Colliers International Group
CIGINASDAQUSD
- Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
- Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
- Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
- $92.20 Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
- $90.61–$92.37 Regular-session low and high so far today.
- 107.3K Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET.
- Not yet confirmed The company has not confirmed its next report date. Reported quarters are available in the chart’s Earnings view.
- $83.21–$153.87 52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.
Understand the Business
Why the Stock Moved
Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.
The core investment thesis
Own CIGI if its global real-estate services platform keeps shifting toward recurring, higher-value client mandates and converts acquisition-led scale into cash and per-share earnings despite commercial real-estate cyclicality.
CIGI price history
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Investment thesis
What must happen next
Large real-estate owners, occupiers, and investors will keep consolidating specialized advisory, outsourcing, leasing, capital-markets, and project work with global platforms like Colliers rather than relying only on local brokers or internal teams.StrengtheningMateriality: High
GAAP annual revenue increased from $4.34 billion in FY2023 to $4.82 billion in FY2024 and $5.56 billion in FY2025. If this holds, Colliers has a demand engine beyond one-time transactions; if it breaks, revenue growth becomes more cyclical and easier for competitors to take.
Watch: CBRE, JLL, or Cushman & Wakefield win a disproportionate share of global occupier outsourcing and investor advisory mandates from Colliers’ target clients.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual revenue increased from $4.34 billion in FY2023 to $4.82 billion in FY2024 and $5.56 billion in FY2025.
Open source ↗Colliers’ mix shift toward recurring and higher-value professional services must produce operating leverage; otherwise growth is being bought with compensation, integration, or lower-margin work.HoldingMateriality: High
GAAP annual operating income was positive in FY2022, FY2023, FY2024, and FY2025 after a GAAP operating loss in FY2021. Revenue growth without margin resilience does not create much owner value, especially in a people-heavy services business.
Watch: CBRE, JLL, Cushman & Wakefield, or private boutiques bid up compensation for top brokers, engineers, and investment-management teams, limiting operating leverage.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual operating income was positive in FY2022, FY2023, FY2024, and FY2025 after a GAAP operating loss in FY2021.
Open source ↗The professional-services model should remain cash-generative because Colliers sells expertise and relationships more than capital-intensive assets.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium
GAAP annual operating cash flow improved from $67.0 million in FY2022 to $165.7 million in FY2023 and $326.0 million in FY2024. Cash conversion funds acquisitions, debt service, and reinvestment; if it weakens, reported earnings and revenue growth become less valuable.
Watch: Clients delay payments or dispute fees, causing receivables and working capital to absorb cash.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual operating cash flow improved from $67.0 million in FY2022 to $165.7 million in FY2023 and $326.0 million in.
Open source ↗Colliers’ acquisition-led expansion must add durable client relationships, talent, and capabilities rather than merely increasing balance-sheet size and integration complexity.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium
Equity increased from $489.7 million at FY2022 year-end to $848.0 million at FY2023 year-end, $1.32 billion at FY2024 year-end, and $1.53 billion at FY2025 year-end. The owner benefits if acquisitions deepen the platform and create cross-selling; the owner loses if acquisitions inflate assets and liabilities without durable earnings.
Watch: Acquired teams depart after earnout periods, taking client relationships with them.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Equity increased from $489.7 million at FY2022 year-end to $848.0 million at FY2023 year-end, $1.32 billion at FY2024 year-end, and.
Open source ↗The roll-up and diversification strategy must translate into per-share earnings power; otherwise Colliers may be building a larger company without building a better stock.HoldingMateriality: Medium
GAAP diluted EPS improved from a loss of $9.09 in FY2021 to positive EPS in FY2022, FY2023, FY2024, and FY2025. Shareholders are paid on per-share compounding, not aggregate revenue, so dilution, financing costs, amortization, or margin leakage can break the investment case.
Watch: Acquisitions are funded or structured in ways that dilute existing shareholders without adding enough earnings power.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP diluted EPS improved from a loss of $9.09 in FY2021 to positive EPS in FY2022, FY2023, FY2024, and FY2025.
Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence
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Original research
Large real-estate owners, occupiers, and investors will keep consolidating specialized advisory, outsourcing, leasing, capital-markets, and project work with global platforms like Colliers rather than relying only on local brokers or internal teams. If this holds, Colliers has a demand engine beyond one-time transactions; if it breaks, revenue growth becomes more cyclical and easier for competitors to take.
