CarGurus
CARGNASDAQUSD
- Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
- Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
- Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
- $34.59 Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
- $33.65–$34.92 Regular-session low and high so far today.
- 793.0K Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET.
- Not yet confirmed The company has not confirmed its next report date. Reported quarters are available in the chart’s Earnings view.
- $26.39–$41.22 52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.
Understand the Business
Why the Stock Moved
Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.
The core investment thesis
Own CARG if its consumer-to-dealer marketplace remains a high-ROI source of vehicle demand while management keeps the business mix asset-light enough to turn growth into cash.
CARG price history
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Investment thesis
What must happen next
CarGurus’ consumer audience and vehicle-shopping transparency keep dealers paying for access because the platform remains a measurable source of high-intent leads relative to competing ad channels.StrengtheningMateriality: High
GAAP annual revenue increased to $906.98 million in FY2025 from $798.04 million in FY2024 and $698.42 million in FY2023. If dealer ROI holds, revenue can compound without requiring CarGurus to own inventory or subsidize demand; if it breaks, the marketplace loses pricing power.
Watch: Dealers shift budget and inventory listings toward Cars.com, AutoTrader/Cox, Google, Facebook Marketplace, or large dealer-group owned channels because those alternatives deliver cheaper qualified leads.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual revenue increased to $906.98 million in FY2025 from $798.04 million in FY2024 and $698.42 million in FY2023.
Open source ↗The business creates most value when marketplace subscriptions and advertising dominate the mix, because software-like listings and demand generation carry far better unit economics than vehicle transaction or wholesale activity.StrengtheningMateriality: High
GAAP annual gross profit rose to $841.51 million in FY2025 from $727.70 million in FY2024. A durable asset-light mix supports high intrinsic value; a shift back toward low-margin transaction revenue would make headline growth less valuable.
Watch: CarOffer or other transaction/wholesale products again become a large share of revenue at materially lower spreads.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual gross profit rose to $841.51 million in FY2025 from $727.70 million in FY2024.
Open source ↗CarGurus can convert incremental marketplace revenue into profit because its platform costs scale more slowly than dealer subscription and advertising revenue when traffic and dealer retention remain healthy.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium
GAAP annual operating income increased to $244.45 million in FY2025 from $157.15 million in FY2024 and $120.33 million in FY2023. If operating leverage persists, owners get earnings growth faster than revenue growth; if it reverses, the company may need to spend heavily just to defend its position.
Watch: Competition from Cars.com, AutoTrader/Cox, Google, or Facebook Marketplace forces a step-up in sales and marketing spend to preserve dealer demand.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual operating income increased to $244.45 million in FY2025 from $157.15 million in FY2024 and $120.33 million in FY2023.
Open source ↗The marketplace model should keep converting accounting profit into cash because CarGurus does not need large owned-inventory investment to generate dealer and advertising revenue.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium
GAAP annual operating cash flow was $295.28 million in FY2025, above GAAP net income of $155.90 million. Strong cash conversion gives management room to reinvest, repurchase shares, or withstand auto-cycle weakness; weak conversion would signal the model is becoming more working-capital intensive.
Watch: A larger transaction or wholesale business creates working-capital swings, receivables risk, or inventory-like cash needs.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual operating cash flow was $295.28 million in FY2025, above GAAP net income of $155.90 million.
Open source ↗Management must allocate cash carefully because the business is cash generative, but the balance-sheet cushion has declined and could be weakened by aggressive repurchases, acquisitions, or renewed transaction exposure.HoldingMateriality: Medium
Cash and cash equivalents were $190.52 million at December 31, 2025. Disciplined capital allocation can increase per-share value; undisciplined use of cash would reduce resilience before the operating thesis is visibly impaired.
Watch: Management pursues a large acquisition or buyback program that materially reduces liquidity without improving marketplace durability.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Cash and cash equivalents were $190.52 million at December 31, 2025.
Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence
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Original research
CarGurus’ consumer audience and vehicle-shopping transparency keep dealers paying for access because the platform remains a measurable source of high-intent leads relative to competing ad channels. If dealer ROI holds, revenue can compound without requiring CarGurus to own inventory or subsidize demand; if it breaks, the marketplace loses pricing power.
The business creates most value when marketplace subscriptions and advertising dominate the mix, because software-like listings and demand generation carry far better unit economics than vehicle transaction or wholesale activity. A durable asset-light mix supports high intrinsic value; a shift back toward low-margin transaction revenue would make headline growth less valuable.
CarGurus can convert incremental marketplace revenue into profit because its platform costs scale more slowly than dealer subscription and advertising revenue when traffic and dealer retention remain healthy. If operating leverage persists, owners get earnings growth faster than revenue growth; if it reverses, the company may need to spend heavily just to defend its position.
The marketplace model should keep converting accounting profit into cash because CarGurus does not need large owned-inventory investment to generate dealer and advertising revenue. Strong cash conversion gives management room to reinvest, repurchase shares, or withstand auto-cycle weakness; weak conversion would signal the model is becoming more working-capital intensive.
