Centerspace
CSRNYSEUSD
- Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
- Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
- Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
- $57.17 Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
- $56.14–$56.99 Regular-session low and high so far today.
- 101.8K Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET.
- Feb 16 projected Projected for 2027-02-16 from the company’s own results filings (SEC 8-K Item 2.02). The company has not confirmed the date.
- $52.00–$69.61 52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.
Understand the Business
Why the Stock Moved
Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.
The core investment thesis
Own CSR if Centerspace is a Midwest/Mountain West apartment REIT whose value depends on turning resident retention, selective redevelopment, and portfolio recycling into durable cash-flow growth without overpaying for growth in a higher-rate world.
CSR price history
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Investment thesis
What must happen next
Centerspace’s focus on markets with stable economies, strong employment, and attractive quality of life should keep renter demand and resident retention strong enough to support rent growth rather than forcing concessions.StrengtheningMateriality: High
GAAP annual revenue increased to $273.7 million in FY2025 from $261.0 million in FY2024. If this holds, the existing apartment base can grow cash flow organically; if it breaks, acquisitions and redevelopment cannot overcome weaker pricing power.
Watch: Material job losses or out-migration in Minneapolis/St. Paul, Denver/Boulder/Fort Collins, or Salt Lake City weakens the local demand pool before revenue declines.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual revenue increased to $273.7 million in FY2025 from $261.0 million in FY2024.
Open source ↗Resident-centered operations, value-add redevelopment, technology, and expense controls should convert apartment demand into higher property profitability rather than letting payroll, taxes, insurance, and maintenance absorb the rent growth.StrengtheningMateriality: High
GAAP annual operating income increased to $64.5 million in FY2025 from $20.5 million in FY2024. This is the operating leverage in the model; without it, revenue growth can fail to create distributable cash flow.
Watch: Property tax, insurance, labor, or repair inflation in Centerspace’s markets structurally outpaces achievable rent increases.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual operating income increased to $64.5 million in FY2025 from $20.5 million in FY2024.
Open source ↗Selling non-core assets and buying communities in larger target markets should improve the portfolio’s long-term demand profile, but only if the new assets produce cash flow above their financing and integration costs.HoldingMateriality: Medium
GAAP annual operating cash flow was $98.5 million in FY2025, roughly stable versus $98.2 million in FY2024 despite significant acquisition and disposition activity. Portfolio recycling is the route to faster growth than same-store rent increases alone; poor execution would turn growth into leverage and dilution.
Watch: Railway Flats or Sugarmont lease-up, renewal pricing, or expense performance trails underwriting after acquisition.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual operating cash flow was $98.5 million in FY2025, roughly stable versus $98.2 million in FY2024 despite significant acquisition.
Open source ↗Centerspace’s ability to fund redevelopment and acquisitions depends on preserving balance-sheet flexibility, because a REIT that relies on debt, equity, preferred shares, and OP units loses value if capital becomes too expensive.HoldingMateriality: Medium
Total liabilities were $1.08 billion at FY2025 against $1.93 billion of assets. Flexible funding lets the company buy or improve assets when opportunities arise; a stressed balance sheet would force asset sales, dilution, or slower growth.
Watch: A refinancing wall at higher interest rates raises debt service faster than property cash flow.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Total liabilities were $1.08 billion at FY2025 against $1.93 billion of assets.
Open source ↗Management must translate portfolio growth into per-share value by avoiding dilutive capital allocation; buybacks below intrinsic value help, but overpaying for acquisitions or issuing cheap equity would undo operating gains.HoldingMateriality: Medium
GAAP diluted EPS improved to $1.02 in FY2025 from a GAAP diluted loss of $1.27 in FY2024. REIT investors own per-share cash flow, not just more apartment units; capital allocation determines whether growth accrues to shareholders.
Watch: The company issues common equity through its ATM program below net asset value to fund acquisitions.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP diluted EPS improved to $1.02 in FY2025 from a GAAP diluted loss of $1.27 in FY2024.
Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence
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Original research
Centerspace’s focus on markets with stable economies, strong employment, and attractive quality of life should keep renter demand and resident retention strong enough to support rent growth rather than forcing concessions. If this holds, the existing apartment base can grow cash flow organically; if it breaks, acquisitions and redevelopment cannot overcome weaker pricing power.
Resident-centered operations, value-add redevelopment, technology, and expense controls should convert apartment demand into higher property profitability rather than letting payroll, taxes, insurance, and maintenance absorb the rent growth. This is the operating leverage in the model; without it, revenue growth can fail to create distributable cash flow.