Colliers’ mix shift toward recurring and higher-value professional services must produce operating leverage; otherwise growth is being bought with compensation, integration, or lower-margin work. Revenue growth without margin resilience does not create much owner value, especially in a people-heavy services business.
The professional-services model should remain cash-generative because Colliers sells expertise and relationships more than capital-intensive assets. Cash conversion funds acquisitions, debt service, and reinvestment; if it weakens, reported earnings and revenue growth become less valuable.
Colliers’ acquisition-led expansion must add durable client relationships, talent, and capabilities rather than merely increasing balance-sheet size and integration complexity. The owner benefits if acquisitions deepen the platform and create cross-selling; the owner loses if acquisitions inflate assets and liabilities without durable earnings.
The roll-up and diversification strategy must translate into per-share earnings power; otherwise Colliers may be building a larger company without building a better stock. Shareholders are paid on per-share compounding, not aggregate revenue, so dilution, financing costs, amortization, or margin leakage can break the investment case.
All standing thesis claims
Original report summary
its global real-estate services platform keeps shifting toward recurring, higher-value client mandates and converts acquisition-led scale into cash and per-share earnings despite commercial real-estate cyclicality.
Bull case and bear case
Bull case and bear case for Colliers International Group
Where the evidence on Colliers International Group stands: Holding on the latest evidence (Nov 8, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 3 strengthening and 2 holding.
Bull case: what the evidence supports
Large real-estate owners, occupiers, and investors will keep consolidating specialized advisory, outsourcing, leasing, capital-markets, and project work with global platforms like Colliers rather than relying only on local brokers or internal teams.
Colliers’ mix shift toward recurring and higher-value professional services must produce operating leverage; otherwise growth is being bought with compensation, integration, or lower-margin work.
The professional-services model should remain cash-generative because Colliers sells expertise and relationships more than capital-intensive assets.
Colliers’ acquisition-led expansion must add durable client relationships, talent, and capabilities rather than merely increasing balance-sheet size and integration complexity.
The roll-up and diversification strategy must translate into per-share earnings power; otherwise Colliers may be building a larger company without building a better stock.
Bear case: what would count against it
CBRE, JLL, or Cushman & Wakefield win a disproportionate share of global occupier outsourcing and investor advisory mandates from Colliers’ target clients.
CBRE, JLL, Cushman & Wakefield, or private boutiques bid up compensation for top brokers, engineers, and investment-management teams, limiting operating leverage.
Clients delay payments or dispute fees, causing receivables and working capital to absorb cash.
Thesis-Break Engine
Thesis-break watch · Colliers International Group
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MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT
The numbers behind the thesis
What Changed
- MixedForeign issuer material report (6-K).
Colliers International Group filed an SEC report on 2026-11-04: Foreign issuer material report (6-K). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedForeign issuer material report (6-K).
Colliers International Group filed an SEC report on 2026-08-05: Foreign issuer material report (6-K). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedForeign issuer material report (6-K).
Colliers International Group filed an SEC report on 2026-07-30: Foreign issuer material report (6-K). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
Risks / falsifiers
What could break the thesis
- CBRE, JLL, or Cushman & Wakefield win a disproportionate share of global occupier outsourcing and investor advisory mandates from Colliers’ target clients.
- CBRE, JLL, Cushman & Wakefield, or private boutiques bid up compensation for top brokers, engineers, and investment-management teams, limiting operating leverage.
- Clients delay payments or dispute fees, causing receivables and working capital to absorb cash.
- Acquired teams depart after earnout periods, taking client relationships with them.
- Acquisitions are funded or structured in ways that dilute existing shareholders without adding enough earnings power.
CIGI news
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Financial statements
CIGI income statement
Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.
CIGI: quick answers
- Which well-known investors own CIGI?
- 1 of the 37 well-known funds tracked here reported CIGI shares in their latest 13F filing. By share of the fund's portfolio: Fairfax Financial (Prem Watsa), 0.1%. Fund portfolios
CIGI in well-known investors’ portfolios
1 of 37 funds reported CIGI shares in their latest 13F filing. A 13F shows quarter-end positions and arrives up to 45 days later.
| Fund | Of its portfolio | Value | Change | Quarter |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Prem WatsaFairfax Financial | 0.09% | $2.3M | No change | Q2 2026 |
