Cable One

CABONYSEUSD

THESIS ALERT

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$3.66
−$0.09 (−2.40%)Today 1M −66.34%
After hours$3.660.00%

Updated Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET · Regular session · May be delayed

Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
$3.75
Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
$3.52–$4.04
Regular-session low and high so far today.
343.0K
Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET.
Not yet confirmed
The company has not confirmed its next report date. Reported quarters are available in the chart’s Earnings view.
$3.52–$138.00
52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.

Understand the Business

Why the Stock Moved

Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.

The core investment thesis

Own CABO if broadband competition stops turning that franchise into a shrinking, leveraged asset base.

CABO price history

Latest price$3.66Today−$0.09 (-2.40%)
CABO -66.39%S&P 500 -2.42%Since first plotted close
4 hours

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Investment thesis

What must happen next

5 MATERIAL PROPOSITIONS
  • Cable One’s local broadband networks must remain the preferred high-speed option in its markets, so competitive pressure does not keep converting essential connectivity demand into shrinking company revenue.WeakeningMateriality: High

    Cable One is described as a broadband communications provider delivering service that keeps customers connected. If this holds, Cable One can remain a durable cash-flow compounder; if it fails, the business becomes a declining infrastructure asset.

    Watch: T-Mobile or Verizon fixed-wireless access takes meaningful share in Cable One markets by offering simpler pricing or bundled mobile discounts.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    Cable One is described as a broadband communications provider delivering service that keeps customers connected.

    Open source ↗
  • The subscription broadband model must keep converting network scale into cash even while GAAP earnings are volatile, because cash generation is the real funding source for upgrades, debt service, and shareholder value.HoldingMateriality: High

    FY2025 annual GAAP operating cash flow was $563.326 million despite a GAAP net loss. If cash conversion holds, the company has time to repair growth; if it weakens, leverage and reinvestment needs become the central risk.

    Watch: Fiber competition forces Cable One to accelerate network upgrades beyond internally funded levels.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    FY2025 annual GAAP operating cash flow was $563.326 million despite a GAAP net loss.

    Open source ↗
  • Cable One must be able to restore positive GAAP operating profitability because its network pricing power and cost discipline, not accounting adjustments alone, determine whether the franchise still has economic moat.WeakeningMateriality: Medium

    FY2022 annual GAAP operating income was $538.989 million and FY2023 was $526.903 million, showing the model has historically produced strong operating profit. A return to positive operating income would support the idea that FY2025 weakness is repairable; continued losses would imply structural deterioration.

    Watch: Fiber entrants force permanent price concessions in Cable One’s broadband plans.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    FY2022 annual GAAP operating income was $538.989 million and FY2023 was $526.903 million, showing the model has historically produced strong.

    Open source ↗
  • Management must keep using cash generation to reduce balance-sheet risk rather than relying on financial engineering, because a shrinking broadband revenue base cannot support rising leverage indefinitely.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium

    Total liabilities declined from $5.149 billion at FY2022 year-end to $4.155 billion at FY2025 year-end. Successful deleveraging preserves equity value through a difficult operating cycle; failed deleveraging shifts value to creditors and raises dilution risk.

    Watch: Refinancing markets require materially higher interest costs before the company can stabilize revenue.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    Total liabilities declined from $5.149 billion at FY2022 year-end to $4.155 billion at FY2025 year-end.

    Open source ↗
  • Cable One’s network and acquired asset base must still be economically productive; otherwise impairments and weak returns will show that past expansion was capitalized at values the current competitive market cannot support.HoldingMateriality: Medium

    Cable One still reported $5.588 billion of total assets at FY2025 year-end. If assets remain productive, equity can recover as earnings normalize; if not, book value and future cash flows may keep resetting lower.

    Watch: Additional goodwill, franchise-right, or network impairments indicate acquired systems cannot earn their carrying values.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    Cable One still reported $5.588 billion of total assets at FY2025 year-end.

    Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence

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Original research

Cable One’s local broadband networks must remain the preferred high-speed option in its markets, so competitive pressure does not keep converting essential connectivity demand into shrinking company revenue. If this holds, Cable One can remain a durable cash-flow compounder; if it fails, the business becomes a declining infrastructure asset.