Selling non-core assets and buying communities in larger target markets should improve the portfolio’s long-term demand profile, but only if the new assets produce cash flow above their financing and integration costs. Portfolio recycling is the route to faster growth than same-store rent increases alone; poor execution would turn growth into leverage and dilution.
Centerspace’s ability to fund redevelopment and acquisitions depends on preserving balance-sheet flexibility, because a REIT that relies on debt, equity, preferred shares, and OP units loses value if capital becomes too expensive. Flexible funding lets the company buy or improve assets when opportunities arise; a stressed balance sheet would force asset sales, dilution, or slower growth.
Management must translate portfolio growth into per-share value by avoiding dilutive capital allocation; buybacks below intrinsic value help, but overpaying for acquisitions or issuing cheap equity would undo operating gains. REIT investors own per-share cash flow, not just more apartment units; capital allocation determines whether growth accrues to shareholders.
All standing thesis claims
Original report summary
Centerspace is a Midwest/Mountain West apartment REIT whose value depends on turning resident retention, selective redevelopment, and portfolio recycling into durable cash-flow growth without overpaying for growth in a higher-rate world.
Bull case and bear case
Bull case and bear case for Centerspace
Where the evidence on Centerspace stands: Holding on the latest evidence (Oct 12, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 2 strengthening and 3 holding.
Bull case: what the evidence supports
Centerspace’s focus on markets with stable economies, strong employment, and attractive quality of life should keep renter demand and resident retention strong enough to support rent growth rather than forcing concessions.
Resident-centered operations, value-add redevelopment, technology, and expense controls should convert apartment demand into higher property profitability rather than letting payroll, taxes, insurance, and maintenance absorb the rent growth.
Selling non-core assets and buying communities in larger target markets should improve the portfolio’s long-term demand profile, but only if the new assets produce cash flow above their financing and integration costs.
Centerspace’s ability to fund redevelopment and acquisitions depends on preserving balance-sheet flexibility, because a REIT that relies on debt, equity, preferred shares, and OP units loses value if capital becomes too expensive.
Management must translate portfolio growth into per-share value by avoiding dilutive capital allocation; buybacks below intrinsic value help, but overpaying for acquisitions or issuing cheap equity would undo operating gains.
Bear case: what would count against it
Material job losses or out-migration in Minneapolis/St. Paul, Denver/Boulder/Fort Collins, or Salt Lake City weakens the local demand pool before revenue declines.
Property tax, insurance, labor, or repair inflation in Centerspace’s markets structurally outpaces achievable rent increases.
Railway Flats or Sugarmont lease-up, renewal pricing, or expense performance trails underwriting after acquisition.
Thesis-Break Engine
Thesis-break watch · Centerspace
No break has crossed Centerspace’s thesis. Its break conditions are checked against every new filing as it lands.
MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT
The numbers behind the thesis
What Changed
- MixedEntered a material definitive agreement.
Centerspace filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-09-23: Entered a material definitive agreement. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedEntered a material definitive agreement.
Centerspace filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-09-09: Entered a material definitive agreement. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedOther material event.
Centerspace filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-08-26: Other material event. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
Risks / falsifiers
What could break the thesis
- Material job losses or out-migration in Minneapolis/St. Paul, Denver/Boulder/Fort Collins, or Salt Lake City weakens the local demand pool before revenue declines.
- Property tax, insurance, labor, or repair inflation in Centerspace’s markets structurally outpaces achievable rent increases.
- Railway Flats or Sugarmont lease-up, renewal pricing, or expense performance trails underwriting after acquisition.
- A refinancing wall at higher interest rates raises debt service faster than property cash flow.
- The company issues common equity through its ATM program below net asset value to fund acquisitions.
CSR news
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Financial statements
CSR income statement
Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.
CSR: quick answers
- When does Centerspace (CSR) report earnings next?
- Centerspace's next results are projected for February 16, 2027, from the dates of its own results filings with the SEC. The company has not confirmed the date. It last reported on November 2, 2026. Earnings calendar
- What is CSR's short interest?
- As of October 30, 2026, 803,600 CSR shares were sold short, 4.78% of its shares outstanding, down 32.3% from the count before. At the stock's average daily volume that is 3.4 days to cover. FINRA publishes the count twice a month. CSR short interest history
- Have members of Congress traded CSR?
- Reports made public in the last 90 days disclose 2 trades in CSR by 1 filer: 0 purchases and 2 sales. They are filed under the STOCK Act by members of Congress, the President and senior officials. Every disclosed CSR trade
