Credit Acceptance

CACCNASDAQUSD

THESIS ALERT

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$513.78
−$1.60 (−0.31%)Today 1M −5.88%
After hours$513.780.00%

Updated Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET · Regular session · May be delayed

Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
$515.38
Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
$506.98–$516.48
Regular-session low and high so far today.
59.8K
Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET.
Jan 28 projected
Projected for 2027-01-28 from the company’s own results filings (SEC 8-K Item 2.02). The company has not confirmed the date.
$405.00–$668.86
52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.

Understand the Business

Why the Stock Moved

Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.

The core investment thesis

Own CACC if Credit Acceptance is a high-cash-flow subprime auto finance franchise whose value depends on whether its dealer-risk-sharing and collections model can keep pricing credit risk better than competitors, regulators, and the credit cycle can erode.

CACC price history

Latest price$513.78Today−$1.60 (-0.31%)
CACC -6.91%S&P 500 -2.42%Since first plotted close
4 hours

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Investment thesis

What must happen next

5 MATERIAL PROPOSITIONS
  • Dealers continue choosing Credit Acceptance because its programs let them finance credit-impaired buyers that conventional lenders often reject, keeping the dealer channel productive.StrengtheningMateriality: High

    GAAP annual revenue increased to $2.317 billion in FY2025 from $2.162 billion in FY2024 and $1.902 billion in FY2023. If the dealer value proposition holds, originations can keep feeding revenue; if dealers defect, the franchise loses its distribution engine.

    Watch: Dealers shift subprime originations to Westlake Financial, Santander Consumer, Exeter Finance, Capital One Auto Finance, or local credit unions because they offer faster approvals, higher advances, or better dealer economics.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    GAAP annual revenue increased to $2.317 billion in FY2025 from $2.162 billion in FY2024 and $1.902 billion in FY2023.

    Open source ↗
  • The underwriting and collections model must keep setting dealer advances and expected collections conservatively enough that subprime credit volatility does not permanently impair profitability.HoldingMateriality: High

    GAAP annual net income recovered to $423.9 million in FY2025 from $247.9 million in FY2024. This is the core spread engine: if expected collections are wrong, reported revenue growth can mask poor vintage economics.

    Watch: Rising unemployment among subprime borrowers causes post-2022 and post-2023 loan vintages to underperform original collection forecasts.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    GAAP annual net income recovered to $423.9 million in FY2025 from $247.9 million in FY2024.

    Open source ↗
  • Seasoned receivable pools and servicing capability continue producing cash collections that exceed accounting earnings and support the model through credit cycles.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium

    GAAP annual operating cash flow was $1.055 billion in FY2025, well above FY2025 GAAP net income of $423.9 million. For a finance company, durable owner value depends on cash collections, not just booked yield or accounting estimates.

    Watch: Securitization or warehouse performance triggers trap cash that would otherwise be available to the parent company.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    GAAP annual operating cash flow was $1.055 billion in FY2025, well above FY2025 GAAP net income of $423.9 million.

    Open source ↗
  • The franchise remains dependent on reliable external funding, so access to securitization, warehouse, and debt markets must stay open enough to finance receivables without forcing a pullback.HoldingMateriality: Medium

    GAAP liabilities were $7.108 billion at FY2025 year-end versus GAAP equity of $1.524 billion, showing the model is materially levered. Even a good underwriting model cannot compound if funding markets close or debt costs consume the spread.

    Watch: ABS investors demand sharply wider spreads or tighter structures for subprime auto collateral.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    GAAP liabilities were $7.108 billion at FY2025 year-end versus GAAP equity of $1.524 billion, showing the model is materially levered.

    Open source ↗
  • Per-share value creation depends on management converting volatile finance-company earnings into durable diluted EPS rather than using leverage to amplify only cyclical rebounds.HoldingMateriality: Medium

    GAAP diluted EPS recovered to $36.38 in FY2025 from $19.88 in FY2024. Owners ultimately receive per-share economics; if EPS is driven by temporary credit-cycle relief or excessive leverage, the apparent recovery is lower quality.

    Watch: Credit losses or funding costs rise enough that EPS recovery reverses even while receivables remain large.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    GAAP diluted EPS recovered to $36.38 in FY2025 from $19.88 in FY2024.

    Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence

Loading the original research archive…

Original research

Dealers continue choosing Credit Acceptance because its programs let them finance credit-impaired buyers that conventional lenders often reject, keeping the dealer channel productive. If the dealer value proposition holds, originations can keep feeding revenue; if dealers defect, the franchise loses its distribution engine.

The underwriting and collections model must keep setting dealer advances and expected collections conservatively enough that subprime credit volatility does not permanently impair profitability. This is the core spread engine: if expected collections are wrong, reported revenue growth can mask poor vintage economics.

Seasoned receivable pools and servicing capability continue producing cash collections that exceed accounting earnings and support the model through credit cycles. For a finance company, durable owner value depends on cash collections, not just booked yield or accounting estimates.

