Casey's General Stores
CASYNASDAQUSD
- Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
- Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
- Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
- $698.48 Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
- $683.77–$716.67 Regular-session low and high so far today.
- 508.3K Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET.
- Not yet confirmed The company has not confirmed its next report date. Reported quarters are available in the chart’s Earnings view.
- $529.84–$927.85 52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.
Understand the Business
Why the Stock Moved
Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.
The core investment thesis
Own CASY if its dense small-market convenience footprint keeps turning local fuel trips into higher-margin in-store purchases while acquisitions expand the network without diluting returns.
CASY price history
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Investment thesis
What must happen next
Casey’s 19-state convenience-store footprint remains locally relevant enough to keep capturing routine fuel and quick-trip demand, rather than ceding those trips to larger chains or alternative retail formats.StrengtheningMateriality: High
GAAP annual revenue rose from $12.953 billion in FY2022 to $17.561 billion in FY2026. If local trip capture holds, the revenue base can keep growing; if trip relevance fades, the entire food, merchandise and fuel flywheel weakens.
Watch: QuikTrip, Love’s, Pilot/Flying J, Circle K or other larger fuel chains accelerate new-store development in Casey’s core Iowa, Missouri and Illinois markets.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual revenue rose from $12.953 billion in FY2022 to $17.561 billion in FY2026.
Open source ↗Casey’s can keep converting store traffic into higher-value in-store purchases, so earnings are not merely a pass-through function of volatile fuel prices.StrengtheningMateriality: High
GAAP annual net income rose from $339.790 million in FY2022 to $714.448 million in FY2026. This is the margin engine: if customers stop buying profitable in-store items, revenue can grow while owner earnings disappoint.
Watch: QSRs such as McDonald’s, Domino’s or regional pizza chains take prepared-food occasions from Casey’s stores.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual net income rose from $339.790 million in FY2022 to $714.448 million in FY2026.
Open source ↗Casey’s acquisition and expansion playbook, including banners referenced as CEFCO and GoodStop, can add scale without absorbing cash or depressing store-level returns.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium
GAAP annual operating cash flow increased from $788.741 million in FY2022 to $1.378 billion in FY2026. Expansion only creates value if acquired or newly built stores earn Casey-like economics; otherwise growth becomes asset accumulation rather than compounding.
Watch: CEFCO or GoodStop stores fail to adopt Casey’s merchandising, food, labor and supply-chain practices.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual operating cash flow increased from $788.741 million in FY2022 to $1.378 billion in FY2026.
Open source ↗Management’s capital deployment converts store growth and cash generation into per-share value rather than relying on dilution or balance-sheet stretch.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium
GAAP annual diluted EPS increased from $9.10 in FY2022 to $19.16 in FY2026. Owners benefit only if growth shows up per share after financing costs, share issuance and reinvestment needs.
Watch: Large acquisitions require equity issuance or debt at rates that reduce per-share returns.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual diluted EPS increased from $9.10 in FY2022 to $19.16 in FY2026.
Open source ↗Casey’s balance sheet and liquidity remain adequate to support opportunistic expansion through cycles without forcing defensive capital allocation.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium
Cash and cash equivalents increased from $158.878 million at FY2022 year-end to $522.991 million at FY2026 year-end. A strong balance sheet lets Casey’s buy or build stores when competitors are constrained; a weak one would turn expansion into risk management.
Watch: A debt-funded acquisition wave materially increases fixed charges before acquired stores contribute cash.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Cash and cash equivalents increased from $158.878 million at FY2022 year-end to $522.991 million at FY2026 year-end.
Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence
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Original research
Casey’s 19-state convenience-store footprint remains locally relevant enough to keep capturing routine fuel and quick-trip demand, rather than ceding those trips to larger chains or alternative retail formats. If local trip capture holds, the revenue base can keep growing; if trip relevance fades, the entire food, merchandise and fuel flywheel weakens.
Casey’s can keep converting store traffic into higher-value in-store purchases, so earnings are not merely a pass-through function of volatile fuel prices. This is the margin engine: if customers stop buying profitable in-store items, revenue can grow while owner earnings disappoint.
Casey’s acquisition and expansion playbook, including banners referenced as CEFCO and GoodStop, can add scale without absorbing cash or depressing store-level returns. Expansion only creates value if acquired or newly built stores earn Casey-like economics; otherwise growth becomes asset accumulation rather than compounding.