The subscription broadband model must keep converting network scale into cash even while GAAP earnings are volatile, because cash generation is the real funding source for upgrades, debt service, and shareholder value. If cash conversion holds, the company has time to repair growth; if it weakens, leverage and reinvestment needs become the central risk.

Cable One must be able to restore positive GAAP operating profitability because its network pricing power and cost discipline, not accounting adjustments alone, determine whether the franchise still has economic moat. A return to positive operating income would support the idea that FY2025 weakness is repairable; continued losses would imply structural deterioration.

Management must keep using cash generation to reduce balance-sheet risk rather than relying on financial engineering, because a shrinking broadband revenue base cannot support rising leverage indefinitely. Successful deleveraging preserves equity value through a difficult operating cycle; failed deleveraging shifts value to creditors and raises dilution risk.

Cable One’s network and acquired asset base must still be economically productive; otherwise impairments and weak returns will show that past expansion was capitalized at values the current competitive market cannot support. If assets remain productive, equity can recover as earnings normalize; if not, book value and future cash flows may keep resetting lower.

All standing thesis claims
Original report summary

broadband competition stops turning that franchise into a shrinking, leveraged asset base.

Evidence assessed Oct 15, 2026. Expand each conclusion for its evidence and what would change it. Thesis evidence—not a buy or sell recommendation.

Bull case and bear case

Bull case and bear case for Cable One

Where the evidence on Cable One disagrees: Mixed on the latest evidence (Oct 15, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 1 strengthening, 2 holding and 2 weakening.

Bull case: what the evidence supports

  • The subscription broadband model must keep converting network scale into cash even while GAAP earnings are volatile, because cash generation is the real funding source for upgrades, debt service, and shareholder value.

    sec.gov ↗

  • Management must keep using cash generation to reduce balance-sheet risk rather than relying on financial engineering, because a shrinking broadband revenue base cannot support rising leverage indefinitely.

    sec.gov ↗

  • Cable One’s network and acquired asset base must still be economically productive; otherwise impairments and weak returns will show that past expansion was capitalized at values the current competitive market cannot support.

    sec.gov ↗

Bear case: what the evidence questions

  • Cable One’s local broadband networks must remain the preferred high-speed option in its markets, so competitive pressure does not keep converting essential connectivity demand into shrinking company revenue.

    sec.gov ↗

  • Cable One must be able to restore positive GAAP operating profitability because its network pricing power and cost discipline, not accounting adjustments alone, determine whether the franchise still has economic moat.

    sec.gov ↗

Thesis-Break Engine

Thesis-break watch · Cable One

Loading the break-condition record for Cable One.

How the Thesis-Break Engine works →Historical outcomes are measured against the market after past breaks of the same kind, across all companies. Not a prediction.

MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT

The numbers behind the thesis

Sourced from filings and market data

What Changed

  1. Mixed
    Entered a material definitive agreement.

    Cable One filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-10-02: Entered a material definitive agreement. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.

  2. Mixed
    Created a direct financial obligation.

    Cable One filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-09-22: Created a direct financial obligation. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.

  3. Mixed
    Director or principal officer change.

    Cable One filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-08-14: Director or principal officer change. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.

Risks / falsifiers

What could break the thesis

  • T-Mobile or Verizon fixed-wireless access takes meaningful share in Cable One markets by offering simpler pricing or bundled mobile discounts.
  • Fiber competition forces Cable One to accelerate network upgrades beyond internally funded levels.
  • Fiber entrants force permanent price concessions in Cable One’s broadband plans.
  • Refinancing markets require materially higher interest costs before the company can stabilize revenue.
  • Additional goodwill, franchise-right, or network impairments indicate acquired systems cannot earn their carrying values.

CABO news

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Financial statements

CABO income statement

Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.

CABO: quick answers

What is CABO's short interest?
As of October 30, 2026, 1.9M CABO shares were sold short, 33.0% of its shares outstanding, up 17.4% from the count before. At the stock's average daily volume that is 2.4 days to cover. FINRA publishes the count twice a month. CABO short interest history
Have members of Congress traded CABO?
4 trades in CABO have been disclosed under the STOCK Act by members of Congress, the President or senior officials, none in reports made public in the last 90 days. Every disclosed CABO trade
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