incremental marketing spend.

ELF news

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Financial statements

ELF income statement

Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.

ELF: quick answers

When does e.l.f. Beauty (ELF) report earnings next?
e.l.f. Beauty's next results are projected for February 3, 2027, from the dates of its own results filings with the SEC. The company has not confirmed the date. It last reported on November 4, 2026. Earnings calendar
What is ELF's short interest?
As of October 30, 2026, 4.2M ELF shares were sold short, 7.03% of its shares outstanding, down 5.4% from the count before. At the stock's average daily volume that is 3.4 days to cover. FINRA publishes the count twice a month. ELF short interest history
Have members of Congress traded ELF?
Reports made public in the last 90 days disclose 2 trades in ELF by 2 filers: 1 purchase and 1 sale. They are filed under the STOCK Act by members of Congress, the President and senior officials. Every disclosed ELF trade
Which well-known investors own ELF?
1 of the 37 well-known funds tracked here reported ELF shares in their latest 13F filing. By share of the fund's portfolio: Bridgewater Associates (Ray Dalio), 0.0%. Fund portfolios

ELF in well-known investors’ portfolios

1 of 37 funds reported ELF shares in their latest 13F filing. A 13F shows quarter-end positions and arrives up to 45 days later.

FundOf its portfolioValueChangeQuarter
Ray DalioBridgewater Associates0.00%$248K−98.3%Q2 2026

Every fund’s portfolio

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