The franchise remains dependent on reliable external funding, so access to securitization, warehouse, and debt markets must stay open enough to finance receivables without forcing a pullback. Even a good underwriting model cannot compound if funding markets close or debt costs consume the spread.

Per-share value creation depends on management converting volatile finance-company earnings into durable diluted EPS rather than using leverage to amplify only cyclical rebounds. Owners ultimately receive per-share economics; if EPS is driven by temporary credit-cycle relief or excessive leverage, the apparent recovery is lower quality.

All standing thesis claims
Original report summary

Credit Acceptance is a high-cash-flow subprime auto finance franchise whose value depends on whether its dealer-risk-sharing and collections model can keep pricing credit risk better than competitors, regulators, and the credit cycle can erode.

Evidence assessed Oct 15, 2026. Expand each conclusion for its evidence and what would change it. Thesis evidence—not a buy or sell recommendation.

Bull case and bear case

Bull case and bear case for Credit Acceptance

Where the evidence on Credit Acceptance stands: Holding on the latest evidence (Oct 15, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 2 strengthening and 3 holding.

Bull case: what the evidence supports

  • Dealers continue choosing Credit Acceptance because its programs let them finance credit-impaired buyers that conventional lenders often reject, keeping the dealer channel productive.

    sec.gov ↗

  • The underwriting and collections model must keep setting dealer advances and expected collections conservatively enough that subprime credit volatility does not permanently impair profitability.

    sec.gov ↗

  • Seasoned receivable pools and servicing capability continue producing cash collections that exceed accounting earnings and support the model through credit cycles.

    sec.gov ↗

  • The franchise remains dependent on reliable external funding, so access to securitization, warehouse, and debt markets must stay open enough to finance receivables without forcing a pullback.

    sec.gov ↗

  • Per-share value creation depends on management converting volatile finance-company earnings into durable diluted EPS rather than using leverage to amplify only cyclical rebounds.

    sec.gov ↗

Bear case: what would count against it

  • Dealers shift subprime originations to Westlake Financial, Santander Consumer, Exeter Finance, Capital One Auto Finance, or local credit unions because they offer faster approvals, higher advances, or better dealer economics.

    sec.gov ↗

  • Rising unemployment among subprime borrowers causes post-2022 and post-2023 loan vintages to underperform original collection forecasts.

    sec.gov ↗

  • Securitization or warehouse performance triggers trap cash that would otherwise be available to the parent company.

    sec.gov ↗

Thesis-Break Engine

Thesis-break watch · Credit Acceptance

Loading the break-condition record for Credit Acceptance.

How the Thesis-Break Engine works →Historical outcomes are measured against the market after past breaks of the same kind, across all companies. Not a prediction.

MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT

The numbers behind the thesis

Sourced from filings and market data

What Changed

  1. Mixed
    Entered a material definitive agreement.

    Credit Acceptance filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-09-21: Entered a material definitive agreement. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.

  2. Mixed
    Entered a material definitive agreement.

    Credit Acceptance filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-09-18: Entered a material definitive agreement. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.

  3. Mixed
    Director or principal officer change.

    Credit Acceptance filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-09-04: Director or principal officer change. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.

Risks / falsifiers

What could break the thesis

  • Dealers shift subprime originations to Westlake Financial, Santander Consumer, Exeter Finance, Capital One Auto Finance, or local credit unions because they offer faster approvals, higher advances, or better dealer economics.
  • Rising unemployment among subprime borrowers causes post-2022 and post-2023 loan vintages to underperform original collection forecasts.
  • Securitization or warehouse performance triggers trap cash that would otherwise be available to the parent company.
  • ABS investors demand sharply wider spreads or tighter structures for subprime auto collateral.
  • Credit losses or funding costs rise enough that EPS recovery reverses even while receivables remain large.

CACC news

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Financial statements

CACC income statement

Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.

CACC: quick answers

When does Credit Acceptance (CACC) report earnings next?
Credit Acceptance's next results are projected for January 28, 2027, from the dates of its own results filings with the SEC. The company has not confirmed the date. It last reported on October 29, 2026. Earnings calendar
What is CACC's short interest?
As of October 30, 2026, 992,876 CACC shares were sold short, 9.79% of its shares outstanding, down 1.7% from the count before. At the stock's average daily volume that is 9.8 days to cover. FINRA publishes the count twice a month. CACC short interest history
Have members of Congress traded CACC?
24 trades in CACC have been disclosed under the STOCK Act by members of Congress, the President or senior officials, none in reports made public in the last 90 days. Every disclosed CACC trade
Which well-known investors own CACC?
1 of the 37 well-known funds tracked here reported CACC shares in their latest 13F filing. By share of the fund's portfolio: Bridgewater Associates (Ray Dalio), 0.0%. Fund portfolios

CACC in well-known investors’ portfolios

1 of 37 funds reported CACC shares in their latest 13F filing. A 13F shows quarter-end positions and arrives up to 45 days later.

FundOf its portfolioValueChangeQuarter
Ray DalioBridgewater Associates0.01%$3.4M—Q2 2026

Every fund’s portfolio

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