Management must allocate cash carefully because the business is cash generative, but the balance-sheet cushion has declined and could be weakened by aggressive repurchases, acquisitions, or renewed transaction exposure. Disciplined capital allocation can increase per-share value; undisciplined use of cash would reduce resilience before the operating thesis is visibly impaired.
All standing thesis claims
Original report summary
its consumer-to-dealer marketplace remains a high-ROI source of vehicle demand while management keeps the business mix asset-light enough to turn growth into cash.
Bull case and bear case
Bull case and bear case for CarGurus
Where the evidence on CarGurus stands: Holding on the latest evidence (Oct 16, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 4 strengthening and 1 holding.
Bull case: what the evidence supports
CarGurus’ consumer audience and vehicle-shopping transparency keep dealers paying for access because the platform remains a measurable source of high-intent leads relative to competing ad channels.
The business creates most value when marketplace subscriptions and advertising dominate the mix, because software-like listings and demand generation carry far better unit economics than vehicle transaction or wholesale activity.
CarGurus can convert incremental marketplace revenue into profit because its platform costs scale more slowly than dealer subscription and advertising revenue when traffic and dealer retention remain healthy.
The marketplace model should keep converting accounting profit into cash because CarGurus does not need large owned-inventory investment to generate dealer and advertising revenue.
Management must allocate cash carefully because the business is cash generative, but the balance-sheet cushion has declined and could be weakened by aggressive repurchases, acquisitions, or renewed transaction exposure.
Bear case: what would count against it
Dealers shift budget and inventory listings toward Cars.com, AutoTrader/Cox, Google, Facebook Marketplace, or large dealer-group owned channels because those alternatives deliver cheaper qualified leads.
CarOffer or other transaction/wholesale products again become a large share of revenue at materially lower spreads.
Competition from Cars.com, AutoTrader/Cox, Google, or Facebook Marketplace forces a step-up in sales and marketing spend to preserve dealer demand.
Thesis-Break Engine
What has broken in CarGurus’s thesis
Each break OptimistFi flagged on CarGurus, dated — with what has historically followed the same kind of break across the market, not a forecast for CarGurus.
- Insider-selling clustercondition set before this filing
Across all companies, this kind of break has happened 9,137 times before. Those stocks beat comparable companies by a median of 1% over the next six months, and 30% of them trailed it by 10 points or more.
- CEO / officer changecondition set before this filing
Across all companies, this kind of break has happened 16,849 times before. Those stocks trailed comparable companies by a median of 2% over the next six months, and 38% of them trailed it by 10 points or more.
Several kinds of break have stacked on CarGurus at once. A cluster is a stronger read than any one signal alone.
MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT
The numbers behind the thesis
What Changed
- MixedDirector or principal officer change.
CarGurus filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-09-03: Director or principal officer change. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedReported results of operations (earnings release).
CarGurus filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-08-06: Reported results of operations (earnings release). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedReported results of operations (earnings release).
CarGurus filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-05-07: Reported results of operations (earnings release). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
Risks / falsifiers
What could break the thesis
- Dealers shift budget and inventory listings toward Cars.com, AutoTrader/Cox, Google, Facebook Marketplace, or large dealer-group owned channels because those alternatives deliver cheaper qualified leads.
- CarOffer or other transaction/wholesale products again become a large share of revenue at materially lower spreads.
- Competition from Cars.com, AutoTrader/Cox, Google, or Facebook Marketplace forces a step-up in sales and marketing spend to preserve dealer demand.
- A larger transaction or wholesale business creates working-capital swings, receivables risk, or inventory-like cash needs.
- Management pursues a large acquisition or buyback program that materially reduces liquidity without improving marketplace durability.
CARG news
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Financial statements
CARG income statement
Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.
CARG: quick answers
- What is CARG's short interest?
- As of October 30, 2026, 9.4M CARG shares were sold short, 12.4% of its shares outstanding, down 1.3% from the count before. At the stock's average daily volume that is 8.4 days to cover. FINRA publishes the count twice a month. CARG short interest history
- Have members of Congress traded CARG?
- Reports made public in the last 90 days disclose 1 trade in CARG by 1 filer: 0 purchases and 1 sale. They are filed under the STOCK Act by members of Congress, the President and senior officials. Every disclosed CARG trade
- Which well-known investors own CARG?
- 1 of the 37 well-known funds tracked here reported CARG shares in their latest 13F filing. By share of the fund's portfolio: Bridgewater Associates (Ray Dalio), 0.0%. Fund portfolios
CARG in well-known investors’ portfolios
1 of 37 funds reported CARG shares in their latest 13F filing. A 13F shows quarter-end positions and arrives up to 45 days later.
| Fund | Of its portfolio | Value | Change | Quarter |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ray DalioBridgewater Associates | 0.00% | $536K | −71.8% | Q2 2026 |
