Crimson Wine Group
CWGLOTC Markets OTCQBUSD
- Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
- Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
- Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
- $3.85 Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
- $3.83–$3.87 Regular-session low and high so far today.
- 1.8K Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 2:18 PM ET.
- Not yet confirmed The company has not confirmed its next report date. Reported quarters are available in the chart’s Earnings view.
- $3.82–$5.36 52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.
Understand the Business
Why the Stock Moved
Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.
The core investment thesis
Own CWGL if Crimson Wine Group is an asset-backed premium-wine turnaround whose value depends on restoring brand demand and operating leverage before weak industry conditions turn into permanent margin and cash-flow impairment.
CWGL price history
Loading recent earnings…
Investment thesis
What must happen next
Crimson’s premium-wine brands must regain consumer and trade pull after the FY2025 reset, rather than depend on temporary channel fill or discount-driven volume.WeakeningMateriality: High
GAAP annual revenue was relatively stable from FY2022 to FY2024, at $74.244 million, $72.402 million, and $72.985 million, suggesting the demand base was not previously collapsing. If brand demand returns, fixed-cost leverage can reappear; if it does not, the company remains an asset-heavy low-return winery.
Watch: Premium-wine consumers downtrade to lower-priced wine, spirits, beer, or non-alcoholic alternatives rather than returning to Crimson’s price points.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual revenue was relatively stable from FY2022 to FY2024, at $74.244 million, $72.402 million, and $72.985 million, suggesting the.
Open source ↗The brand and appellation value in Crimson’s wine portfolio must keep supporting price-mix and cost absorption even when volumes are soft.StrengtheningMateriality: High
GAAP annual gross profit was $30.715 million in FY2025, equal to roughly 47.2% of revenue, despite the revenue decline. Gross-margin resilience is the clearest sign that revenue recovery would translate into value rather than being bought with discounting.
Watch: Competing premium wineries use aggressive promotions that force Crimson to discount to clear inventory.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual gross profit was $30.715 million in FY2025, equal to roughly 47.2% of revenue, despite the revenue decline.
Open source ↗Crimson’s small winery platform needs enough revenue scale and cost discipline for gross profit to cover fixed operating overhead.WeakeningMateriality: Medium
GAAP annual operating income was positive in FY2022 and FY2023 at $1.969 million and $1.975 million, showing the model can work at higher revenue levels. This determines whether shareholder value comes from an operating business or remains trapped in low-return assets.
Watch: Management keeps winery, hospitality, sales, and corporate overhead sized for a larger revenue base after demand has reset lower.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual operating income was positive in FY2022 and FY2023 at $1.969 million and $1.975 million, showing the model can.
Open source ↗A conservative balance sheet must give Crimson time to manage through a weak wine cycle without distressed financing or forced asset sales.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium
Cash was $20.595 million at FY2025 year-end. The balance sheet is what lets the company wait for demand normalization; losing that cushion would shift the case from turnaround to impairment risk.
Watch: Multiple weak vintages, wildfire damage, or facility issues require major cash investment before sales recover.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Cash was $20.595 million at FY2025 year-end.
Open source ↗Crimson’s inventory-heavy wine model must convert product back into cash as sell-through normalizes, rather than tying up more capital in aging stock and receivables.HoldingMateriality: Medium
GAAP annual operating cash flow remained positive in FY2025 at $1.419 million. Positive earnings are not enough if the wine cycle consumes cash; owners need the operating model to self-fund inventory and brand investment.
Watch: Distributor destocking forces finished wine to remain in inventory longer before conversion to cash.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual operating cash flow remained positive in FY2025 at $1.419 million.
Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence
Loading the original research archive…
Original research
Crimson’s premium-wine brands must regain consumer and trade pull after the FY2025 reset, rather than depend on temporary channel fill or discount-driven volume. If brand demand returns, fixed-cost leverage can reappear; if it does not, the company remains an asset-heavy low-return winery.
The brand and appellation value in Crimson’s wine portfolio must keep supporting price-mix and cost absorption even when volumes are soft. Gross-margin resilience is the clearest sign that revenue recovery would translate into value rather than being bought with discounting.
Crimson’s small winery platform needs enough revenue scale and cost discipline for gross profit to cover fixed operating overhead. This determines whether shareholder value comes from an operating business or remains trapped in low-return assets.
A conservative balance sheet must give Crimson time to manage through a weak wine cycle without distressed financing or forced asset sales. The balance sheet is what lets the company wait for demand normalization; losing that cushion would shift the case from turnaround to impairment risk.
Crimson’s inventory-heavy wine model must convert product back into cash as sell-through normalizes, rather than tying up more capital in aging stock and receivables. Positive earnings are not enough if the wine cycle consumes cash; owners need the operating model to self-fund inventory and brand investment.
All standing thesis claims
Original report summary
Crimson Wine Group is an asset-backed premium-wine turnaround whose value depends on restoring brand demand and operating leverage before weak industry conditions turn into permanent margin and cash-flow impairment.
Bull case and bear case
Bull case and bear case for Crimson Wine Group
Where the evidence on Crimson Wine Group disagrees: Mixed on the latest evidence (Oct 13, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 2 strengthening, 1 holding and 2 weakening.
Bull case: what the evidence supports
The brand and appellation value in Crimson’s wine portfolio must keep supporting price-mix and cost absorption even when volumes are soft.
A conservative balance sheet must give Crimson time to manage through a weak wine cycle without distressed financing or forced asset sales.
Crimson’s inventory-heavy wine model must convert product back into cash as sell-through normalizes, rather than tying up more capital in aging stock and receivables.
Bear case: what the evidence questions
Crimson’s premium-wine brands must regain consumer and trade pull after the FY2025 reset, rather than depend on temporary channel fill or discount-driven volume.
Crimson’s small winery platform needs enough revenue scale and cost discipline for gross profit to cover fixed operating overhead.
Thesis-Break Engine
Thesis-break watch · Crimson Wine Group
Loading the break-condition record for Crimson Wine Group.
MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT
The numbers behind the thesis
What Changed
No assessed change was returned in this research window. That can reflect a quiet period or a coverage limit.
Risks / falsifiers
What could break the thesis
- Premium-wine consumers downtrade to lower-priced wine, spirits, beer, or non-alcoholic alternatives rather than returning to Crimson’s price points.
- Competing premium wineries use aggressive promotions that force Crimson to discount to clear inventory.
- Management keeps winery, hospitality, sales, and corporate overhead sized for a larger revenue base after demand has reset lower.
- Multiple weak vintages, wildfire damage, or facility issues require major cash investment before sales recover.
- Distributor destocking forces finished wine to remain in inventory longer before conversion to cash.
CWGL news
Loading headlines…
Financial statements
CWGL income statement
Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.
CWGL: quick answers
- Have members of Congress traded CWGL?
- 1 trade in CWGL has been disclosed under the STOCK Act by members of Congress, the President or senior officials, none in reports made public in the last 90 days. Every disclosed CWGL trade