Management’s capital deployment converts store growth and cash generation into per-share value rather than relying on dilution or balance-sheet stretch. Owners benefit only if growth shows up per share after financing costs, share issuance and reinvestment needs.
Casey’s balance sheet and liquidity remain adequate to support opportunistic expansion through cycles without forcing defensive capital allocation. A strong balance sheet lets Casey’s buy or build stores when competitors are constrained; a weak one would turn expansion into risk management.
All standing thesis claims
Original report summary
its dense small-market convenience footprint keeps turning local fuel trips into higher-margin in-store purchases while acquisitions expand the network without diluting returns.
Bull case and bear case
Bull case and bear case for Caseys General Stores
Where the evidence on Caseys General Stores stands: Strengthening on the latest evidence (Oct 21, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 5 strengthening.
Bull case: what the evidence supports
Casey’s 19-state convenience-store footprint remains locally relevant enough to keep capturing routine fuel and quick-trip demand, rather than ceding those trips to larger chains or alternative retail formats.
Casey’s can keep converting store traffic into higher-value in-store purchases, so earnings are not merely a pass-through function of volatile fuel prices.
Casey’s acquisition and expansion playbook, including banners referenced as CEFCO and GoodStop, can add scale without absorbing cash or depressing store-level returns.
Management’s capital deployment converts store growth and cash generation into per-share value rather than relying on dilution or balance-sheet stretch.
Casey’s balance sheet and liquidity remain adequate to support opportunistic expansion through cycles without forcing defensive capital allocation.
Bear case: what would count against it
QuikTrip, Love’s, Pilot/Flying J, Circle K or other larger fuel chains accelerate new-store development in Casey’s core Iowa, Missouri and Illinois markets.
QSRs such as McDonald’s, Domino’s or regional pizza chains take prepared-food occasions from Casey’s stores.
CEFCO or GoodStop stores fail to adopt Casey’s merchandising, food, labor and supply-chain practices.
Company research
Research on Caseys General Stores
- Reporting · Casey's Earnings Jump Was Fueled More by Gas Margins Than Pizza
Fuel generated 62.3% of the combined increase in inside-store and fuel gross profit. The next test is whether food and traffic can carry more of the growth.
Thesis-Break Engine
Thesis-break watch · Caseys General Stores
Loading the break-condition record for Caseys General Stores.
MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT
The numbers behind the thesis
What Changed
- MixedReported results of operations (earnings release).
Caseys General Stores filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-09-08: Reported results of operations (earnings release). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedRegulation FD disclosure.
Caseys General Stores filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-06-24: Regulation FD disclosure. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedReported results of operations (earnings release).
Caseys General Stores filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-06-09: Reported results of operations (earnings release). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
Risks / falsifiers
What could break the thesis
- QuikTrip, Love’s, Pilot/Flying J, Circle K or other larger fuel chains accelerate new-store development in Casey’s core Iowa, Missouri and Illinois markets.
- QSRs such as McDonald’s, Domino’s or regional pizza chains take prepared-food occasions from Casey’s stores.
- CEFCO or GoodStop stores fail to adopt Casey’s merchandising, food, labor and supply-chain practices.
- Large acquisitions require equity issuance or debt at rates that reduce per-share returns.
- A debt-funded acquisition wave materially increases fixed charges before acquired stores contribute cash.
CASY news
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Financial statements
CASY income statement
Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.
CASY: quick answers
- Have members of Congress traded CASY?
- 16 trades in CASY have been disclosed under the STOCK Act by members of Congress, the President or senior officials, none in reports made public in the last 90 days. Every disclosed CASY trade
- Which well-known investors own CASY?
- 1 of the 37 well-known funds tracked here reported CASY shares in their latest 13F filing. By share of the fund's portfolio: Bridgewater Associates (Ray Dalio), 0.0%. Fund portfolios
CASY in well-known investors’ portfolios
1 of 37 funds reported CASY shares in their latest 13F filing. A 13F shows quarter-end positions and arrives up to 45 days later.
| Fund | Of its portfolio | Value | Change | Quarter |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ray DalioBridgewater Associates | 0.04% | $9.7M | +191.9% | Q2 2026 |