Beyond Meat
BYNDNASDAQUSD
- Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
- Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
- Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
- $5.65 Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
- $5.51–$5.99 Regular-session low and high so far today.
- 917.4K Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET.
- Not yet confirmed The company has not confirmed its next report date. Reported quarters are available in the chart’s Earnings view.
- $5.51–$44.40 52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.
Understand the Business
Why the Stock Moved
Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.
The core investment thesis
Own BYND if the brand can re-earn consumer demand and shelf space while fixing unit economics before liquidity and dilution overwhelm owners.
BYND price history
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Investment thesis
What must happen next
Beyond’s brand and product set must regain enough consumer repeat purchase to keep retail and foodservice partners from shrinking distribution further.WeakeningMateriality: High
GAAP annual revenue was still $275.5 million in FY2025, showing the brand has not disappeared from the market. If demand stabilizes, the company has a base to rebuild margins; if partners cut space, the turnaround loses its revenue foundation.
Watch: Major grocery retailers reduce Beyond Meat shelf space because category velocity and repeat purchase remain weak.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual revenue was still $275.5 million in FY2025, showing the brand has not disappeared from the market.
Open source ↗The product economics must shift from discounting and underabsorbed production costs to a price-cost equation that supports positive gross profit on the current sales base.HoldingMateriality: High
GAAP annual gross profit improved from negative $82.7 million in FY2023 to positive $41.7 million in FY2024 and positive $7.6 million in FY2025. Revenue that cannot carry gross profit is not valuable growth; this determines whether scale can ever translate into operating leverage.
Watch: Conventional meat prices stay low enough that Beyond must discount to maintain velocity.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual gross profit improved from negative $82.7 million in FY2023 to positive $41.7 million in FY2024 and positive $7.6.
Open source ↗Management must prove the business can be rightsized so the smaller demand base no longer consumes cash at a pace that forces repeated external financing.HoldingMateriality: Medium
GAAP annual operating cash flow improved from negative $320.2 million in FY2022 to negative $107.8 million in FY2023 and negative $98.8 million in FY2024. If cash burn persists, equity value is transferred to creditors or new capital providers even if the brand survives.
Watch: Cost cuts impair innovation, sales support, or product quality before revenue stabilizes.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
GAAP annual operating cash flow improved from negative $320.2 million in FY2022 to negative $107.8 million in FY2023 and negative.
Open source ↗The balance-sheet repair must provide enough runway for the operating turnaround without handing most upside to creditors or new financing sources.HoldingMateriality: Medium
Total liabilities declined from $1.279 billion at FY2024 year-end to $615.7 million at FY2025 year-end. For shareholders, survival is not enough; the turnaround must happen with tolerable dilution and creditor claims.
Watch: Debt holders, suppliers, or financing partners require punitive terms before operating cash flow improves.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Total liabilities declined from $1.279 billion at FY2024 year-end to $615.7 million at FY2025 year-end.
Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence
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Original research
Beyond’s brand and product set must regain enough consumer repeat purchase to keep retail and foodservice partners from shrinking distribution further. If demand stabilizes, the company has a base to rebuild margins; if partners cut space, the turnaround loses its revenue foundation.
The product economics must shift from discounting and underabsorbed production costs to a price-cost equation that supports positive gross profit on the current sales base. Revenue that cannot carry gross profit is not valuable growth; this determines whether scale can ever translate into operating leverage.
Management must prove the business can be rightsized so the smaller demand base no longer consumes cash at a pace that forces repeated external financing. If cash burn persists, equity value is transferred to creditors or new capital providers even if the brand survives.
The balance-sheet repair must provide enough runway for the operating turnaround without handing most upside to creditors or new financing sources. For shareholders, survival is not enough; the turnaround must happen with tolerable dilution and creditor claims.
All standing thesis claims
Original report summary
the brand can re-earn consumer demand and shelf space while fixing unit economics before liquidity and dilution overwhelm owners.
Bull case and bear case
Bull case and bear case for Beyond Meat
Where the evidence on Beyond Meat disagrees: Mixed on the latest evidence (Oct 16, 2026). Of its 4 thesis points, 3 holding and 1 weakening.
Bull case: what the evidence supports
The product economics must shift from discounting and underabsorbed production costs to a price-cost equation that supports positive gross profit on the current sales base.
Management must prove the business can be rightsized so the smaller demand base no longer consumes cash at a pace that forces repeated external financing.
The balance-sheet repair must provide enough runway for the operating turnaround without handing most upside to creditors or new financing sources.
Bear case: what the evidence questions
Beyond’s brand and product set must regain enough consumer repeat purchase to keep retail and foodservice partners from shrinking distribution further.
Thesis-Break Engine
What has broken in Beyond Meat’s thesis
Each break OptimistFi flagged on Beyond Meat, dated — with what has historically followed the same kind of break across the market, not a forecast for Beyond Meat.
- CEO / officer changecondition set before this filing
Across all companies, this kind of break has happened 16,849 times before. Those stocks trailed comparable companies by a median of 2% over the next six months, and 38% of them trailed it by 10 points or more.
MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT
The numbers behind the thesis
What Changed
- MixedDirector or principal officer change.
Beyond Meat filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-10-01: Director or principal officer change. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedUnregistered sale of equity securities.
Beyond Meat filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-09-23: Unregistered sale of equity securities. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedOther material event.
Beyond Meat filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-09-22: Other material event. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
Risks / falsifiers
What could break the thesis
- Major grocery retailers reduce Beyond Meat shelf space because category velocity and repeat purchase remain weak.
- Conventional meat prices stay low enough that Beyond must discount to maintain velocity.
- Cost cuts impair innovation, sales support, or product quality before revenue stabilizes.
- Debt holders, suppliers, or financing partners require punitive terms before operating cash flow improves.
BYND news
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Financial statements
BYND income statement
Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.
BYND: quick answers
- Which well-known investors own BYND?
- 1 of the 37 well-known funds tracked here reported BYND shares in their latest 13F filing. By share of the fund's portfolio: Coatue Management (Philippe Laffont), 0.0%. Fund portfolios
BYND in well-known investors’ portfolios
1 of 37 funds reported BYND shares in their latest 13F filing. A 13F shows quarter-end positions and arrives up to 45 days later.
| Fund | Of its portfolio | Value | Change | Quarter |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Philippe LaffontCoatue Management | 0.00% | $225K | −12.7% | Q2 2026 |